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Over the past decade, outsourcing has emerged as an imperative for competitive success 
in modern organizations. Yet, the high failure rate of outsourcing initiatives suggests that 
despite the significant opportunities available through outsourcing, several organizations 
remain unprepared for the transformation that it brings. My dissertation, “Essays on the 
Organization and Value of Outsourcing Relationships,” identifies governance strategies 
that maximize the strategic value of outsourcing investments and estimates the size of 
governance effects by analyzing the contribution of efficient governance to an increase in 
shareholder value of the outsourcing firm. The first two essays, “An Empirical Analysis 
of the Impact of Information Capabilities Design on Business Process Outsourcing 
(BPO) Performance” and “An Empirical Analysis of the Contractual and Information 
Structures of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) Relationships,” focus on business 
process outsourcing (BPO), the fastest growing segment of the outsourcing market. In 
particular, the first essay emphasizes the information intensive nature of BPO to posit that 
v 
performance heterogeneity across BPO relationships is a function of the fit between the 
information requirements and information capabilities of the relationship. The design of 
information capabilities extends contract design that addresses incentive conflicts to 
include design of the information structure comprising relational processes and 
technologies that address cognitive conflict between the participant firms. The second 
essay demonstrates complementarities between the contractual and information structures 
to emphasize that their joint assessment is necessary to enhance the explanatory power of 
extant theories of organization. These results have important implications for how BPO 
relationships must be designed and managed to realize strategic value. The third essay in 
my dissertation, “Outsourcing Discount or Paradox? A Comparative Analysis of the 
Long-Term Abnormal Stock Returns and Operational Performance Gains across 
Outsourcing Contracts,” estimates the extent of this strategic value by assessing the long-
term abnormal stock returns to the hundred largest outsourcing initiatives implemented 
between 1996 and 2005. I find that transaction cost economizing outsourcing decisions 
yield significantly higher abnormal returns. The results imply the need to exercise caution 
in initiating outsourcing initiatives and emphasize that value chain scoping and 
management are important sources of comparative advantage in the modern firm.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, outsourcing has emerged as an imperative for competitive success 
in modern businesses. It is estimated that by 2008, outsourcing will constitute 58 percent 
of the average firm’s technology budget. Moreover, core business functions such as 
R&D, product development and marketing are being externalized across a wide spectrum 
of industries to achieve diverse strategic objectives that shape firms’ competitive 
positions. Despite this extended reach of outsourcing, several researchers and 
practitioners have highlighted the complexity and high failure rate of outsourcing1. In my 
dissertation, I draw on institutional economics and organizational theories to take a closer 
look at the performance implications of outsourcing and the factors that drive 
heterogeneity in outsourcing performance.  
The first two chapters in my dissertation focus on business process outsourcing 
(BPO) that is the fastest growing segment of the outsourcing market. As the information 
technology outsourcing (ITO) market matures, ITO is increasingly being bundled with 
BPO offerings and subsumed into a broader business process decision. According to 
Singh et al. (2007), the delivery of such converged ITO/ BPO services is expected to 
account for over 40 percent of the total deals by revenue by 2010. They emphasize that 
moving forward, an understanding of the issues unique to BPO management is essential 
for the IT organization. The academic literature in IS recognizes this trend: “as such the 
IS outsourcing phenomenon has moved beyond the boundaries of the IS function to 
                                                 
1
 70% of the respondents in a 2005 survey by Deloitte Consulting expressed significant dissatisfaction with 
their outsourcing projects. Similarly, a survey conducted by Bain Consulting found that although 82% of 
large firms in North America engage in BPO, almost half of the respondents say their outsourcing programs 
fall short of expectations. According to SAP INFO Solutions, four out of five BPO contracts inked today will 
be renegotiated within two years. Further, 20% of all such contracts will collapse (SMR Intelligence 2006). 
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include entire information technology (IT)-supported business processes…” (Hirschheim, 
Dibbern and Heinzi, 2008). 
The first chapter in my dissertation builds on the information processing view of 
the firm to propose that performance heterogeneity across BPO exchanges is a function 
of the fit between the information requirements (IR) and information capabilities (IC) of 
the exchange. The design of IC comprises both choice of the contract that addresses 
incentive conflict and the choice of relational processes and technologies that address 
cognitive conflict between the outsourcing firm and the service provider. I compare 
performance effects of the fit between IR and IC across dominant categories of BPO 
relationships to provide insights into the relative benefits of enacting such fit between the 
constructs. Empirical analysis of survey data on 128 active BPO relationships supports 
my hypotheses. The results have important implications for how BPO relationships must 
be designed and managed to realize strategic value. 
While the first chapter establishes the contractual and information structures of 
BPO relationships as important dimensions of BPO governance, the second chapter 
explores the interrelationships between these dimensions. I integrate perspectives in neo-
institutional economics and information processing to develop and test the theoretical 
argument that the extent of use of the information structure of the BPO relationship varies 
with the underlying contractual choice. I find that the performance effects of the 
information structure are stronger in time and materials BPO contracts, marked by low 
powered incentives, than in fixed price BPO contracts, marked by high powered 
incentives. Survey data on 134 BPO relationships provide empirical support for my 
hypotheses. The synergistic impact of incentives and information on BPO performance 
3 
emphasizes that their joint assessment is necessary to enhance the explanatory power of 
extant theories of organization.  
If heterogeneity in outsourcing performance is linked to the outsourcing decision 
and the financial ramifications are shown to be economically significant, it would imply 
the need to exercise caution in initiating outsourcing initiatives and emphasize that value 
chain scoping and management are important sources of comparative advantage in the 
modern firm. This is the motivation behind the third chapter of my dissertation. I assess 
the long-term abnormal returns to the hundred largest outsourcing initiatives 
implemented between 1996 and 2005. Relative to a size-and book-to-market matched 
sample of control firms in the industry, the mean three year buy-and-hold abnormal 
return for fixed price contracts is 17.5 percent (p<0.05) while that for relatively 
incomplete variable price contracts is -21.2 percent (p<0.10). However, after 
conditioning on the factors that drive the outsourcing and contract choices, I find that 
significantly lower returns to relatively incomplete variable price contracts are the 
outcome of an adverse selection process - fast business requirements, high specificity of 
relational investments, lack of prior cooperative association between participant firms, 
and lack of experience of the outsourcing firm that increase the likelihood of choice of a 
variable price contract also result in lower abnormal returns. The three year returns are 
consistent with changes in income efficiency of the outsourcing firm. My findings point 
to the benefits of transaction cost economizing, and emphasize that financial markets are 
slow to recognize the extent of such benefit.  
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Chapter 1 - An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Information Capabilities 
Design on Business Process Outsourcing Performance 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Business process outsourcing (BPO) refers to “the delegation of one, or more, 
information and communication technology intensive business processes to an external 
service provider” (Tornbohm and Andrault 2005). The role of IT in the outsourced 
process ranges from ‘automating’ process tasks to ‘infomating’ or delivering the right 
information to the right process worker at the right time. Prior research (e.g., Whitaker et 
al. 2006) argues that BPO has its origin in ITO. As the ITO market began to mature and 
providers acquired experience in the management of IT services for diverse business 
processes and knowledge of specific functional areas that built on the IT, organizations 
began to outsource the business processes enabled and supported by the IT services 
(Pfannenstein and Tsai 2004). Further, advances in the underlying IT, through reduction 
in the costs of coordination and control across firm boundaries (Hitt 1999), have rendered 
business capabilities much more portable so that even core processes like R&D, 
marketing and financial planning are moving outside the firm and changing the way 
firms’ value chain decisions shape their competitive position (Gottfredson et al. 2005). 
 BPO is the fastest growing segment of the outsourcing market and is rapidly 
emerging as an imperative for competitive success2. Yet, best practices have rarely 
emerged in the field (Tornbohm 2006), and a large number of firms cite significant 
                                                 
2
 According to IDC, the worldwide BPO market is expected to grow to $682.5 billion in 2008. Forecast 
growth rates for BPO are 10-15% per annum (in contrast to 7.1% for technology infrastructure and 
application outsourcing). 
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negative experiences with their BPO initiatives3. Further, there exists limited outsourcing 
research on the unique managerial challenges in BPO relationships, the performance 
implications of BPO or the drivers of such performance (Rouse and Corbitt 2006; 
Whitaker et al. 2006). Research on outsourcing performance is “heavily tied to 
information systems” (Dibbern et al. 2004) and has yet to apply the learning from ITO to 
emergent outsourcing forms such as BPO. 
Prior theoretical and empirical work on the management of ITO relationships has 
largely focused on the appropriation concerns that arise from behavioral uncertainty 
perceived by the user firm in its relationship with the service provider and contracting 
problems (Dibbern et al. 2004). These appropriation concerns are addressed through 
incentive alignment (Kern 1997; Willcocks and Kern 1998) or social exchange aspects of 
the relationship such as trust and its underlying normative behaviors that act as self-
enforcing safeguards (Marcolin and McLellan 1998; Grover et al. 1996)4. These studies 
largely draw on transaction cost economics, agency theory or social exchange theory to 
develop their arguments (Dibbern et al. 2004).  
The extant ITO literature provides a rich starting point to develop a model of BPO 
performance. However, an important limitation inherent to this body of research must be 
addressed to advance our understanding of BPO. Due to their focus on the uncertainty 
perceived by the user firm about its relationship with the provider, “nearly all of these 
                                                 
3
 70% of the respondents in a 2005 survey by Deloitte Consulting expressed significant dissatisfaction with 
their outsourcing projects. Similarly, a survey by Bain Consulting found that although 82% of large firms in 
North America engage in BPO, almost half of the respondents say their outsourcing programs fall short of 
expectations. According to SAP INFO Solutions, four out of five BPO contracts inked today will need to be 
renegotiated within two years. Further, 20% of all such contracts will collapse (SMR Intelligence 2006). 
 
4
 Dibbern et al. (2004) find that the emphasis on these relational aspects is often to the exclusion of the 
contract. This is likely because relationship theories that form the basis for some of these studies contend 
that formal contracts may signal distrust of the exchange partner, and by undermining trust, encourage, 
rather than discourage, opportunistic behavior (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Fehr and Gachter 2000). 
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studies (on ITO management and performance) take place at an overall firm level, 
abstracting from the IS level” (Dibbern et al. 2004) so that the specific nature of the 
outsourced IT receives little attention.  
Yet, the nature of the outsourced process requires attention in BPO. In an age of 
information intensive firms, products and services (Glazer 1999), business processes may 
be described as a series of interrelated information processing activities that exchange, 
manipulate or transform input information to create value. The amount and frequency of 
information processed by process workers varies significantly with process attributes 
such as analyzability (contrast tax management with customer experience management), 
dynamism (payroll processing versus product development), or interdependence with 
other organizational processes (new credit card issuance versus financial forecasting and 
planning). These attributes determine the responsiveness of a process to changes in the 
firm’s value chain and business context, and in turn, the rate of information change in the 
process that must be managed on an ongoing basis.  
Bounded rationality, in addition to limiting the user firm’s capacity to predict 
provider intent, also limits its ability to anticipate information changes in the outsourced 
task environment or formalize actions to respond to such change. The difference between 
adaptation problems engendered by relational and process uncertainty is understood in 
strategy and organization in terms of the difference between aligning interests 
(cooperation) and aligning actions (coordination) (Gulati et al. 2005; Heath and 
Staudenmayer 2000; Jacobides 2005)5. Attention to uncertainty and ensuing information 
                                                 
5
 These studies explain that problems of cooperation arise from incentive conflicts so that firms are not 
motivated to generate collectively beneficial outcomes. On the other hand, problems of coordination arise 
due to the lack of shared knowledge about the “decision rules that others are likely to use” (Gulati et al. 
2005) and mutual interdependencies. Thus, the latter have their origin in cognitive conflict. 
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needs that are unique to an outsourced process is critical in extending our body of 
understanding of ITO management to BPO6. 
 Our study addresses this issue by exploring the management and performance of 
BPO relationships through the lens of information processing. We conceptualize BPO 
relationships as information processing networks whose unique information requirements 
(IR) are determined by the nature of the outsourced process. At one end of the spectrum 
are ‘transactional BPO’ relationships involving relatively simple and modular processes 
characterized by low uncertainty and IR while at the other end are ‘transformational 
BPO’ relationships involving complex interdependent processes characterized by high 
uncertainty and IR. We build on research (Galbraith 1973; Tushman and Nadler 1978) 
in the tradition of the information processing view of the firm (IPV) to theorize that 
managerial effort in BPO is largely concerned with the design of information capabilities 
that manage uncertainty in the task environment7 and are idiosyncratic to the IR of the 
process. Consequently, we expect two theoretical outcomes. First, user firms will design 
information capabilities (IC) that fit or match the IR of the BPO relationship. Second, we 
expect significant performance gains from such effort. 
We test our hypotheses using a switching regression model that is estimated with 
survey data on 128 BPO relationships. Our results confirm that performance differences 
                                                 
6
 The limited attention to the outsourced task in ITO may be due to relatively lower levels of uncertainty in 
the task environment. Business processes must adapt to changes in the business environment, which may 
necessitate changes in the underlying IT applications and infrastructure. However, the underlying IT 
infrastructure and applications are largely influenced by fundamental changes in the technological 
environment. For instance, consider the outsourcing of an outbound marketing campaign of a bank in our 
sample, designed to promote a payment protection product. The key process outputs, customer leads and 
product information, were continually updated to reflect changing customer preferences, new competitor 
product info, and inputs from other business processes such as product development and yield analyses. 
On the other hand, the underlying technology - data mining and analytics applications, and enterprise 
integration tools - was marked by relatively little change through the process cycle. 
 
7
 Prior research on strategic alliances (Gulati et al.  1998) finds it difficult to distinguish between 
appropriation and coordination concerns of uncertainty. 
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across BPO relationships arise as a function of the fit between the IR and IC of the 
exchange. The result is robust to both transactional and transformational BPO initiatives.  
 Our research is an early attempt to empirically study the drivers of BPO 
performance. Several IS studies argue that “outsourcing research appears to be heavily 
tied to IS” (Dibbern et al. 2004) and that “the field (of BPO) appears somewhat neglected 
compared to ITO” (Borman 2006) with “little rigorous empirical work that examines 
(BPO) performance outcomes” (Whitaker et al. 2006). Yet, the study of BPO is salient to 
the IS field for three important reasons.  
First, emergent industry and academic research (Singh et al. 2007; Borman 2006,) 
suggests that with the growing maturity of the ITO market, ITO is increasingly being 
bundled with BPO offerings and subsumed into a broader business process decision. 
According to Singh et al. (2007), the delivery of such converged ITO/ BPO services is 
expected to account for over 40 percent of the total ITO deals by revenue by 2010. They 
emphasize that moving forward, an understanding of the issues unique to BPO 
management is essential for the IT organization.  
Second, as illustrated in our study, IT is integral to process execution and 
management in BPO – as an enabler, delivery or coordination mechanism, or even a 
driver for innovation. This is true of transactional processes such as administration or 
processing services, where IT performs simple automation or process updates, as well as 
transformational processes such as customer analytics or financial planning, where IT 
facilitates linkages with other processes and delivers the right information to the right 
process worker at the right time. Thus, we offer that the IS field is best positioned to 
leverage its understanding of ITO to analyze various aspects of BPO performance. This 
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argument is consistent with the view that evolving forms of outsourcing offer an “all-
encompassing opportunity to the entire IS field” to establish the latter as “the reference 
discipline for other fields” (Dibbern et al. 2004) that conduct their own investigations of 
outsourcing. As efficiency gains from BPO initiatives become increasingly driven by 
process automation and sophisticated delivery models rather than by labor arbitrage, we 
expect this linkage between IT and BPO to only become more pronounced. 
Most important, BPO is an example of how advances in technology are rendering 
business capabilities much more portable so that even core processes like R&D, 
marketing and financial planning are moving outside the firm and changing the way 
firms’ value chain decisions shape their competitive position. IS scholars (Agarwal et al. 
2004; Whinston et al. 2003) have opined that the future of the IS field depends on a 
significant number of researchers undertaking research on topics that represent the 
powerful transformational impact of IT. As BPO grows in its impact, we believe that 
research in this area has positive effects on the relevant nature of IS research. 
Our study also contributes to theories of inter-firm cooperation and coordination. 
We demonstrate the salience of the IPV to the inter-firm context; however, as IR of the 
relationship have to be managed without the structures and systems available in 
organizational hierarchies, we draw from prior research to identify structural, process and 
technological mechanisms that constitute the IC of the relationship. We also extend 
transaction cost analyses beyond considerations of incentive conflict. Our results 
emphasize that hierarchical control is just as important an element of IC of the BPO 
relationship that responds to the IR of the outsourced process as it is a contractual 
mechanism that responds to incentive conflict. 
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1.2 A Model of BPO Performance 
The key constructs in our theoretical model of BPO performance, IR and IC, map to the 
information processing view of the firm (IPV) (Galbraith 1973). The IPV describes IR as 
an important basis for explaining and predicting structures apposite for intra-
organizational coordination and adaptation. IR is a function of task uncertainty and the 
allied need to coordinate interdependent subtasks among organizational actors (Daft and 
Macintosh 1981; Tushman and Nadler 1978). Effective coordination within the firm is 
achieved through information exchange mechanisms that either decrease the IR of the 
firm or enhance its capacity to process such IR.  
The IPV provides the foundation for our expectation that BPO performance is 
shaped by the design of IC that provide the optimal capacity to process the IR of the BPO 
relationship. Thus, dissatisfaction in BPO likely stems from the lack of fit between 
homogeneity in IC design and heterogeneous BPO task and relational environments that 
shape the IR of the BPO relationship. Our theoretical model of BPO performance is 
outlined in Figure 1.1.  
1.2.1 IR of the BPO Relationship 
Information reduces uncertainty or changes an actor’s understanding of the world 
(Tushman and Nadler 1978). Given the difficulty in assessing the amount of change in 
organizational understanding, research in the information processing tradition largely 
defines the IR of a firm in terms of “the volume or quantity of data about organizational 
activities that is gathered and interpreted by organization participants” (Daft and 
Macintosh 1981) to address uncertainty in the task environment. Task uncertainty, in 
11 
turn, has its origin in task analyzability, variety and interdependence (Galbraith 1973; 
Daft and Lengel 1986; Tushman and Nadler 1978). 
In extending this view to the BPO context, we define the IR of the BPO 
relationship in terms of the amount of information that must be collected, processed and 
disseminated across firm boundaries to address uncertainty in the outsourced task 
environment. Such uncertainty, in turn, is a function of two attributes of the outsourced 
process – complexity and interdependence. Complexity of the outsourced process is 
defined in terms of low levels of analyzability and high levels of variety (Daft and 
Macintosh, 1981; Withey et al. 1983). An analyzable process consists of events that are 
“hard, measurable and determinant” (Daft and Weick 1984). When a process is 
analyzable, outcomes are well understood, and process administrators follow an 
objective, computational procedure to resolve problems (Daft and Macintosh 1981). 
Process variety is defined as the frequency of occurrence of process events that deviate 
from mean values of stability or uniformity of inputs/ outputs, requiring different work 
processes than is the norm for completion of process objectives (Perrow 1967; Van de 
Ven and Delbecq 1974; Pentland 2003).  
Low levels of analyzability imply that it is relatively difficult to establish rules, 
procedures and predetermined responses to potential problems during process execution 
and management. Fewer information cues require greater information processing to 
identify the type of information needed and the utility of that information for the 
outsourced process (Daft and Macintosh 1981), thereby increasing IR of the BPO 
relationship. Similarly, high levels of process variety result in greater levels of 
12 
information change in the outsourced task environment, including process exceptions and 
deviations, thereby increasing IR of the BPO relationship.  
 The interdependence between the outsourced process and the user firm’s value 
chain also increase the IR of the BPO relationship. This is because changes to 
interdependent functions or processes in the value chain can create unexpected and forced 
adaptations in the BPO task environment. The greater the interdependence, the more 
frequent are such adaptations in the BPO relationship and the greater are its IR (Daft and 
Lengel 1986). Further, the greater the interdependence between the outsourced process 
and the user firm’s value chain, the greater is the number of process owners and the wider 
is the extent of impact assessment, bargaining and reconciliation of disjunctive objectives 
among these owners (Hirschheim & Lacity 2000). Process interdependence also 
necessitates variety in coordination efforts required to transfer value back to the user 
firm, thereby increasing IR. When the outsourced process is relatively modular and can 
be analyzed, modified, and enhanced, independent of other organizational processes, the 
BPO relationship is characterized by greater stability and lower levels of IR. 
The relationships between process complexity, interdependence and IR of the 
BPO relationship are illustrated in Figure 1.2. 
Consonant with exploratory studies (Aron and Singh 2003; Aundhe 2003) and the 
above theoretical arguments, we suggest that it is useful to think of outsourced business 
processes along a continuum of IR, levels of which represent the amount of information 
that must be processed in the relationship to respond to complexity and interdependencies 
of the process. On one end, we have routine, modular business processes that are 
managed and executed relatively independent of information changes in the value chain. 
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Next along the continuum are processes that involve rule-based processing of information 
changes in the task environment. At yet another point along the continuum are processes 
that involve the design of information solutions and are less amenable to rule-based 
execution. These processes draw on and contribute critical information to the user firm’s 
value chain and in turn, require unstructured information intervention from the user firm. 
Finally, we have processes that are highly information intensive, and involve significant, 
often real-time, information support from the user firm during their execution.  
These different points on the continuum are illustrated in Figure 1.3 in the context 
of a credit card processing function. Functions like application form filling or other data 
entry are examples of modular information processing. Often, in such cases, information 
exchange between the firms is limited to batch transfer of process output. Customer 
interface functions like new credit card issuance access and record basic customer 
information, but the structured nature of the information allows much of the business 
logic to be implemented through rule-based information processing. On the other hand, 
unstructured informational functions like customer analytics involve access to multiple 
customer databases, the integration of these databases with data mining tools of the 
provider, and design of information solutions that link to multiple departments such as 
marketing and new product development. Expert information services such as the design 
or marketing of payment products are supported by information solutions such as 
customer analytics or financial analysis and often, real-time information linkages to 
directly deliver critical business outcomes. The relative complexity and interdependence 
of the above functions are mapped in Figure 1.4. As illustrated, the combination of 
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complexity and interdependence of the outsourced process determines the IR of the BPO 
relationship. 
1.2.2 IC of the BPO Relationship 
Each BPO relationship is embedded in a unique process context, and therefore, differs in 
its IR. The information processing view of the BPO relationship suggests that observed 
variations in BPO forms represent variations in strategies to increase participant firms’ 
ability to reduce IR, or increase their capacity to adapt to their inability to reduce IR, or 
decrease the performance required for continued viability (Galbraith 1973). Therefore, 
the IC design problem is to create mechanisms through which the user firm and the 
service provider can coordinate their behaviors and actions to address the IR of the BPO 
relationship and significantly enhance performance.  
Our conceptualization of IC design, in the context of BPO, encompasses design of 
both structural mechanisms that provide a framework for cooperation as well as process 
mechanisms that help enact this cooperative framework to coordinate actions between the 
firms. In particular, we identify three mutually reinforcing dimensions of IC of the BPO 
relationship – governance structure, relational processes and information technologies. 
While each of these dimensions has been investigated separately under different research 
paradigms, their joint impact has received little empirical attention. Each of these 
dimensions of IC is described below. 
1.2.2.1 Governance Structure  
Consistent with prior research (Pisano 1990; Gulati and Singh 1998; Bharadwaj 2005), 
we define the BPO governance structure as the contractual structure used to formalize the 
relationship, and distinguish among these contractual structures by the level of 
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hierarchical control present in the structure, contract length, and degree of formalization 
or relational emphasis on coordination.  
Some of the hierarchical elements (Stinchcombe 1985) embedded in vertical 
relationships include command structures and authority systems, incentive systems, 
standard operating procedures and control mechanisms, change management procedures 
and private ordering mechanisms that bypass courts and markets, and non-market pricing 
systems that enable accurate compensation for changes in project specifications. A 
governance structure is hierarchical to the extent that the hierarchical elements it 
incorporates “replicate the control and coordination features associated with 
organizations, which are considered to be at the hierarchical end of the spectrum” 
(Gulati and Singh 1998). Thus, BPO governance structures in decreasing order of 
hierarchical control range from equity sharing structures such as joint ventures to arm’s 
length contracts marked by competitive bidding that have few hierarchical controls. 
The IPV theorizes that the clear specification of boundaries on organizational 
decisions and activities through hierarchical control makes division of labor and 
interactions between interdependent organizational actors more predictable, thereby, 
providing superior coordination (Galbraith 1973, Chandler 1977).  This is pertinent to the 
inter-firm context of BPO as well. Hierarchical elements such as incentive systems and 
non-market pricing systems pertain to agency features and address exchange hazards. 
Yet, others such as command systems or operating procedures pertain to coordination 
features that preempt conflicts and limit the scope of dispute. These elements render 
interactions between the firms more predictable and allow joint decisions to be made 
more by mutually agreeable rules than by exception (Gulati and Singh 1998; Pondy 
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1977). Similarly, incentive alignment elements of hierarchical control aid coordination by 
reducing the need for continual bargaining and renegotiation. Thus, hierarchical controls 
reduce the number of information signals that impinge on participant firms, enabling a 
coordinated response to changes in the BPO task environment. 
The BPO governance structure also represents codification of the parties’ 
knowledge about efficient ways to collaborate. For instance, Mayer and Argyres (2004), 
in a qualitative study of contractual structures in the personal computer industry, find that 
the contract plays the important role of a knowledge repository that guides collaboration 
between the firms: 
“…it is well-established that transferring knowledge within or between organizations 
often requires at least some codification (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). By providing 
a means for this to occur, contracting processes could facilitate the development of such 
relational capital, in the form of a collaboration capability...” (Mayer and Argyres 2004) 
Long-term contracts that provide more opportunity for mutual adjustments in 
behavior and learning effects (Anand and Khanna 2000) particularly support the 
development of such collaboration capabilities. The expectation of continuity is also 
higher in long-term contracts, in which case, firms are better predisposed to information 
and knowledge sharing (Bensaou 1997). Thus, we expect that long-term BPO contracts 
will be characterized by relatively greater IC. On the other hand, greater levels of 
formalization in the BPO relationship that emphasize control versus coordination lower 
the IC of the relationship through signaling a lack of trust (Ghoshal and Moran 1996) and 
shifting the focus and resources of the provider from information exchange aimed at 
problem solving to defending actions and choices (Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003). 
While the function of the governance structure in mitigating exchange hazards is 
well developed in the transaction cost tradition, its abovementioned role in enabling 
17 
information coordination between the user firm and provider remains largely untested. In 
order to better understand this role, consider the example of a metals manufacturing firm 
in our sample that decided to outsource its human resources (HR) process in order to 
reduce total costs of process ownership. Prior association between the firms resulted in 
minimal appropriation concerns. However, the HR process was characterized by a set of 
complex and unique information flows that would not readily scale to standard service 
offerings. For example, the dominant category of the manufacturer’s workforce was 
stratified unionized labor. Payroll calculations and retirement timing and benefits differed 
for each stratum and incorporated important information on exposure to specific metals 
and associated hazardous materials. The labor agreements implicit in these calculations 
also needed to be frequently updated to reflect changing regulations and market 
conditions. Finally, the HR system provided important inputs to cost and pricing modules 
that generated the final price for quantities of different metals. All of the above created 
large volumes of information that needed to be processed and translated into decisions.  
Given the demanding IR of the task environment, the provider could not easily 
assume sole ownership of the HR process. Thus, the manufacturer took an equity stake in 
the provider, emphasizing that governance choice is motivated more by information 
processing concerns than by exchange hazards alone. This example also emphasizes that 
IC design in the BPO relationship comprises the design of appropriate levels of 
hierarchical control, formalization and continuity that address IR of the relationship.  
1.2.2.2 Relational Processes  
Economic sociologists (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997) focus on and relate exchange 
performance to the pattern of interactions between organizations rather than the formal 
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contract that links them. We argue that these interactions reflect how the contract is 
actually implemented in the BPO relationship to help participant firms adjust their 
cognitive frameworks and develop shared meanings of outsourced tasks and mutual 
interdependencies. Following prior research (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1992), we 
characterize relational interactions between the user firm and provider in terms of three 
dimensions – joint action, commitment and conflict resolution - along a “conflictual-
cooperative” continuum. Increasing values of these dimensions represent greater 
“embeddedness” or tighter relational processes that directly affect the extent to which 
information is freely exchanged between the firms (Benaou and Venkatraman 1992).  
Relational processes have an especially important influence on exchange 
performance in relational contexts such as BPO where information is tacit and localized 
(von Hippel 1994; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003). For example, the user firm has domain 
knowledge in the business context in which the process is situated while the service 
provider has expertise in executing and managing the outsourced process at reduced cost 
of ownership. These different information sets must be sequenced, scheduled and 
synchronized for efficient work design. Further, critical contextual information that 
cannot be easily transferred through the contract must be made available to the provider 
for effective process execution and management. In such case, greater levels of joint 
action, commitment and collaborative conflict resolution complement the adaptive limits 
of the contract to facilitate process execution and management.  
For example, when TiVo, a start-up manufacturer of the digital video recorder, 
outsourced customer support to develop distinctive capabilities at speed, it realized that 
success of the function was contingent on helping customers install, understand, and use 
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the new product in a way that specifically suited them. The provider’s extant scripts 
would not scale easily to the job. TiVo worked closely with its provider to jointly develop 
processes and training materials that enabled customer agents to “think like a TiVo” 
(Linder 2003) customer. The agents used the product in their own homes, observed open-
ended dialogues by TiVo employees and mastered investigative problem solving 
techniques needed to provide superior customer solutions. In turn, the agents provided 
rich descriptions of customer problems back to TiVo’s product development and 
marketing divisions. The example illustrates how relational processes enhance participant 
firms’ IC. They facilitate access to strategic information and tacit know-how, enable 
information credentialing in the context of the task environment, and are central to timely 
sharing of expertise and clarification of outputs that are integrated back into the user firm. 
The IPV posits that in order to develop a shared understanding of task 
management and execution, as the rate of information change in the task environment 
increases, the information network between organizational actors must shift from being 
mechanistic or autonomous to being organismic or highly connected (Galbraith 1973; 
Tushman and Nadler 1977). Thus, as IR of the BPO relationship increases, participant 
firms should promote a tightly linked social structure of relational interactions that 
increase the opportunity for feedback, synthesis of different points of view, and joint 
decision making to complement the limits to adaptability of the governance structure. 
1.2.2.3 Information Technology 
This study includes IT as an important dimension of IC that addresses the IR of the BPO 
relationship. Prior research on information processing (Mendelsona and Pillai 1998; 
Zuboff 1988) suggests that two primary functions of organizational technologies are 
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“automating” and “informating”. The former enables an increase in the amount of 
information processed per unit of time while the latter facilitates proper routing of 
available information among organizational actors within the firm and between firms to 
assist them in acting on it quickly and effectively.  
These functions of technology extend to the context of BPO as well. The use of IT 
in the outsourced business process helps participant firms sense and respond to important 
business changes that impact process execution and management. Further, the participant 
firms use a portfolio of technologies that address the IR of the relationship at various 
stages of the outsourcing life cycle. For instance, databases, expert systems and decision 
tools help in the effective representation of information flows in both the outsourced 
process and task environment and help commit to memory a variety of processes required 
for sound managerial decision making, thereby enhancing responsiveness (Glazer 1993). 
Enterprise integration tools help in the timely exchange and accurate interpretation of 
messages required for efficient work design. Performance and coordination systems help 
monitor and manage the performance of the provider and transfer value from the 
outsourced task environment back to the user firm. 
1.2.2.4 Interrelationship between governance structure, relational processes and 
technologies 
Emergent research (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Puranam and Gulati 2005) points to strong 
complementarities between contractual and relational structures in outsourcing 
relationships that foster cooperation. We posit that such complementarity also enhances 
coordination between participant firms. Hierarchical governance structures promote 
relational linkages between firms by formally specifying a long-term commitment to 
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exchange and promoting the expectation that firms will behave cooperatively. This 
complements the informal limits of relational processes and aligns incentives for 
investment in relational processes. Moreover, the design of complex hierarchical controls 
requires participant firms to mutually determine and commit to processes for dealing with 
potential contingencies, thereby, influencing the development of social relations.  
Similarly, the development and sustenance of relational processes enables the 
refinement of hierarchical controls to better reflect participant firms’ behavior and 
learning. Relational processes also complement the adaptive limits of complex 
governance structures to provide stability in the relationship. Hierarchical governance 
structures limit the flexibility of the firms to respond and adjust to unforeseen 
contingencies (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999; Williamson 1991) and do not guarantee a 
bilateral resolution of such contingencies. In this case, relational processes foster 
bilateralism and mutual adjustments in behavior required for adaptation.  
The improved information processing that IT affords is also synergistic with 
hierarchical governance structures and tight relational processes. Technology investments 
are necessary for the implementation of complex hierarchical controls and allied 
processes. Given this covariance and complementarity among the three dimensions of IC, 
we use an integrated representation of IC that underlies choice of contract, processes and 
technologies in the relationship. The second-order construct of IC of the BPO 
relationship is depicted in Figure 1.5.  
 
1.2.3 The Conceptualization of Fit between IR and IC 
The IPV posits that “organizations will be more effective when there is a match between 
information processing requirements facing the organization and information processing 
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capacity of the organization’s structure” (Tushman and Nadler 1978). In extending this 
view to the inter-firm context of BPO, we posit that the IC of the BPO relationship must 
“fit” the IR of the relationship to maximize performance. Venkatraman (1989) identifies 
six different types of fit – moderation, mediation, matching, gestalts, profile deviation 
and covariation – each with a distinct theoretical implication and requiring the use of 
specific analytical methods. A summary of the underlying functional relationship in each 
of perspectives is outlined in Table 1.1.  
The use of a specific perspective is contingent on the functional form of the 
relationship between the underlying variables and its anchoring to a particular criterion 
(such as effectiveness). In the current study, there are two key constructs of interest – IR 
and IC. Venkatraman (1989) notes that “in situations involving the fit between only two 
concepts, only moderation, mediation and matching could be considered”. Each of these 
conceptualizations is depicted in Figure 1.6. 
The moderation perspective is invoked when the theory specifies that the 
relationship between the predictor and outcome variable is different at different levels of 
the moderating variable. In our study, since IC responds to IR of the BPO relationship, 
the latter is assumed to be the moderator variable. However, the baseline effect of IC on 
performance, which forms the basis for development of a moderated effect, is not 
theorized in this study; rather, the level of IC interacts with the level of IR to impact 
performance. Thus, fit as moderation is not supported. Similarly, the mediation 
perspective specifies the existence of a significant intervention between antecedent and 
consequent variables. Whether or not a mediation effect has occurred is determined by 
the extent to which the direct effect changes when the mediator variable is added to the 
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model. This too is not applicable to our study since IR is not theorized as an antecedent of 
performance, thus, ruling out a comparison of its direct effect on performance with its 
mediated effect through IC. Thus, our study rules out fit as mediation or moderation.                  
Following this literature, we conceptualize “fit” as a theoretically defined “match” 
(Venkatraman 1989) between levels of IR and IC, and theorize about the effect of such fit 
between IR and IC on BPO performance. We posit that in order to be effective, BPO 
relationships, which differ in their IR, must be governed by aligned IC, reflected in the 
endogenous choice of structural, process and technological mechanisms in the 
relationship. Patterns of fit and misfit between IR and IC are shown in Figure 1.7.  
The IPV states that if the organization does not consciously match IR and IC, 
reduced performance standards will automatically ensue in configurations of misfit 
(Tushman and Nadler 1978). For example, in configuration C4 in Figure 1.7, IC of the 
BPO relationship are inadequate to deal with uncertainty in the outsourced task 
environment, and less than optimal amount of information will render decision making 
ineffective. On the other hand, the IC in configuration C1 is in excess of IR. Such 
redundancy is costly in terms of organizational resources, rendering management of the 
BPO relationship relatively inefficient. Consequently, performance of configurations C2 
and C3, where IC fit the IR of the relationship, is relatively higher than that of cells C1 
and C4, where there is a misfit. Thus, we posit: 
Hypothesis 1: The performance of BPO relationships that achieve a fit between IR and IC 
will be higher than that of incongruent relationships whose IC do not fit their IR. 
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1.2.4 Configurations of Fit – Transactional and Transformational BPO 
IR may be minimal or extensive, as shown in Figure 1.7, reflecting two dominant classes 
of BPO initiatives that we characterize as transactional BPO and transformational BPO 
respectively (Linder 2004). Given that IR of the relationship is determined by outsourced 
process complexity and interdependence, transactional and transformational BPO are 
characterized by variance in complexity and interdependence of the outsourced process. 
The difference between these two classes of BPO relationships is consistent with 
emergent research on BPO (Linder 2004; Gottfredson et al. 2005), which finds that 
outsourcing may involve externalizing non-core business processes to increase process 
efficiency as well as partnering with another company to achieve rapid and substantial 
improvement in enterprise-level performance.  
Low IR of transactional BPO exchanges reflect high levels of process 
analyzability, and low levels of process variety and interdependence. These process 
attributes enable a relatively complete specification of contingent obligations and 
establishment of property rights in an arm’s length contract with little hierarchical control 
(Baker 1990; Lee et al. 2004; Uzzi 1997). Such a contract generates relational rents by 
lowering transaction costs (Dyer and Singh 1998), is short-term, and largely emphasizes 
formalization or relational control over coordination. Ease in process transferability and 
ownership also renders the BPO relationship mechanistic with lower need for rich 
information exchange processes or technologies that emphasize extensive joint action and 
collaboration between firms. Thus, modular or limited information processing in 
transactional BPO relationships requires low levels of matching IC or structural, process 
and technological mechanisms, to coordinate activities between participant firms.  
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For instance, consider search engine AltaVista’s outsourcing of email customer 
support (Linder et al. 2003). The outsourced process was simple and involved limited 
interdependencies with the user firm’s value chain. Thus, it was amenable to modular 
information processing. Consequently, the matching IC involved minimal interaction 
with the provider to manage the relationship, with responsibilities, service levels, and 
pricing structures clearly spelled out in an arm’s length contract. Further, the relationship 
comprised limited investment in technological capabilities. AltaVista was able to 
disseminate training materials, monitor service, and negotiate new pricing structures via 
the web and telephone. This fit between IR and IC was instrumental in reducing costs of 
the support division by nearly 40 percent (Linder et al. 2003). 
On the other hand, the high IR of transformational BPO initiatives reflects high 
levels of process complexity and interdependencies. The governing contract is largely 
incomplete, rendering it difficult to establish property rights. Prior research (Anand and 
Khanna 2000) finds that such organizational tasks are more likely to be governed by 
hierarchical contracts since it is easier to monitor activities of partners in such 
arrangements than via arms length contracts. Hierarchical contracts generate relational 
rents by providing incentives for value creation (Dyer and Singh 1998), are long-term, 
and emphasize coordination over control. The nature of information processing inherent 
to these relationships is also enabled by tight relational linkages and sophisticated 
coordination technologies. This is similar to partnership-like arrangements described in 
the IT outsourcing literature (Kern 1997). The user firm and provider are committed to 
creating value, and engage in high levels of joint action, information exchange and 
knowledge transfer (Baker 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1992). Thus, high levels of 
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information processing in transformational BPO relationships require high levels of 
matching IC or structural, process and technological mechanisms, to coordinate activities 
between participant firms.  
For instance, Alcatel, Europe’s largest provider of business voice and data 
networking solutions, outsourced supply chain management for its European operations 
to UPS Logistics with the objective of boosting service levels while reducing costs 
(Cohen and Roussel 2004, UPS Supply Chain Solutions case study8). As a fourth-party 
logistics provider, UPS was the sole management interface between Alcatel and its third-
party logistics providers, and was responsible for diverse functions such as storage, 
inspection, testing and packing, inbound and outbound transportation, and fulfillment and 
customer delivery for a range of products. The management of the supply chain also 
involved interactions with Alcatel’s manufacturing, sourcing, sales, finance, and 
technology departments. We argue that such complexity and interdependence of the 
outsourced function results in high IR of the BPO relationship, thereby, necessitating 
investment in high levels of IC. A long-term partnership, marked by minimal control of 
the user firm over process execution enabled optimization of supply chain processes. 
Further, the two firms worked in close association to enhance service efficiency. For 
example, instead of producing to stock based on forecasts, the firms jointly designed 
processes that used demand frequency, volume, and item value, contingent on product 
category, to fulfill customer requests – configure to order applied to telephones, build to 
customer order applied to end-to-end systems, pick-to-order applied to high-volume 
printed circuit boards, and purchase to consumer order applied to high-value peripherals. 
UPS also worked with Alcatel to coordinate its own logistics organization’s resources 
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and information technologies with those of complementary service partners. Finally, 
integration of technological resources of the two firms was central to coordination of 
mutual interdependencies in process execution and management. In a recent press 
statement9, Alcatel stated that the outsourcing initiative has helped increase its inventory 
turnover rate by 75 percent and its productivity rates to a significant degree.    
The above examples demonstrate the difference between transformational and 
transactional BPO in terms of process attributes, IR, aligned IC and impact (Table 1.2).  
1.2.5 Comparative Analysis of BPO Performance across Configurations of Fit 
In this section, we examine performance differences between transactional and 
transformational BPO. Relative to transactional BPO, the outsourced process in 
transformational BPO is marked by greater interdependence with other processes in the 
user firm’s value chain. Consequently, the output of transformational BPO initiatives has 
a more pervasive impact in the user firm, often forming critical input to other business 
processes. Thus, in contrast to modular processes in transactional BPO that may 
independently contribute to performance, interdependent processes in transformational 
BPO enable creation of enterprise-level competences through firm wide integration of 
process output, thereby directly impacting competitiveness.  
This difference between the impact of transactional and transformational BPO 
may also be understood in terms of the difference in development of two key 
competences of firms – “component competence” or the expertise in localized activities 
and “architectural competence” or the ability of a firm to integrate competencies to 
develop new ones (Henderson and Cockburn 1994). Aligned IC in transformational BPO, 
through coordinated execution of the outsourced process and deployment of process 
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output across the organization, likely facilitates development of architectural 
competences in the user firm. However, the main function of aligned IC in transactional 
BPO is to transfer localized process expertise and contextual knowledge to the provider 
who manages the process relatively independently. This likely develops component 
competences in the user firm. Prior research (Henderson and Cockburn 1994) finds that 
architectural competencies explain a significant portion of the variance in productivity 
across firms since they facilitate development of new competences.  
The outsourced process in transformational BPO is also marked by relatively 
greater levels of complexity, including lower analyzability and higher variety. This, in 
turn, renders it more difficult and/or costly to ex ante specify contingencies that arise in 
process management. Prior research (Khanna and Anand 2000) finds that the complexity 
of contingencies facing inter-firm alliances positively influences the extent of learning of 
participant firms. They argue that such learning, which stems from anticipating and 
effectively responding to unspecified contingencies, is an important source of alliance 
value. Thus, we expect transformational BPO relationships with stronger learning effects 
will be characterized by greater performance than transactional BPO initiatives with 
weaker learning effects. The above arguments suggest that: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive impact of fit on exchange performance is relatively higher in 
the case of transformational BPO arrangements (marked by high IR) than in the case of 
transactional BPO arrangements (marked by low IR). 
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1.3 Empirical Analysis 
1.3.1. Data Collection  
The data for this study were obtained through a survey of senior executives responsible 
for the management and review of outsourced business processes. A structured 
questionnaire was developed based on comprehensive reviews of the literature and initial 
interviews with 20 BPO experts10. These exploratory interviews were conducted with the 
underlying objective of assessing applicability of the information processing model to 
inter-firm BPO relationships, assessing the validity of distinguishing characteristics of 
our conceptual model, validating logical linkages between the constructs, and obtaining 
more clarity of perspective on desirable sample characteristics. They also influenced 
questionnaire design and component items, especially those that were being adapted to 
the BPO context. Consequent to these exploratory interviews, we developed a structured 
questionnaire that was pre-tested with a total of 30 medium to large organizations, market 
research firms, and academicians. The instrument was tested for clarity of content, scope 
and purpose (or content validity). A seven point Likert scale was used for most questions; 
however, some questions involved binary choices.  
The desired sample included small to large organizations across diverse industries 
that had outsourced one or more business processes. Our list of respondents came from 
several active compilations of outsourcing firms, industry association referrals and 
outsourcing advisory referrals. A technique deployed in related research on ITO in 
surveying executives is “to define populations and response rates based on those who will 
pre-commit to respond” (Poppo and Zenger 2002). The normative response rates based 
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 The subject experts comprised directors of strategic outsourcing practices in Fortune 100 firms (in 
financial services, healthcare, retail, and high-tech), outsourcing advisory consultants, leading service 
providers, and academicians. 
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on pre-committed samples are as high as 40 percent (Anderson and Narus 1990). Six 
hundred pre-committed surveys were mailed, with follow-up letters five weeks later. We 
received a total of 145 valid responses of which 128 were complete in all respects. This 
response rate of approximately 24% was slightly lower than expected, and was likely due 
to the lengthy and extensive nature of the questionnaire. However, it is consistent with 
the rate found in similar survey research in IS (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Pavlou et al. 
2007). The final sample was representative of a range of outsourcing objectives for which 
there was sufficient variance in exchange and task attributes. 
All respondents were assured that their responses would remain confidential and 
that results would be reported only in aggregate, thereby addressing privacy concerns and 
minimizing potential bias in self-reported data. We also distributed the questions 
measuring each construct across the survey to minimize response bias. To test for 
potential response bias, we compared the firm size in the sample to the larger population. 
The sample and population did not appear to differ in terms of firm size. We also 
compared questionnaires turned in early with questionnaires turned in later along a 
number of variables – firm size, industry, respondent position, exchange attributes and 
service satisfaction – to check for non-response bias (Armstrong and Overton 1970; 
Poppo and Zenger 2002). This procedure assumes that late respondents share similar 
attributes and biases with non-respondents. No significant differences were found 
between early and late respondents. We also checked for the presence of common-
method bias through Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). All of the 
variables in our study were simultaneously subject to an exploratory factor analysis, and 
the results of the unrotated factor solution were examined. The absence of a single factor 
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that explained a significant amount of variance in the data suggested that common 
method bias did not likely impact survey responses. 
Finally, a section of the raw data was also randomly subject to independent cross 
validation exercises. For a random sample of 25 firms, we requested the respondent firm 
to identify the vendor for the outsourced process for the purpose of a brief interview. 10 
firms obliged, and we interviewed the vendors for the outsourced process to obtain 
relevant process information. The two information sets in the user firm-provider dyad 
were mutually consistent.  
 
1.3.2 Measures 
1.3.2.1 Exchange Performance  
Our use of service satisfaction as a key performance metric is consistent with prior 
measures of outsourcing performance found in the information systems literature (e.g., 
Grover et al. 1996; Saunder et al. 1997; Marcolin and McLellan 1998; Lee and Kim 
1999). Satisfaction is a proxy for perceived effectiveness in working partnerships like 
BPO (Barber and Venkatraman 1986; Poppo and Zenger 2002). It is also a significant 
determinant of future actions, including repeat business, positive word-of-mouth, and 
loyalty (Barber and Venkatraman 1986). Its use as a performance metric is also supported 
by the argument that satisfaction is driven by the realization of pre-established 
performance expectations (Dibbern et al. 2004): high levels of satisfaction represent 
realized performance expectations. However, since performance goals often relate to the 
overall cost and quality of service, prior research (Lee and Kim 1999; Poppo and Zenger 
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2002) has largely emphasized satisfaction with service quality, where measures of the 
latter are based on the SERVQUAL instrument (Parasuraman et al. 1988).  
In this study, we measure the user firm’s level of satisfaction with four 
dimensions of service - reliability, responsiveness, systematization and innovation 
(Sureshchandar et al. 2002). Reliability refers to the ability to perform contracted services 
dependably and accurately. Responsiveness reflects willingness to help customers and 
provide prompt service. Systematization refers to the processes, procedures, systems and 
technology that make a service a seamless one. Innovation refers to the ability to leverage 
process knowledge to deliver a range of process enhancements that go beyond 
performance expectations of the user firm and contracted service level agreements. 
Measures of these four dimensions are adapted from Sureshchandar et al. (2002). Our 
measure of innovation is also consistent with the literature on service innovation and 
delight (Hipp and Grupp 2005; Oliver et al. 1997). The use of these four dimensions of 
satisfaction is consistent with recent research, which finds that there is a need to study 
performance outcomes in BPO “beyond the traditional outcomes of quality and cost” 
(Whitaker et al. 2003). We measure satisfaction on a 7 point scale where ‘1’ represents 
‘highly dissatisfied’ and ‘7’ represents ‘highly satisfied’. 
1.3.2.2 Explanatory Variables  
In order to perform a comparative analysis of performance across the identified 
categories of BPO relationships, we define the variable IC to be equal to one for cases 
where a firm employs high levels of IC, and equal to zero for cases where a firm uses low 
levels of IC. We define the threshold value for high IC as the median value of 411. To 
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estimate whether the choice of IC is aligned with the IR of the BPO relationship, we use 
the following probit model to estimate the choice of IC for a given BPO relationship: 
)()4Pr()1Pr( iii XICY β ′Φ=>==    (1) 
Here, Yi represents the capabilities choice – high or low – for BPO relationship i, Xi is a 
vector of determinants of governance choice, including IR and other control variables, β 
is the vector of coefficients of these determinants and Φ(.) is the standard normal CDF. 
The primary argument posited in this study is that BPO performance is contingent 
on the degree to which the IC of the BPO relationship are aligned with the IR of the BPO 
relationship. To test this proposition, we develop a measure of IC Misfit which captures 
the probability that relatively higher IC are appropriate in BPO relationships with low IR 
and that relatively lower IC are appropriate for BPO relationships marked by high IR 
respectively (Leiblein et al. 2002). We estimate the misfit in choice of IC as the absolute 
difference between the observed and predicted value of IC from the probit estimation. 
Therefore, IC Misfit is equal to )(1 iXβ ′Φ− , when IC is equal to one (for high IC) and as 
)( iXβ ′Φ  when IC is equal to zero.  
 Measures of dimensions of IC, including governance structure, relational 
processes and technologies are adapted from prior research. The governance structure is 
identified by the degree of hierarchical control (Gulati and Singh 1999), the length of the 
relationship, and the degree of formalization or relational emphasis on control versus 
coordination (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995; Tushman and Nadler 1978). Relational 
processes are identified by the levels of commitment (Gardner and Cooper 1988), extent 
of joint action (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995; Heide and John 1990, 1992), and 
                                                                                                                                                 
frequency of each value along the IC continuum in the IC clusters as well as multiple comparison tests 
support the threshold value for high IC as the median response value of 4. 
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(collaborative versus adversarial) conflict resolution (Linder 2003; Bensaou and 
Venkatraman 1995). These mechanisms “directly affect the extent to which information is 
freely exchanged” (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995) in the relationship. The relational 
technologies are measured by the scope and intensity of use of IT in the outsourced 
process, and sophistication of coordination systems (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995). 
To measure IR, we draw upon on Keller’s (1994) measurement of information 
processing by project groups. Two items measure the amounts of information 
communicated within the user firm and with the service provider. Two other items ask 
about the use of external agencies such as law firms, consulting firms, etc. and the 
different stages of the outsourcing process in which these agencies were used (for 
example, contract negotiation, vendor evaluation, etc.). The observed IR was regressed 
on process complexity and interdependence to obtain predicted values of IR. All 
measures of key constructs are detailed in Table 1.3. Measurement items were tested for 
content validity through discussions with outsourcing practitioners. Reliability of all 
scales used were satisfactory with Cronbach alpha values greater than 0.70. 
1.3.3.3 Control Variables  
Our performance models for both high and low IC also include a series of controls for 
firm size, firm tenure, mutual trust and environmental dynamism. Mutual trust and 
environmental dynamism control for uncertainty in the BPO relationship and allied 
exchange hazards posited in the institutional economics literature. All measures of 
controls are adapted from prior literature. We measure firm size as the firm’s average 
domestic sales during the period 2000 – 2003. Firm tenure is measured by the number of 
years elapsed since the firm’s founding, mutual trust is measured by whether the user 
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firm and service provider had a history of prior cooperative association, and 
environmental dynamism is measured by the rate of change in product/ service 
technologies, innovations, and customers’ demands/buying habits in the user firm’s 
industry. We also control for the firm’s experience in managing outsourcing 
relationships, measured by the number of active outsourcing relationships in the firm 
other than the focal BPO initiative. 
 
1.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.4 reports the summary statistics and pair-wise correlations between the variables 
used in our analysis. Significant correlations between measures of service satisfaction, 
the use of high IC and a number of the control variables indicate the need for multivariate 
analyses to assess the impact of each variable on service satisfaction. 
 
1.3.5 Data Analysis 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we use a structural model to provide 
preliminary evidence of fit between IR and IC. The analysis uses scores from the 
regression of observed IR on process complexity and interdependence. The structural 
model also validates an integrative latent representation of IC, and yields factor scores for 
IC. All constructs are tested for convergent and discriminant validity. We test the former 
by checking the critical ratios of each factor and the latter by comparing construct 
variance extracted with squared correlations among constructs (Segars and Grover 1998).  
 The next stage involves analyzing the determinants of governance choice and the 
impact of such choice on dimensions of satisfaction. Venkatraman (1989) suggests that in 
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order to test fit as a theoretical match between two variables, the residuals from the 
regression of one variable (in this case, IC) on the other (in this case, IR) must be related 
to the criterion variable (in this case, performance). Consistent with this view, we analyze 
the fit between IR and IC by employing a two stage regression model (Heckman 1978, 
1979; Lee et al. 1980; Smith 1980). We first estimate a first stage probit model of IC 
choice that represents the selection equation (Equation 1). The absolute values of the 
residuals from this first stage model are subsequently incorporated in second stage OLS 
regressions of performance. In both stages of the analysis, we use standard z-scores for 
all variables to account for measurement differences.  
Our two stage regression model also enhances the validity of the residual analysis 
by correcting for endogeneity of IC choice. Firms self-select the observed IC based on 
their own analyses of performance outcomes. The failure to correct for unobserved firm 
and transactional factors that simultaneously influence IC choice and performance 
produces biased, inconsistent estimates (Leiblein 2002; Heckman 1978). To account for 
possibly endogenous IC choices, we construct the inverse Mills ratio, λji using the 
predicted probabilities from the probit model. This ratio is then included as a control 
variable in the second-stage performance models. Second-stage models, which 
incorporate the self-selection correction, provide consistent, unbiased estimates. 
 
1.3.6 Results 
1.3.6.1 Structural Modeling 
The adjusted R-Square for the regression of observed IR on complexity and 
interdependence of the outsourced process is 0.40. Regression weights for both variables 
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are significant at the one percent level. The correlation between predicted and observed 
IR is nearly 0.66, indicating good fit. Further, all results reported below are robust to the 
use of both observed and predicted IR. 
Tables 5 and 6 provide reliability estimates for the IC construct. IC is 
conceptualized as a second-order construct comprising three complementary dimensions 
– governance structure, relational processes and information technologies. Correlations 
among these dimensions are significant but below the limit of 0.90 (Bagozzi et al. 1991). 
Hence, a second-order factor model comprising an integrative latent representation of IC 
is useful in explaining such correlations (Segars and Grover 1998). Table 1.5 details the 
factor loadings for the second-order IC construct while Table 1.6 details the factor 
loadings for the first-order dimensions of IC. All factor loadings are significant and of 
high magnitude. We find a significant positive correlation between IR and IC. The 
Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.58 is significant at the 1 percent level, providing 
preliminary evidence of fit. 
1.3.6.2 First-stage Governance Choice Estimates 
Table 1.7 presents the results from two potential governance choice models. Model I 
presents a baseline case comprising controls while Model II introduces IR as an 
explanatory variable. The results for the controls are largely aligned with expectations 
and results published in the literature. The significantly positive coefficient of firm size is 
consistent with research findings that larger firms often have “superior financial and 
human resource endowments” (Leiblein et al. 2002) required to invest in high IC. The 
significant positive coefficient of environmental uncertainty is also consistent with the 
findings of prior research which suggests that adaptation to business disturbances 
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requires extensive coordination and negotiation of terms of the BPO relationship, 
necessitating investment in high levels of IC. The coefficient for outsourcing experience, 
although significant in Model I, turns insignificant in the final model, suggesting that 
rather than having an independent effect, it picks up some of the effect of IR on IC 
choice. Firm tenure is insignificant in both models, and is consistent with observations 
from practice (Linder 2003) that a large number of start-up firms have leveraged BPO 
and worked in close association with their providers to launch their businesses and 
develop important capabilities rapidly. 
The significant coefficient of IR in Model II emphasizes its importance in 
uniquely influencing firms’ choice of IC for our sampled BPO arrangements. The 
probability of investing in high levels of IC increases with the IR of the BPO relationship, 
providing initial support of Hypothesis 1. Given the results of the log likelihood ratio 
tests and the pseudo-R square estimates presented at the bottom of Table 1.7, the 
estimates from Model II are used to formulate the inverse Mills ratio for the second-stage 
performance models.  
1.3.6.3 Second-stage Performance Models 
Tables 8 - 11 provide the results of our performance models – satisfaction with service 
reliability, responsiveness, systematization and innovation respectively. In each table, 
Model I provides a baseline specification that includes controls and IC alone. A 
comparison with Model II, which adds the correction for self-selection and IC misfit, 
illustrates the impact of these two variables on performance. While Model II assumes the 
impact of the controls and self-selection to be equivalent across both low and high IC, 
Model III separately estimates models for the two IC choices while correcting for self-
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selection. F-tests for all models across the four measures of performance reject the 
hypothesis that the predictors are jointly insignificant (p<0.001).  
Potential multicollinearity problems were investigated in all models by examining  
variance inflation factors (VIFs) and condition indices for the predictor variables. Near 
multicollinearity is a problem if VIF > 10 (Neter et al. 1996; Hayter 1996) or the 
maximum condition index (CI) for the model > 30 (Myers 1990). An analysis of these 
measures suggested that the coefficients in Model III for all the measures of performance 
were biased by near multicollinearity. The VIF for misfit and lambda were greater than 
10. The maximum CI for the model was also greater than 30 and the variance proportions 
associated with the index suggested that the dependencies involved variables lambda and 
misfit. We used the residual regression method (Chung and Charoenwong 1998; Ciscel 
and Carroll 1980) to handle multicollinearity and spurious correlations. We regressed 
lambda on misfit and calculated the residual value for lambda which is the observed 
value minus the predicted value for lambda. This residual value was used in the final 
regression in Model III for high and low IC. 
1.3.6.4 Second stage Satisfaction with Service Reliability Estimates 
Table 1.8 reports results from OLS models in which the dependent variable is the 
satisfaction of the user firm with service reliability. Examining the coefficient of IC 
Misfit in Model II, we conclude that Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. The negative 
coefficient of IC Misfit in both specifications in Model III demonstrates that this result is 
robust to the type of BPO initiative. We test Hypothesis 2 by examining the coefficient of 
IC in Models I and II. After treating IC choices as endogenous, we do not find support for 
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Hypothesis 2 for satisfaction with service reliability. This implies that satisfaction levels 
with service reliability are similar across both classes of BPO relationships.  
 Results for the control variables suggest that while outsourcing experience, in 
general, influences satisfaction with service reliability in transactional BPO, prior 
association with the focal service provider, in particular, positively impacts satisfaction in 
transformational BPO relationships. This implies that the user firm can apply learning 
from other outsourcing initiatives to enhance service reliability in transactional BPO 
more easily than in transformational BPO. In the case of the latter, specific experience in 
interacting with the provider enables better management of the interface between the 
firms. Older firms are more likely to house mature processes that are easily transferable 
and lend themselves to autonomous functioning. This explains the positive impact of 
tenure on satisfaction in transactional BPO. Environmental uncertainty negatively 
impacts satisfaction in transformational BPO. Transactional BPO contracts have a 
relatively more complete specification of contingent tasks and responsibilities and are 
thus, not significantly influenced by environmental uncertainty. 
1.3.6.5 Second stage Satisfaction with Service Responsiveness Estimates 
Table 1.9 provides the results of satisfaction with service responsiveness. As in the case 
of service reliability, the coefficient for IC misfit is negative and significant, providing 
strong support for Hypothesis 1. Further, this result is robust to the type of BPO initiative. 
The coefficient of IC misfit is negative and significant in both specifications in Model III. 
Thus, excessive hierarchical control associated with overinvestment in IC impedes value 
creation as much as lack of adequate coordination capabilities associated with 
underinvestment in IC. 
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However, in contrast to the results for satisfaction with reliability, we find that 
after controlling for endogeneity, the coefficient for IC in Model II is positive and 
significant. This implies that BPO relationships with high IC exhibit relatively superior 
satisfaction with the provider’s response to service requests and feedback. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported.  
 As in the case of satisfaction with service reliability, satisfaction with 
responsiveness is positively influenced by firm tenure in transactional BPO initiatives 
and negatively by environmental uncertainty in transformational BPO relationships. 
Outsourcing experience positively impacts satisfaction in transformational BPO. This 
suggests that the development of response and feedback mechanisms in prior outsourcing 
projects and the learning inherent to such development enhance responsiveness of the 
provider in the focal BPO relationship. 
1.3.6.6 Second stage Satisfaction with Systematization Estimates 
Table 1.10 provides results for second stage models of satisfaction with service 
systematization. As in the case of the other satisfaction models, the coefficient for misfit 
is negative and significant in Models II and IV. The results strongly support Hypothesis 1 
– deviation from the optimal choice of IC as predicted by IR has an adverse effect on 
systematization. After controlling for endogeneity, we also find support for Hypothesis 2 
– perceived satisfaction with the procedures and technologies that render the service 
seamless is higher for transformational BPO with high IC. Thus, the capability of service 
systems to communicate contingencies and contingent actions and responsibilities is 
enhanced by high IC in transformational BPO, resulting in relatively higher levels of 
perceived satisfaction. 
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 Prior association has a significant positive influence on perceived satisfaction 
levels in both transformational and transactional BPO. This is consistent with prior 
research (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) which finds that the social structure of prior 
interactions between firms enhances their competence in transacting with each other, 
including establishment of appropriate rules, routines and procedures to manage the 
interface between them. This is true across both categories of BPO relationships.  
1.3.6.7 Second stage Satisfaction with Service Innovation Estimates 
Table 1.11 provides results for second stage models of satisfaction with service 
innovation. The coefficient of IC Misfit is negative and significant in Models II and III. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported and is robust to both specifications of BPO. 
After controlling for endogeneity of IC, we find that transformational BPO has higher 
levels of satisfaction, supporting Hypothesis 2. Thus, the ability of the provider to 
effectively utilize feedback from the user firm to deliver process capabilities and 
innovations that create value beyond contracted levels is likely greater in 
transformational BPO relationships with high IC. 
 Firm tenure positively influences satisfaction in transactional BPO. This is likely 
because process innovations in this class of BPO relationships largely pertain to 
significant operational improvements or operational excellence in existing modes of 
operation but without a fundamental change in how that work gets accomplished. Higher 
levels of process maturity in older firms make it easier to define process work standards, 
establish process metrics and measure variance against these metrics, and identify key 
areas where improvements are required and have maximal impact. Prior association 
positively impacts satisfaction in transformational BPO. This is likely because the 
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provider has a greater awareness of the user firm’s business needs and is thus, better 
positioned to deliver process innovations that are best aligned with these needs. 
Environmental uncertainty negatively impacts satisfaction in transformational BPO. The 
summary of results and support for our hypotheses is outlined in Table 1.12. 
 
1.4 Discussion of Results 
Over the past few years, BPO has gained significant momentum as organizations 
increasingly outsource broader business processes – particularly information intensive 
ones such as human resources, finance, accounting, and customer care – to achieve 
diverse strategic objectives. Consequently, our objective in this study has been to broaden 
the conceptualization of outsourcing beyond a simple contractual transaction that reduces 
transaction costs. We extended the basis of design and management of the BPO 
relationship from potential exchange hazards to IR of the BPO relationship and the form 
of relational design from the governance structure that addresses exchange hazards to IC 
of the exchange that address the IR of the relationship. We examine IR of the BPO 
relationship as predicted by the complexity and interdependencies of the outsourced 
process and IC of the BPO relationship as comprising the underlying governance 
structure, relational processes and information technologies. 
We find that analyzability, variety and interdependence of the outsourced process 
explain significant variance in the observed IR of the BPO relationship. It is likely that 
the user firm will process information to address additional factors including 
appropriation concerns resulting from behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Further, 
in the model of IC choice, the insignificance of the user firm’s outsourcing experience, 
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once we introduced the measure for IR, suggests that evolving outsourcing experience 
may capture the effects of underlying IR. A likely explanation is that IR decreases with 
increasing outsourcing experience. However, it is difficult to distinguish between these 
different influences empirically in a cross sectional study. While it may be difficult to 
isolate the observed IR attributable to each of these factors, in considering the IR of the 
BPO relationship predicted by outsourced process attributes, we empirically demonstrate 
the distinct role of the information intensiveness of the outsourced process in guiding the 
choice of IC. This enables us to separate the impact of IR, as theorized by the IPV, from 
that of constructs of mutual trust and environmental uncertainty, theorized in the 
institutional economics literature.  
The results of the structural model confirm that differences in IC across BPO 
relationships are manifest in differences in the underlying governance structure, relational 
processes and technologies. Further, the finding of positive covariance between these 
dimensions, although not direct evidence of complementarity, has important implications 
for future research in this area. Governance structures and relational processes in inter-
organizational exchanges have long been treated as competing theoretical constructs with 
little conceptual or empirical insights into how they relate to each other. However, 
emergent research (Gulati and Nickerson 2005; Poppo and Zenger 2002) has begun to 
consider possible complementarities between these constructs and their joint impact on 
exchange performance. Our support for an integrated latent representation of governance 
structure and relational processes contributes to this literature and suggests that moving 
forward, the joint assessment of these constructs is necessary to enhance the explanatory 
power of extant theories of organization. The conceptualization of IC also extends 
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transaction cost analyses beyond traditional considerations of incentive conflict. It 
suggests that governance structures differ not only in their ability to align incentives 
between the user firm and the service provider but also in their ability to provide a 
framework for coordination and information processing across firm boundaries. 
The significant influence of IR on IC choice lends credence to our configurations 
of transactional and transformational BPO relationships arranged in increasing order of 
IC. Our finding that the choice between low or high IC levels is influenced significantly 
by the IR of the BPO relationship (which is determined by process complexity and 
interdependence) enhances our claim that the two classes of BPO relationships should 
incorporate distinctive types of IC. This distinction is robust and theoretically relevant to 
future research on BPO and may also be extended in useful ways. For instance, future 
studies can examine the extent to which there may be differences among the three 
dimensions – governance structure, relational processes and technologies – within each of 
these categories. We believe that clusters of these three attributes will help in the 
development of richer typologies of BPO relationships. 
The integrated representation of IC for transformational BPO initiatives also 
provides a conceptualization of the partnership construct for use in future research. 
Dibbern et al. (2004), in their review of the IS outsourcing literature, note that 
outsourcing partnerships are variously defined as the sharing of risks and rewards 
(Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994), the development of long-term relationships (Klepper 
1995) and in terms of attributes of user firm-service provider interactions such as trust 
and communication (Grover et al. 1996). Further, these conceptualizations of outsourcing 
partnerships do not examine the underlying contractual structure, suggesting that their 
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results must be interpreted cautiously (Dibbern et al. 2004; Grover et al. 1996). For 
example, Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) find that outsourcing relationships, often 
portrayed as a “strategic partnership” in the literature, are at odds with the actual 
outsourcing contract. The support for an integrated representation of IC in 
transformational BPO emphasizes that outsourcing partnerships comprise, not only tight 
relational processes, but also complementary hierarchical contracts and sophisticated 
coordination technologies. 
An important finding in this study is that performance differences across BPO 
relationships arise as a function of the fit (or lack of) between the IR and IC of the 
relationship. This result is robust to both classes of BPO relationships – transactional and 
transformational – and to all measures of performance – satisfaction with (i) service 
reliability, (ii) responsiveness, (iii) innovation, and (iv) systematization. This suggests 
that absent a holistic strategy for value capture that pays close attention to the unique 
nature of the outsourced task environment, BPO initiatives can create a significant dent in 
firm competitiveness. In the case of transactional BPO, misfit might result in excessive 
resource utilization and bureaucracies that impede effective process execution and value. 
In transformational BPO, the relationship might lack critical coordination capabilities 
required to create and transfer value.  
Further, emergent research (Rouse and Corbitt 2006) suggests that the divestiture 
of important skills and expertise results in the path out of the outsourced state being far 
slower and more expensive than the path into the outsourced state, a systemic property of 
outsourcing known as hysteresis. Our results do not account for these potential 
organizational, staffing and financial costs of “backsourcing”, or bringing the outsourced 
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process back in-house, which may be significantly higher than losses in reliability, 
responsiveness, systematization and innovation.  
Our finding for the adverse influence of misfit on performance helps resolve 
conflicting findings in the literature (Dibbern et al. 2004) regarding the impact of 
partnerships on exchange performance. For instance, Grover et al. (1996) conclude that 
the establishment of elements of partnership such as trust and communication are 
important determinants of outsourcing success. However, Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) 
find that viewing a relationship as a partnership can be dangerous because it may lead to 
a loose contract, in part because the client thinks of the outsourcing vendor as a partner 
when in fact it is not, thereby, engendering appropriation concerns. Similarly, Marcolin 
and McLellan (1998) find that “buyer-seller” relationships achieved greater satisfaction 
than “strategic partnerships” through more control and certainty in their relationships, and 
were better in avoiding conflict, achieving cost reductions, and developing trust. This 
study emphasizes that the effectiveness of investments in partnership structures is 
contingent on the nature of the underlying outsourced task - such investments are 
beneficial when the underlying task is complex and marked by interdependencies; yet, 
they are costly and inefficient when the task is simple and modular. 
Our results, in addition to supporting the overall positive impact of fit between IR 
and IC on performance, also find that transformational BPO initiatives that achieve a fit 
between their IR and IC are marked by higher levels of satisfaction with service 
responsiveness, innovation and systematization than transactional BPO. However, the 
two classes of relationships do not differ in terms of satisfaction with service reliability. 
This result is consistent with the theoretical argument that arm’s-length market 
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relationships do not generate competitive advantage since “there is nothing idiosyncratic 
about the exchange relationship that enables the two parties to generate profits above and 
beyond what other seller-buyer combinations can generate” (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
Thus, although transactional BPO initiatives may engender important steady 
improvements in operational efficiency through reduction of process errors, costs or 
delays, significant changes in enterprise-level performance entail the externalization of 
complex processes with interdependencies through the value chain. Higher levels of IC in 
such transformational BPO initiatives enable participant firms to uniquely combine, 
exchange, or invest in idiosyncratic assets, thereby, realizing relational rents and 
competitive advantage. Longer-term contracts with an emphasis on coordination and tight 
relational processes increase partner-specific absorptive capacity and encourage 
investment in learning networks and knowledge sharing routines (Powell et al. 1996) 
while technological capabilities help firms search, evaluate and combine complementary 
resources and capabilities (Argyres 1999). That these relational capabilities will help 
inter-firm relationships “out innovate” (Dyer and Singh 1998) comparable relationships 
with lower levels of these capabilities is manifest in the superior satisfaction with process 
innovation in transformational BPO initiatives. Superior satisfaction with responsiveness 
and systematization in this class of BPO relationships also emphasizes that high levels of 
IC are central to coping with adaptation requirements in the relationship and that they 
influence the ability of the provider to invest in relation-specific assets that render 
process services seamless. The results for service reliability suggest that superior IC do 
not enable greater conformance to contracted guidelines for performing the service 
reliably and accurately. Rather, they are critical to achieving the greatest benefits from 
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outsourcing. In our study, these benefits translate to higher levels of responsiveness, 
process innovation and enhanced communication processes and technologies.  
Greater satisfaction in transformational BPO initiatives also holds important 
implications for its growth. The impact of BPO in our sample was expansive and 
included a variety of strategic business processes such as customer care, new product 
development, and human resources management. The results presented in this study 
suggest that absent any fundamental changes in transactional or institutional 
characteristics, the expanded notion of the potential for value through BPO is accurate 
and will continue to grow in the future.   
Conversely, a comparison of the coefficient of misfit between transformational 
and transactional BPO for the models of satisfaction suggests that underinvestment in IC 
in transformational BPO initiatives has more adverse performance effects relative to 
overinvestment in IC in transactional BPO. The difference in the performance effects of 
misfit between the two classes of BPO relationships is not significant in models of 
satisfaction with service reliability and responsiveness. However, misfit in 
transformational BPO initiatives has a significantly (p<0.05) more negative influence on 
satisfaction with process innovation and systematization. Thus, while excessive 
bureaucracy associated with overinvestment in IC may penalize other dimensions of 
performance such as administrative costs, our models provide no evidence that excessive 
IC reduce perceived service satisfaction levels in the BPO relationship. 
The difference in the three dimensions of performance between the two categories 
of BPO relationships also supports the need to use performance outcomes that reflect the 
unique nature of the BPO engagement. As BPO matures from being a cost-saving tool for 
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peripheral functions to a powerful organizational lever used to engender “rapid, 
substantial and sustainable improvement in enterprise-level performance” (Linder 2004), 
its study must be analyzed in terms of value creation measures that go beyond traditional 
measures of cost and quality. 
The central role of IR in BPO relationships may be investigated more closely in 
future research. Given that an understanding of IR is important for the efficient design of 
information mechanisms and coordination capabilities in outsourcing relationships, the 
IR of the BPO relationship may well influence the fundamental choice of firm 
boundaries. Thus, future research could examine the role of IR as an important basis for 
why firms exist. Further, while in this study, we conceptualize IR in terms of the amount 
of information that must be processed to address the complexity and interdependencies of 
the outsourced process, future research may explicitly examine other important aspects of 
information requirements such as quality and visibility and how the choice of IC in the 
BPO relationship addresses these requirements. 
This study is subject to certain limitations. First, it treats IR of the BPO 
relationship as an exogenous construct. However, in a continuous feedback system 
marked by important learning processes, the user firm will likely adjust IR and its 
antecedents to better align with the IC of the relationship. This may give rise to an 
endogeneity problem, which results in inconsistent OLS estimates. We use the 
Hausman’s specification test for endogeneity of IR in our model where under the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity, OLS estimators are consistent and asymptotically efficient: 
endogeneity among the regressors does not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates. 
The test results indicate that OLS produces consistent estimates and is efficient. Given 
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that learning effects develop over continuous periods of time, it is likely that endogeneity 
is long-term and therefore, does not impact our results. However, it is important to 
recognize that as the goals and expectations of the user firm and service provider evolve 
with time, the IR and IC of the BPO relationship also evolve as does the relationship 
between them. In the current study, we have only cross-sectional data, which limits our 
ability to provide a richer conceptualization of the relationship between IR and IC. A 
multi-period model will address this issue and introduce a dynamic perspective that 
examines how governance forms change over time with evolving expectations and goals 
of participant firms (Khanna et al. 1998; Gulati and Singh 1998). 
Second, our measure of observed IR does not consider the amount of information 
processed by the service provider. However, our use of regression scores for IR, 
predicted by the attributes of the outsourced process, helps address this issue, since IR is 
measured at the process level and not at the firm level. Further, as a robustness check, we 
measure the IR of service providers for a sub-sample of outsourcing dyads. The 
correlation between the two measures of IR was 0.69, suggesting that the two information 
sets were mutually consistent.      
Third, our measures of exchange performance, service satisfaction and process 
turnaround time, are based on perceptual items. We do not consider objective measures 
of efficiency recorded in service level agreements (SLAs) in the contract. However, given 
the nascent and topical nature of BPO, such data are difficult to obtain from user firms 
for reasons of confidentiality. Further, given the heterogeneity in BPO objectives (say 
innovation versus cost savings), allied strategic importance of the outsourced processes, 
and ensuing timeline of returns from outsourcing, it is difficult to reconcile BPO 
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contracts and SLAs in terms of a singular measure of performance. Thus, our measures of 
service satisfaction and process turnaround time create defined anchor points and 
represent the best alternative.  
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study makes important 
contributions to the literature on organization of outsourcing relationships. 
Comprehensive data on transaction and relational characteristics of a range of BPO 
relationships allows us to take the first step towards understanding what drives the 
performance of this emergent, rapidly growing form of outsourcing relationships. In 
doing so, we complement and extend the rich literature on firm boundaries. Our results 
show that consonant with research that emphasizes the increasingly information intensive 
nature of business processes in organizations, the organization of these processes too is 
motivated by concerns of information processing in addition to traditional considerations 
of hold-up. This study integrates these important perspectives through a systematic 
framework of IC that is rooted in the information processing view of the firm. We offer 
that exchange performance is contingent on the alignment between the IR and IC of the 
BPO relationship. Applied to an organizational context, the framework yields an 
important understanding of the value of BPO and is valuable to user firms for designing 
their relationships with the service provider. This, in turn, enables the user firm to define 
and enact clear expectations that impact its profitability and competitiveness. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
Our study adds to the rich literature on firm boundaries, and emphasizes that moving 
forward, especially as outsourcing matures to being a collaborative network paradigm 
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that is increasingly strategic in its impact, attention must be paid to issues of work design 
and coordination. While theoretical arguments have been made in favor of this 
proposition, we empirically establish its salience and demonstrate that an outsourcing 
strategy, in addition to attention to contractual mechanisms to control opportunism, must 
include processes and technologies that enable participant firms to coordinate tasks and 
responsibilities so as to process information and create strategic value. The extent to 
which firms can accurately predict their IR of control and coordination and design IC that 
are aligned with such IR is an important determinant of their ability to leverage BPO and 
create firm value.   
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Chapter 2 - An Empirical Analysis of the Contractual and Information 
Structures of Business Process Outsourcing Relationships 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Business process outsourcing (BPO) refers to contracting with an external organization 
for the primary responsibility of providing a business function or a certain business 
process within a wider function (such as accounts payable within accounting) (Linder 
2003). BPO is the fastest growing segment of the outsourcing market12, and represents 
the maturing of outsourcing from a cost saving tool for transaction intensive business 
processes to a powerful strategy for business transformation (Linder 2004; Gottfredson et 
al. 2005). Yet, there are significant challenges inherent to the process of value creation 
through BPO, evidenced by the large number of firms that cite significant negative 
experiences with their outsourcing projects13, and emergent research (e.g., Rouse and 
Corbitt 2006) highlighting the intrinsic complexity and high failure rate of BPO 
initiatives. What, then, drives BPO performance? 
 The study of outsourcing performance has largely been dominated by neo-
institutional economic theories, which view efficacy of contract choice as central to 
exchange performance. The outsourcing contract aligns incentives between the user firm 
and the service provider to engender cooperative behavior that is required to exert effort 
necessary to achieve outsourcing objectives and high levels of performance. However, 
                                                 
12
 According to IDC, the worldwide BPO market is expected to grow from $405 billion in 2003 to $682.5 
billion in 2008. By 2008, the use of external technology and business process services is likely to move from 
a 2005 average of 12% of the corporation’s total costs to 20% of total costs. Forecast growth rates for BPO 
are 10-15% per annum (in contrast to 7.1% for technology infrastructure and application outsourcing). 
 
13
 70% of the respondents in a 2005 survey by Deloitte Consulting expressed significant dissatisfaction with 
their outsourcing projects. Similarly, a survey conducted by Bain Consulting found that although 82% of 
large firms in North America engage in BPO, almost half of the respondents say their outsourcing programs 
fall short of expectations. According to SAP INFO Solutions, four out of five BPO contracts inked today will 
need to be renegotiated within two years. Further, 20% of all such contracts will collapse (SMR Intelligence 
2006). 
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these economic theories acknowledge that despite incentive alignment, ex-post adaptation 
failures might also occur “because autonomous parties read and react to signals 
differently, even though their purpose is to achieve a timely and compatible combined 
response” (Williamson 1991). This implies that outsourcing failures may stem not only 
from incentive conflicts but also from cognitive conflicts or the firms’ inability to either 
recognize and develop a shared understanding of changes in the outsourced task 
environment or coordinate actions to respond to such change (Gulati et al. 2005). This 
class of adaptation problems, rooted in cognitive conflicts between the participant firms, 
extends focus on the contractual structure that facilitates mutual exchange of rights to 
include the information structure, or relational processes and technologies that facilitate 
the mutual exchange of information to achieve an integrated response, in order to 
understand exchange performance.  
The efficient exchange of information is especially salient to BPO. In contrast to 
information technology outsourcing (ITO) that involves the management of technological 
applications, infrastructure, and services, BPO involves the management of business 
processes that draw upon these technologies. Key inputs and outputs of business 
processes are information, and their successful execution often requires information 
coordination between process workers (Mani et al. 2007). Further, the dynamic 
relationship between the business process and the business environment may result in 
greater rates of information change in the task environment on an ongoing basis than in 
ITO. This, in turn, results in larger amounts of information that need to be communicated, 
processed and translated into decisions in many BPO relationships.  
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Emergent research (Aron and Singh 2003; Mani et al. 2007) suggests that the 
amount of information that is processed in the BPO relationship may be represented 
along an increasing continuum with a “data origin” and “knowledge end” (Aron and 
Singh 2003). As the outsourced process moves along the continuum from being data- to 
information- to knowledge-intensive, the nature of information processing in the BPO 
relationship must also make the allied shift from modular information processing that 
occurs relatively independent of information changes in the value chain to significant, 
often real-time, information processing that requires extensive information exchange 
between the user firm and the service provider. This, in turn, necessitates extending the 
focus of relational design beyond alignment of incentives to include the coordination of 
process information across firm boundaries to align actions (Gulati et al. 2005). 
 Despite growing recognition (Sinha and Van de Ven 2005; Gulati et al. 2005) of 
the importance of the information structure to exchange performance, there exists little 
empirical evaluation of this relational dimension in the context of outsourcing exchanges. 
Information processing theories (Galbraith 1973; Tushman and Nadler 1978) underlying 
the choice of information structure have largely been applied to the study of intra-
organizational coordination14 that enables effective adaptation to changes in the business 
context to enhance firm performance. We extend this theoretical perspective to the inter-
organizational context to examine the information structure of the BPO relationship as an 
important antecedent to BPO performance.  
                                                 
14
 Notable exceptions include Bensaou and Venkatraman (1993) and Gulati et al. (2005). However, while 
Bensaou and Venkatraman examine issues of coordination absent contractual considerations, Gulati et al. 
examine issues of integration and differentiation that impact information flows across the dichotomy of 
markets and hierarchies alone. 
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In inter-organizational exchanges, hierarchical control, which establishes the 
intent to exchange information in the intra-organizational context, is substituted by the 
price mechanism. This refocuses attention on the contract as an enabler of relational 
processes and technologies that define the information structure of the BPO relationship. 
Yet, how the contractual and information structures of exchange relate to each other is 
relatively unexamined in the literature. In this study, we integrate the premises of 
information processing theories and institutional economics to posit that the information 
structure of the BPO relationship varies across BPO contract choices, and that these 
relational dimensions jointly impact BPO performance.  
Contract choices in ITO often take the form of fixed price or time and materials 
contracts (Gopal et al. 2003; Banerjee and Duflo 2000). Fixed price contracts involve the 
payment of a fixed fee per billing cycle negotiated ex ante while time and materials 
contracts involve payment for person-hours used during the specified billing cycle at a 
predetermined rate. BPO contracts are largely variants of these two widely prevalent ITO 
contracting forms. Fixed price BPO contracts involve payment of a fixed price per billing 
cycle or per unit of process output (e.g. claims processed, calls fielded) per billing cycle 
while time and materials BPO contracts involve compensation for the time and effort 
expended in process delivery.  The difference between these two contract s may be 
examined in terms of risk allocation and incentives. Fixed price (time and materials) 
contracts are high-powered (low-powered) incentive contracts where the service provider 
(user firm) is the residual claimant of ex post surplus. The contractual risks of cost and 
demand uncertainty that characterize BPO contracts are higher for the user firm 
(provider) in a time and materials (fixed price) contract. A risk-averse firm prefers a 
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contract that protects it from ex post risk to that which does not compensate for risk ex 
ante due to incomplete information (Gopal et al. 2003). Thus, all else being equal, a risk-
averse user firm (provider) prefers a fixed price (time and materials) contract. 
 However, it is not contract choice, per se that is of interest to us in this study. We 
theorize how differences in risk and incentive allocation across fixed price and time and 
materials contracts engender differences in the use and performance impact of 
information flows in the BPO relationship. Theories of information processing (Galbraith 
1973; Tushman and Nadler 1978) view the creation of lateral relations and vertical 
information systems as two important information capabilities design strategies that 
enhance the information processing capacity of the organization. We extend this premise 
to the inter-firm context to define the information structure of the BPO relationship in 
terms of joint action (Heide and John 1990, 1992; Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995), 
relational emphasis on coordination versus control (Tushman and Nadler 1978; Gulati 
and Singh 1998), and technological capabilities (Argyres 1999; Brynjolffson 1994). 
Along an increasing continuum, the values for these relational dimensions represent a 
shift from an autonomous information strategy, characterized by little information 
exchange, to a tightly connected information strategy, marked by the increased flow of 
information that enhance information capacity to enable an integrated pattern of behavior. 
The empirical testing of our hypotheses uses a two-stage regression model that is 
estimated with survey data on 137 BPO relationships. We first examine if contract choice 
in the BPO relationship is a significant predictor of the extent of joint action, 
coordination, and investment in technological capabilities in the relationship. We then 
assess if the performance impact of the three dimensions of information structure, as 
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measured by service satisfaction and perceived reduction in costs of process ownership, 
varies across the two contract choices. 
The contributions of our analyses are threefold. First, prior studies on contractual 
and information structures have largely abstracted from each other, yielding few insights 
on how these dimensions relate to each other in outsourcing exchanges. Our analysis 
demonstrates that the contractual structure influences the information structure, and that 
these two relational dimensions jointly influence performance. Thus, the joint study of 
information and incentives is necessary to enhance the explanatory power of extant 
theories of organization.  
Second, we find that after controlling for the nature of the outsourced process and 
relationship, contract choice is a significant predictor of the information structure of the 
BPO relationship. This relation between the BPO contractual and information structures 
points to an important function of the contract beyond the resolution of incentive conflict. 
The contract necessitates complementary information flows in the relationship that 
address cognitive conflict between the firms. Thus, in addition to addressing exchange 
hazards that stem from uncertainty perceived by the user firm about its relationship with 
the provider, the BPO contract also influences the organization of information that 
addresses task uncertainty to integrate actions. 
Finally, the study represents an early attempt to analyze the determinants of 
performance of BPO relationships. Although BPO is increasingly viewed by modern 
organizations as critical to competitive success, there is little empirical research that 
incorporates its distinctive nature and form. Rouse and Corbitt (2006) find that during the 
period 1980 to June 2005, only 11 scholarly or peer reviewed articles reported empirical 
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research on BPO. They lament that “the absence of independent empirical research 
means that decision makers choosing whether to outsource a business process have to 
proceed on faith” (Rouse and Corbitt 2006). Our results help practice by improving 
managerial understanding of the specific relationship between contractual incentives and 
relational processes and technologies that facilitate the mutual exchange of information, 
including their joint impact on BPO performance.  
 
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 The Contractual Structure of the BPO Relationship 
Efficient contract design has long been considered central to the success of outsourcing 
relationships (e.g., Lacity and Willcocks 1998). The “right” contract enables participant 
firms to overcome individual conflicts of interest to yield collectively beneficial 
outcomes and adapt effectively to disturbances. Formulations of contract problems in 
ITO and software development in particular (Banerjee and Duffolo 2000; Gopal et al. 
2003) analyze the trade-off between risk allocation and incentives provision in the 
context of two dominant contract types – fixed price and time and materials. Fixed price 
contracts involve the payment of a fixed fee for the software negotiated ex ante while 
time and materials contracts involve payment for the time and materials, often person-
hours used during the specified billing cycle at a predetermined rate.  
However, unlike the output of software development projects, which is largely an 
indivisible application(s) developed on a turnkey basis, the output of BPO initiatives 
comprises a variable number of process transactions (e.g. calls fielded, claims processed) 
in each billing cycle that are often delivered on an ongoing basis. Contingent on the 
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measurability of these transactions, a fixed price BPO contract involves the payment of a 
fixed price per process transaction negotiated ex ante. When output transactions are 
indivisible (e.g. closing of financial books) or difficult to measure (e.g. R&D), a fixed 
price BPO translates to the payment of a fixed fee per billing cycle. On the other hand, a 
time and materials BPO contract, akin to that in software development, involves payment 
for labor and other resources expended in process delivery during the billing cycle at a 
predetermined rate. This rate takes into account factors such as worker skills and process 
complexity. Thus, in time and materials contracts, the provider is fully compensated for 
costs of process execution and has no incentive to engage in cost reduction efforts. 
Alternatively, in a fixed price contract, since the output price is a given, the provider will 
engage in cost-reduction efforts until marginal costs of effort equal marginal benefits. 
Fixed price (time and materials) contracts comprise high (low) powered incentives that 
render the provider (user firm) the residual claimant of ex post surplus.  
The primary contractual risk considered in prior research on contract 
manufacturing and ITO pertains to cost uncertainties. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) 
illustrate this source of risk with the example of two people being assigned to a software 
project for fourteen weeks longer than originally planned. The greater the complexity of 
the outsourcing project, the greater is the cost uncertainty, and the more difficult and 
costly it becomes to ascertain the source of such cost overruns. Third parties such as 
courts can verify the resource assignment and total overruns but not whether such 
overrun is a result of poor choices made by the provider such as not adequately 
understanding project needs. The major portion of this risk of cost uncertainty in 
outsourcing is borne by the user firm (provider) in a time and materials (fixed price) 
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contract. All else being equal, a risk-averse firm prefers a contract that protects it from ex 
post risk to a contract that does not compensate for risk ex ante due to incomplete 
information (Gopal et al. 2003). Thus, ceteris paribus, a risk-averse user firm (provider) 
prefers a fixed price (time and materials) contract, where the fixed price incorporates a 
risk premium based on the variance of distribution of costs. 
Cost uncertainty is especially pertinent to BPO since the greater frequency of 
change in business processes engenders greater uncertainty and ambiguity in the BPO 
task environment relative to ITO (Mani et al. 2007). For instance, a firm that is a leader in 
providing global business insights outsourced the business analytics function for one of 
its dynamic industry segments to acquire critical capabilities at speed. The provider 
offered continuing education to its employees, created and shared knowledge 
management material with the user firm, received and responded to feedback of the user 
firm’s clients, and delivered periodic risk reports. There is significant cost uncertainty 
associated with such complex activities, and it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
reported cost overruns may be attributable to dynamic process requirements. Cost 
overruns and allied risk of moral hazard are borne by the user firm in a time and materials 
contract while the provider bears the risk of cost uncertainty in a fixed price contract. 
BPO initiatives are also characterized by demand uncertainty – the demand for 
the outsourced function is often unknown ex ante. Demand uncertainty exists in some 
ITO contracts as well – for example, network maintenance contracts typically stipulate 
that the provider is to maintain the system and fix all network faults for a specified 
period. The exact number of maintenance activities in this case is unknown. Yet, demand 
uncertainty is generally less of an issue in ITO contracts such as software development. 
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This is also true of BPO initiatives where process output is indivisible. However, the 
issue of demand uncertainty is salient to BPO initiatives characterized by a variable 
number of process transactions in each billing cycle that cannot be predicted ex ante. The 
output of BPO initiatives is information which, unlike products or applications, cannot be 
inventoried. Input resources are not perfectly flexible and thus, the provider must choose 
a resource allocation ex ante to service demand that is revealed ex post. Allied risks 
involve either resource wastage resulting from lower than expected demand or resource 
acquisition from the market resulting from higher than expected demand. These costs of 
demand uncertainty increase with the specialized nature of input resources. In a fixed 
price contract, the costs are borne by the provider since the user firm only pays for the 
output transactions. In a time and materials contract, the risk of demand uncertainty is 
borne by the user firm; although demand variance itself is measurable, the additional 
costs of addressing such variance (e.g. forecasting and planning) are difficult to ascertain.   
While contract choice influences outsourcing performance, economists 
acknowledge that neither contractual archetype dominates the other. The user firm and 
provider trade-off risk for incentives, with the former preferring a fixed price contract and 
the latter preferring a time and materials contract (Jensen and Stonecash 2005). Thus, it is 
typically not possible to implement the “first best” through contractual means. In such 
case, “it is possible to improve on the outcome if the behavior of the firms and the clients 
is at least partly norm-governed” (Banerjee and Duflo 2000). In the next section, we 
discuss the information structure that complements the limits to adaptability of the BPO 
contract, thereby improving on exchange outcomes. 
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2.2.2 The Information Structure of the BPO Relationship 
While the neo-institutional economics literature has largely focused on analyzing the 
class of adaptation problems that arise from bounded rationality and allied behavioral 
uncertainty perceived by the user firm about its relationship with the provider, 
information processing theorists (Galbraith 1973; Tushman and Nadler 1978) have 
contemporaneously engaged in studying another class of adaptation problems that also 
arises from bounded rationality but has its origin, not in behavioral uncertainty, but rather 
in uncertainty in organizational tasks. 
The information processing view of the firm (Galbraith 1973) suggests that 
organizations must process information to cope with uncertainty in their task 
environment, and that variations in organizational form represent variations in strategies 
to increase the firm’s ability to mitigate its information requirements, or increase its 
capacity to adapt to its inability to mitigate information requirements, or decrease the 
performance required for continued viability. Therefore, while the economic literature 
emphasizes the role of mutual exchange of rights in the contract in effective adaptation, 
the information processing literature views the mutual exchange of information as central 
to effective adaptation. However, while the neo-institutional economics literature focuses 
on the organization of economic activity across firm boundaries, the central ideas of the 
information processing view of the firm have largely been applied to the study of 
organization design that best facilitates intra-organizational adaptation.  
Yet, this research paradigm is particularly salient to the context of BPO. We noted 
earlier that BPO facilitates the transition of the user firm to a niche information node in a 
work system (Sinha and Van de Ven 2005; Linder 2004). Efficient work design in this 
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system requires that the user firm and the provider overcome cognitive limitations and 
develop a shared understanding of outsourced tasks and mutual interdependencies 
required for process management and execution. Diverse views of task concepts such as 
quality and performance standards need to be resolved so that effort can be focused on 
task execution. While the BPO contract aligns incentives and provides a framework for 
cooperation, it does not ensure the enactment of this framework to align actions in the 
relationship. In an organization, culture and affiliation enable members to develop shared 
meanings (Gioia and Thomas 1996) required for efficient work design. However, since 
participant firms in the BPO relationship are affiliated with different cultures, information 
fills the key role that culture serves for organizations and the information structure 
collects, processes, and disseminates required information across firm boundaries so that 
an integrated pattern of behavior emerges to enact the relationship at relatively higher 
levels of performance.  
Information processing theorists (Galbraith 1973; McCann and Galbraith 1981) 
find that information exchanges vary along three relational dimensions - joint action, 
relational emphasis on coordination versus control, and technological capabilities. Joint 
action is a process mechanism that enables information exchange between the firms to 
sequence, schedule, and synchronize outsourced tasks. Relational emphasis on 
coordination is a structural mechanism that reflects lower degree of formalization in the 
relationship (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995), thereby, enabling timely sharing of 
information, expertise and clarification of task outputs that must ultimately be integrated 
back into the user firm’s value chain.  
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While joint action and emphasis on coordination help participant firms overcome 
diverse interpretations and develop a shared understanding of changes in the information 
environment of the outsourced process, technological mechanisms of information 
exchange enable an accurate and timely incorporation of these changes in the 
management and execution of the process. They increase the amount of information 
transmitted and received per unit of time between decision makers, are central to the 
timeliness and accurate representation and interpretation of information, and the 
reduction of information overload.  
The above arguments emphasize that as the rate of information change in the task 
environment increases, the level of joint action, emphasis on coordination, and 
technological capabilities must also increase, and the information structure must shift 
from being mechanistic or autonomous to being organic or highly connected (Galbraith 
1973; Tushman and Nadler 1978). However, since research on information processing 
has largely developed in an intra-organizational context, it has focused on the role of 
exogenous task attributes such as process analyzability (Perrow 1967; Daft and Lengel 
1986) or interdependence (Daft and Lengel 1986) in explaining the choice of information 
structure. In this study, we argue that in inter-firm BPO exchanges, as hierarchical control 
is substituted by the price mechanism, the risks and incentives inherent to the latter 
engender patterns of coordination that influence the information structure.   
 
2.2.3 The Relationship between Contractual and Information Structures 
Recent research (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002) has begun to consider possible 
complementarities between contractual and relational design (that is a dimension of the 
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information structure). However, these studies consider neither the role of a holistic 
information strategy, encompassing both relational and technological design, nor that this 
strategy might vary systematically with the underlying contract type to shape 
performance (Puranam and Gulati 2005). 
 The possibility of a relationship between the contractual and information structure 
is finding recognition in emergent research in economics, law, organization and strategy, 
and information systems. For example, Mayer and Argyres (2004), in a qualitative study 
of contracts in the personal computer industry find that in industry contexts marked by 
high rates of information change, contracts, in addition to their role as frameworks for 
governing the exchange, also play an important role as a knowledge repository that 
guides coordination: 
“…Contracting processes, our evidence suggests, might in some instances serve to help 
develop and codify such knowledge sharing routines. Moreover, it is well-established that 
transferring knowledge within or between organizations often requires at least some 
codification (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). By providing a means for this to occur, 
contracting processes could facilitate the development of such relational capital, in the 
form of a collaboration capability...” (Mayer and Argyres 2004) 
This suggests that the relationship between the contractual and information 
structures in the BPO relationship is much like that between formal and informal 
organization. Similarly, Puranam and Gulati (2005) point to an isomorphic relationship 
between the contractual and social structure of the exchange. They note that the 
contractual specification of task and reward interdependence influences patterns of 
interactions and therefore, strength of ties between the firms. This suggests that the 
increased formal control of the user firm embedded in the BPO contract engenders 
greater relational embeddedness and a more connected information structure. 
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 The co-varying relationship between the contract and each of the dimensions of 
the information structure – joint action, relational emphasis on coordination and 
technological capabilities - finds important support in the incentive structure of time and 
material contracts. The user firm bears the risks of cost and demand uncertainty in time 
and material contracts and is the residual claimant of ex post surplus. This structure of 
interdependencies and joint ownership of process execution and management inherent to 
the time and materials contract necessitates the formal specification of modes of 
integration such as steering committees, executive dashboards and cross-functional teams 
that meet regularly to resolve process issues and discuss project updates and progress. 
This, in turn, creates norms for collaboration that are conducive to increased levels of 
joint action and information sharing and dissemination. 
Further, since the user firm shares process risks, investments and rewards in time 
and material contracts, it is less tolerant of information noise - inexact process 
information that adversely impacts process efficiency – in this contractual structure, and 
has the incentive to efficiently communicate process information across firm boundaries 
to enhance process performance and output. Information processing theorists argue that 
information noise is reduced to yield deep knowledge through rich exchanges of 
customized information. Consequently, firms are likely to emphasize coordination 
structures that yield a mutually rich understanding of the outsourced process when 
governed by time and materials contracts. 
Finally, since the user firm is the residual claimant of ex post surplus, it invests in 
technological capabilities that not only facilitate efficient communication of process 
information, but also enable accurate measurement of process performance and output to 
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maximize surplus. Overall, we expect the extent of joint action, emphasis on coordination 
and technological capabilities to be greater in time and materials contracts (see Figure 
2.1). Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: The extent of joint action will be greater in time and materials contracts 
than in fixed price contracts. 
Hypothesis 1b: The relational emphasis on coordination will be greater in time and 
materials contracts than in fixed price contracts. 
Hypothesis 1c: The extent of technological capabilities will be greater in time and 
materials contracts than in fixed price contracts. 
The above hypotheses build on the assumption that residual claim to the ex post 
surplus in time and materials contracts motivate the user firm to work in close association 
with the provider to foster a precise understanding of the process. However, the 
concomitant risk sharing inherent to time and materials contracts is not aligned with the 
objectives of the risk-averse user firm, and is susceptible to moral hazard. This, in turn, 
engenders important agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976), including monitoring 
costs of assessing the performance of the provider and residual loss resulting from the 
provider maximizing his own utility function. This will likely mitigate the user firm’s 
incentives for free exchange of information and limit the extent of joint action, 
coordination, and investment in technological capabilities in the BPO relationship.  
Further, contention of the positive impact of formal control of execution and 
management of the outsourced process on the relations between participant firms, 
inherent to the above hypotheses, has been challenged by prior research (Ghoshal and 
Moran 1996; Macaulay 1963), which points out that formal control of exchange 
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processes and outputs undermines relations between the user firm and the provider. For 
example, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) find that:  
“…For the controller, negative feelings arise from what Strickland (1958) described as 
‘the dilemma of the supervisor’ viz., the situation when the use of surveillance, 
monitoring, and authority led to management’s distrust of employees and perceptions of 
an increased need for more surveillance and control…” (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 24) 
Thus, if the user firm’s control of execution and management of outsourced 
processes and stake in the ex post surplus do indeed have a pernicious effect on 
coordination, then we would expect that fixed price contracts, where the provider bears 
process risks, controls process management, and is the residual claimant, will be 
characterized by greater joint action, relational emphasis on coordination and 
technological capabilities that support these coordination efforts: 
Hypothesis 2a: The extent of joint action will be greater in fixed price contracts than in 
time and materials contracts. 
Hypothesis 2b: The relational emphasis on coordination will be greater in fixed price 
contracts than in time and materials contracts. 
Hypothesis 2c: The extent of technological capabilities will be greater in fixed price 
contracts than in time and materials contracts. 
 
2.2.4 The Joint Impact of Contractual and Information Structures on 
Performance 
In this section, we examine the joint impact that the contractual and information 
structures have on BPO performance. In particular, we study contingent complementary 
and substitutional relationships between the contractual and information structures of the 
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BPO relationship to theorize how choice of the former could potentially impact the 
performance impact of the latter. 
 The incorporation of contingencies in fixed price contracts renders them relatively 
more complete than time and materials contracts. One of the objectives of a more 
complete contract is to minimize the need for ex post adaptation and ongoing 
coordination (Joskow 1988; Heide 1994). This suggests that to the extent formal modes 
of control and coordination, specified in the BPO contract, address exchange hazards and 
promote cooperative behavior, relational structures and technological capabilities present 
additional costs with no additional benefits. Such redundancy is costly in terms of 
organizational resources, rendering management of the BPO relationship relatively 
inefficient. Further, prior research (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Sitkin and Roth 1993) has 
argued that contractual completeness could detract from the effectiveness of social 
structural elements. A detailed, negotiated fixed price contract, while optimizing the risk-
averse user firm’s utility function, would indicate lack of trust that “blunts the demands 
of friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horsetrade” (Macauley 
1963). This is exacerbated by the fact that the incentives in fixed price contracts are 
aligned with the risk-averse user firm and not the service provider’s optimal utility. 
Finally, the relatively complete nature of the contract also reduces the need for 
investments in technological capabilities to support coordination, monitor process 
performance and output, and integrate firm actions. 
These theoretical arguments suggest that the use of fixed price contracts will 
likely reduce the performance impact of the allied information structure in the BPO 
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relationship, and that the performance impact of the information structure in time and 
materials contracts will be higher than in fixed price contracts. Thus, we posit: 
Hypothesis 3a: The effect of joint action on BPO performance will be stronger in time 
and materials contracts relative to fixed price contracts. 
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of relational emphasis on coordination on BPO performance 
will be stronger in time and materials contracts relative to fixed price contracts. 
Hypothesis 3c: The effect of technological capabilities on BPO performance will be 
stronger in time and materials contracts relative to fixed price contracts. 
An alternative theoretical argument is that increasing contractual completeness 
promotes the expectation that the service provider will behave cooperatively, and thus 
complements the impact of joint action, emphasis on coordination, and technological 
capabilities on performance. For example, Poppo and Zenger (2002) note that detailed 
contractual specifications, not only limit the gains from opportunistic behavior, but also 
provide a framework for ex post bilateral adjustment that enhances exchange 
performance. This is aligned with the view that the contract choice in outsourcing 
relationships is not necessarily a transaction cost economizing outcome in BPO but a 
strategic choice that results in a set of optimal self-enforcing implicit agreements 
(Bernheim and Whinston 1999). In the face of such “strategic ambiguity” (Bernheim and 
Whinston 1999), the formal rules specified in the contract “complement and increase the 
effectiveness of informal constraints” in the exchange (North 1990). Thus, isomorphic 
with the relationship between formal and informal organization analyzed in prior research 
(Krackhardt, 1990; Moran and Ghoshal, 1996), the contract is likely especially designed 
to enhance the impact of information exchange processes and technologies in the 
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relationship. It guides, legitimizes and reinforces information flows between the user firm 
and the service provider. The mitigation of relational uncertainty through the governance 
structure helps in the alignment of incentives for information exchange and reduction in 
the information states that firms must contend with.  
These theoretical arguments suggest that the use of fixed price contracts will 
likely enhance the performance impact of allied information processing mechanisms in 
the BPO relationship, and that the performance impact of the information structure in 
fixed price contracts will be higher than in time and materials contracts. Thus, we 
develop the competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: The effect of joint action on BPO performance will be stronger in fixed 
price contracts relative to time and materials contracts. 
Hypothesis 4b: The effect of relational emphasis on coordination on BPO performance 
will be stronger in fixed price contracts relative to time and materials contracts. 
Hypothesis 4c: The effect of technological capabilities on BPO performance will be 
stronger in fixed price contracts relative to time and materials contracts. 
 
2.3 Empirical Analysis 
2.3.1 Data Collection 
The data for this study were obtained through a survey of senior executives responsible 
for the management and review of outsourced business processes. Drawing on prior 
research (Halvey and Melby 2000; IDC report) and our discussions with outsourcing 
practitioners, we developed a list of ten business functions that are most commonly 
outsourced. A structured questionnaire was developed based on comprehensive reviews 
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of the literature and initial interviews with 20 BPO experts15. These exploratory 
interviews were conducted with the underlying objective of assessing applicability of 
information processing theories to inter-firm BPO relationships, validating logical 
linkages between the constructs, and obtaining more clarity of perspective on desirable 
sample characteristics. The interviews also influenced questionnaire design and 
component items, especially those that were being adapted to the BPO context. 
Consequent to these exploratory interviews, we developed a structured questionnaire that 
was pre-tested with a total of 30 medium to large organizations, market research firms, 
and academicians. The instrument was tested for clarity of content, scope and purpose (or 
content validity). A seven point Likert scale was used for most questions; however, some 
questions involved binary choices.  
The desired sample included small to large organizations across diverse industries 
that had outsourced one or more business processes. Our list of respondents came from 
several active compilations of outsourcing firms, industry association referrals and 
outsourcing advisory referrals. A technique deployed in related research in surveying 
executives is “to define populations and response rates based on those who will pre-
commit to respond” (Poppo and Zenger 2002). The normative response rates based on 
pre-committed samples are as high as 40 percent (Anderson and Narus 1990; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). Six hundred pre-committed surveys were mailed, with follow-up letters 
five weeks later. We received a total of 145 valid responses of which 134 were complete 
in all respects. This response rate of approximately 24% was lower than expected, and 
was likely due to the lengthy and extensive nature of the questionnaire. However, it is 
                                                 
15
 The subject experts comprised directors of strategic outsourcing practices in Fortune 100 firms (in 
financial services, healthcare, retail, and high-tech), outsourcing advisory consultants, leading Indian 
offshore vendors, and academicians. 
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consistent with the rate found in other studies (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Weiss and 
Anderson 1992). The final sample was representative of a range of outsourcing objectives 
for which there was sufficient variance in exchange and task attributes. 
All respondents were assured that their responses would remain confidential and 
that results would be reported only in aggregate, thereby addressing privacy concerns and 
minimizing potential bias in self-reported data. We also distributed the questions 
measuring each construct across the survey to minimize response bias. To test for 
potential response bias, we compared the firm size in the sample to the larger population. 
The sample and population did not appear to differ in terms of firm size. We also 
compared questionnaires turned in early with questionnaires turned in later along a 
number of variables – firm size, industry, respondent position, exchange attributes and 
service satisfaction - to check for non-response bias (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Armstrong 
and Overton 1970). This procedure assumes that late respondents share similar attributes 
and biases with non-respondents. No significant differences were found between early 
and late respondents. We also checked for the presence of common-method bias 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003) and concluded that common method bias did not likely impact 
survey responses. 
Finally, a section of the raw data was randomly subject to cross validation. For a 
random sample of 25 user firms, we requested the respondent to identify the service 
provider for the purpose of a brief interview. 10 firms obliged, and we interviewed the 
providers to obtain relevant process information. The two information sets in the dyad 
were mutually consistent.  
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2.3.2 Measures 
2.3.2.1 Exchange performance: The emergent and confidential nature of objective 
measures of BPO performance rendered their use difficult in this study. Consequently, we 
used multiple dimensions of service satisfaction as metrics of exchange performance. Our 
use of service satisfaction is consistent with prior measures of performance found in the 
organization and strategy literature (Poppo and Zenger 1998, 2002; Gulati et al. 2005). 
Satisfaction is an important issue in working partnerships like BPO since it is a proxy for 
perceived effectiveness (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Barber and Venkatraman 1986). 
Further, given that BPO is characterized by a range of business objectives ranging from 
reduced costs to innovation to speed to market, a single objective measure of 
performance may be inadequate. Satisfaction is also a significant determinant of future 
actions, including repeat business, positive word-of-mouth, and loyalty (Barber and 
Venkatraman 1986). Thus, although not identical to exchange performance, we expect 
that satisfaction of the user firm will be strongly correlated with the former. 
We adapted established scales to measure service satisfaction. We used a 7 point 
scale where ‘1’ represented ‘dissatisfied’ and ‘7’ represented ‘satisfied’. A total of eleven 
items were used to measure service reliability, responsiveness, innovation, and 
systematization or the procedures, systems and technology that make a service seamless. 
We complement the use of service satisfaction with that of perceived 
improvement in process efficiency. In interviews with process owners, we found that 
process efficiency in BPO relationships are assessed using a combination of metrics such 
as process costs, labor productivity, process accuracy or error rate, and process 
turnaround time or cycle time. Given that nearly all BPO contracts in our sample 
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measured reduction in process costs to assess process performance, we included it as 
another measure of performance of the BPO relationship. Process costs in the case of 
vertical integration include activity costs of labor and overheads, material and handling 
costs, if any, cost of invested capital, if any, and the opportunity cost of outsourcing 
estimated by the strategic impact of BPO. Process costs for BPO include one time and 
ongoing costs of BPO, and any anticipated future pricing adjustments.  
2.3.2.2 Explanatory variables: In order to perform a comparative analysis of 
performance across the identified categories of BPO relationships, we define contractual 
structure to be equal to one for cases where a firm employs time and material contracts, 
and equal to zero for cases where a firm uses fixed price contracts. Thus, we use the 
following probit model to estimate contract choice: 
)'()0Pr()1Pr( iii XYY βΦ=>==   (1)  
Here, Yi represents the contract choice – time and materials or fixed price - for 
transaction i. Xi is a vector of determinants of contract choice, β is the vector of 
coefficients of these determinants and Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. The determinants of contract choice that we consider are analyzability, 
modularity, and information intensity of the outsourced process, bargaining power of the 
user firm, prior cooperative association between participant firms, size of the user firm, 
contractual completeness, and contract length. 
 Fixed price contracts preclude bargaining over ex post surplus by excluding price 
revisions, and are more complete than time and materials contracts (Crocker and 
Reynolds 1993). The latter permit substantial price revisions that are largely limited only 
by the ability of the provider to document transaction processing costs. The lack of price 
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revisions to fixed price contracts points to the risk of price lock-in that is increased in 
long-term contracts. Thus, we expect the length of fixed price contracts to be lower than 
that of time and materials contracts. Decreased process analyzability increases the risks 
of cost and demand uncertainty. It also increases the cost of completeness by 
necessitating systematic allocation of resources to forecast and interpret diverse action-
outcome contingencies, and incorporate paths that are best aligned with the objectives of 
the outsourcing initiative. Thus, lower levels of process analyzability will likely result in 
more incomplete time and materials contracts. Similarly, greater levels of information 
change that characterize information intensive process environments also increase the 
choice of a time and materials contract. The lower interdependencies of modular 
processes with the value chain reduce the risk of cost uncertainty and render it easier to 
disaggregate the process from the value chain to specify a precise division of labor 
between the participant firms. Thus, modular processes increase the choice of a fixed 
price contract. Bargaining power of the user firm weakens the association between task 
attributes and contract choice – a user firm with considerable bargaining power will be 
able to negotiate a fixed price contract. Gopal et al. (2003) find that prior association 
between participant firms increases the potential transaction costs of switching to an 
alternate vendor, thereby, increasing the likelihood of choice of a time and materials 
contract. Larger firms likely have superior financial and technological resource 
endowments that render the design and monitoring of complex contracts more efficient 
and less expensive. Thus, we expect that larger firms will design more complete fixed 
price contracts.  
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Measures of the antecedents of contract choice and dimensions of the information 
structure, including joint action, relational emphasis on coordination and technological 
capabilities were all adapted from prior literature. All measurement items were tested for 
content validity through interviews and discussions with outsourcing practitioners and 
service providers. Reliability of all scales used were satisfactory with Cronbach alpha 
values greater than 0.70.  
 
2.3.3 Data Analysis 
First, we use a structural model to provide evidence of an integrative latent representation 
of information structure as shown in Figure 2.1. The information structure of the BPO 
relationship is conceptualized as a second-order construct comprising joint action, 
relational emphasis on coordination, and technological capabilities. Technological 
capabilities is conceptualized as a first-order construct comprising scope of IT use, 
intensity of IT use, and sophistication of coordination systems. Composite z-scores were 
created for all indicators to facilitate combining and comparing different scales of 
measurement. Factor scores for the technological capabilities and information structure 
constructs obtained at this stage are used in subsequent analyses.  
Subsequently, we analyze the determinants of contract choice, the influence of 
such choice on the information structure and their join influence on BPO performance. 
Prior research (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998) suggests that the inability 
to control for unobserved features of the exchange (such as user firm or provider 
characteristics, market conditions or levels of embeddedness between the firms) that 
simultaneously influence the choice of contractual structure as well as the ex-post 
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information structure and BPO performance results in biased and inconsistent estimates. 
To account for possibly endogenous choices of contractual structure, we employ a two-
stage regression model that is derived from work in labor economics (Heckman 1978; 
Lee et al. 1980; Smith 1980).  
We first estimate a first stage probit model that represents the selection equation 
(Equation 1). The instrument variables used in the selection equation are performance 
guarantees offered by the service provider and competitive intensity. Performance 
guarantees assure delivery of specific performance outcomes (Shavell 1980, 1984). The 
ensuing completeness is more representative of a fixed price contract. The rationale 
behind the use of competitive intensity as an instrument is that increased levels of 
competition in service provision provide the user firm with diverse alternatives, thereby, 
reducing the provider’s bargaining power and increasing the probability of choice of a 
fixed price contract (Gopal et al. 2003).  
Using the predicted probabilities from the probit model, we construct the inverse 
Mills ratio, λji, which is included as a control variable in the second-stage models of 
information structure and BPO performance. Second-stage models, which incorporate the 
correction for self-selection, provide consistent and unbiased estimates. All models report 
heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors that correct for underestimation of 
variances resulting from potential non-independence among sample observations.  
 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.1 details the factor loadings for the second-order information structure construct 
and the first-order technological capabilities construct. All factor loadings are significant 
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and of high magnitude. Further, measures of composite construct reliability and variance 
extracted for both constructs are greater than the threshold levels of 0.70 and 0.50 
respectively. The goodness-of-fit measures also provide adequate support for the 
information structure model. The normed chi-square is less than the threshold value of 3, 
the GFI and NFI are greater than threshold values of 0.90 and the RMSEA is less than the 
threshold value of 0.05. We use the output matrix of factor score weights to calculate a 
weighted average score for information structure and technological capabilities that we 
use in subsequent analyses.   
Table 2.2 presents the results of the contract choice model that are used to 
formulate the inverse Mills ratio for the second-stage information processing and 
performance models. We note that both instrumental variables are significant predictors 
of contract choice. Further, the results for all variables except prior association are 
consistent with our expectations - prior cooperative association between the user firm and 
the service provider is negatively associated with choice of time and material contracts. 
However, this result is consistent with findings in strategy (Poppo and Zenger 2002; 
Singh and Gulati 1998) that prior cooperative association makes it easier to predict and 
assess the provider’s behavior, and engenders a deeper understanding of the 
organizational routines and procedures that each firm adheres to. Our finding suggests 
that such competence in transacting with each other enables greater formalization of 
information exchange processes and specificity in contractual provisions that detract from 
the need for relatively incomplete time and materials contracts. 
Table 2.3 presents the results of three treatment effect models (Shaver 1998) 
where the dependent variables are the overall information structure of the BPO 
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relationship and its three dimensions – joint action, coordination, and technological 
capabilities. The simultaneous OLS estimation of the three dimensions through 
multivariate regression ignores potential correlation among the errors across equations; 
however, because the three dimensions are correlated and the dependent variables are 
same across the equations, there may be contemporaneous correlation among errors 
across the three equations. Thus, we use the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model 
to estimate the three equations. Our use of SUR is consistent with results of the Breusch-
Pagan test of independence of equations - the correlation among the residuals of the 
equations for joint action, coordination, and technological capabilities is significant 
(p<0.001). The regression of overall information structure of the BPO relationship reports 
robust standard errors. The adjusted R-Square values for the models range from 0.32 to 
0.54.  
The coefficient for self-selection is significant in all models, indicating that the 
firms have self-selected the pertinent contract and that unobserved heterogeneity that 
impacts self-selection also impacts information structure and its dimensions. The choice 
of time and materials contract is significant in all four models, providing support for 
Hypotheses 1a – 1c: the extent of overall information exchanged, and that facilitated 
through each of joint action, emphasis on coordination, and technological capabilities is 
greater in time and materials contracts than in fixed price contracts. The finding that 
differences in the three dimensions of information structure across the two contracts are 
significantly different from zero is robust to alternative estimation methods, including a 
joint test of the effect of contract choice across the three models through standard 
multivariate regression and OLS estimation with robust standard errors.  
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 The results for the control variables are consistent with prior research. Lower 
process analyzability and prior cooperative association positively impact the levels of 
joint action, coordination and technological investments. Modularity of the outsourced 
process suggests that it can be disaggregated from the value chain and managed and 
executed independently by the service provider with relatively few inputs from the user 
firm. This explains its negative impact on joint action. It has been shown in prior research 
(e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993) that when the user firm has no bargaining power, it 
does not get an adequate share of the non-contractible surplus; yet if it has all the 
bargaining power, then service providers might not make any non-contractible 
investments, engendering little surplus to bargain over. These studies find that in order to 
decrease the opportunism risks that stem from the provider’s concerns that returns to its 
investment will be expropriated in ex post bargaining, the user firm invests in increasing 
the supplier’s bargaining power through development of close relations and this approach 
to partnering is especially facilitated by the use of technology in the relationship 
(Clemons et al. 1993). The positive impact of the user firm’s bargaining power on the 
joint action and technological investments is consistent with this theoretical argument.   
Table 2.4 reports results for the performance effect of the three dimensions of 
information structure. Model I provides results for service satisfaction while Model II 
provides results for perceived reduction in costs of process ownership. The correlation 
between service satisfaction and perceived reduction in process costs is 0.61 (p<0.01), 
emphasizing that satisfaction is a reasonable proxy for the successful realization of 
efficiency outcomes. F-tests for all models reject the hypothesis that the predictors are 
jointly insignificant (p<0.01). Potential multicollinearity problems were investigated by 
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examining variance inflation factors (VIFs) and condition indices for the predictor 
variables. Near multicollinearity is a problem if VIF > 10 (Neter et al. 1996; Hayter 
1996) or the maximum condition index (CI) for the model > 30 (Myers 1990). An 
analysis of these measures confirmed that the three models were not biased by 
multicollinearity. The adjusted R-Square values for the models range from 0.22 to 0.62.  
We test hypotheses set 3 and 4 by comparing the significance of coefficients of 
the three dimensions of information structure across the two contract choices in Table 
2.4. We find that the impact of joint action and coordination on service satisfaction and 
the impact of joint action and technological capabilities on reduction in process costs are 
stronger in time and material contracts than in fixed price contracts. Thus, our results for 
the model of satisfaction support Hypotheses 3a and 3b while our results for the model of 
reduction in process costs support Hypotheses 3a and 3c. Hypotheses 4a – 4c are not 
supported by the results. 
Table 2.5 reports the results of analysis of the impact of the overall information 
structure of the BPO relationship on satisfaction and reduction in process costs across the 
two contracts. A comparison of the coefficient of information structure across both 
contract choices confirms that the effect of the overall information structure on 
satisfaction and reduction in process costs is significantly greater (p<0.01) in time and 
materials contracts than in fixed price contracts. Further, the impact of the information 
structure on reduction in process costs is negative and significant in fixed price contracts. 
This suggests that redundant investments in information resources might be costly in 
terms of organizational resources and might detract managerial attention, thereby, 
adversely impacting the costs of ownership of the outsourced process. 
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The outsourcing of value chain functions has gained significant momentum as 
organizations increasingly outsource broader business processes – particularly 
information intensive ones such as human resources, finance and accounting, supply 
chain management and customer care – to achieve diverse strategic objectives. BPO 
necessitates expanding the view of outsourcing beyond a contractual transaction that 
reduces production costs to include an information network that enhances the user firm’s 
capacity to process information. While each of the contractual and information structure 
has been investigated separately under different research paradigms and business 
contexts, our objective in this study has been to investigate the relationship between these 
distinctive dimensions in the context of BPO relationships.  
Our empirical analysis confirms that the extent of use and the performance impact 
of information processing mechanisms are stronger in time and materials contracts than 
in fixed price contracts. Our results for the relationship between the contract and 
information structure address the broader issue of how to provide incentives for non-
contractible provider investments. In particular, our analysis tests whether the relatively 
complete nature of fixed price contracts that renders the provider the residual claimant of 
ex post surplus provides a superior framework for non-contractible investments in 
information processing (Hypotheses 1a-1c), and whether the incentives inherent to fixed 
price contracts complement the emergent information structure to enhance exchange 
performance (Hypotheses 3a-3c). We find that the impact of joint action and coordination 
on satisfaction and that of joint action and technological capabilities on perceived 
reduction in process costs are significant in time and materials contracts. Thus, the 
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division of risks and incentives inherent to time and materials contracts complement 
emergence of the information structure and its subsequent impact on BPO performance.  
Our results hold implications for theory development. They emphasize that 
problems of governance and information arise simultaneously in modern outsourcing 
relationships and represent interlinked explanations of outsourcing performance. Thus, 
moving forward, as firms and business functions become increasingly information 
intensive16, the joint assessment of contractual and information structures is necessary to 
yield a more holistic picture of the effects of boundary decisions, and enhance the 
explanatory power of extant theories of organization.  
We find that although the information structure in fixed price contracts does not 
impact satisfaction, it negatively influences process costs in these contracts. When the 
user firm invests in high levels of joint action, coordination and technological capabilities 
in the BPO relationship, managerial attention and involvement, a necessary input to this 
relational dimension but often a constrained organizational resource, likely becomes 
overloaded and inadequate to sustain joint action at high levels of performance. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the user firm is not the residual claimant of ex post surplus in 
fixed price contracts, so that the transaction and bureaucratic costs associated with 
increased levels of joint action outweigh the user firm’s marginal benefits, thereby, 
reducing the performance of the BPO relationship. 
Our results for the interactions between the contractual and information structure 
of the exchange also extend transaction cost analyses beyond traditional considerations of 
incentive conflict. The results suggest that contracts differ not only in their ability to align 
                                                 
16
 Sinha and Van de Ven (2005) note that knowledge intensive services are the dominant form of work in the 
industrialized world. Similalrly, Quinn, Baruch, and Zien (1997) report that three-fourths of all economic 
activity involves the management of intellectual activities and their interface to service outputs.  
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incentives between the user firm and the provider but also in their ability to motivate and 
coordinate information processing activities across firm boundaries in an accurate and 
timely way. For example, a law firm in our sample outsourced training and development 
to a leading provider of managed learning services and hosted learning and performance 
technology. A key responsibility of the provider was workplace compliance training 
programs for the law firm’s employees and customers. The provider’s extant customers 
accessed a web-enabled training module for compliance training. However, given that 
employment law was one of the key practices of the law firm and that the law firm’s 
employees had unique training needs in employment, human relations and benefits 
matters, the extant compliance training modules of the provider would not suffice. In this 
case, the technology firm could not afford to assume sole ownership of the process, and 
hence, entered into a time and materials contract that shifted a portion of the risk to the 
law firm. The latter worked in close cooperation with the provider to develop a learning 
content management system that incorporated personnel handbooks, covenants not to 
compete, and confidentiality agreements of the firm and was customized to meet 
industry-specific needs of the law firm’s customers. Thus, the contract, not only 
addressed exchange hazards, but also provided a cooperative framework for superior 
coordination and information processing. 
This study is subject to certain limitations. Our data is cross-sectional in nature, 
and our measures of exchange performance are based on perceptual items that do not 
directly account for the economic costs and benefits of BPO. However, given the nascent 
and topical nature of BPO, such data are difficult to obtain from user firms for reasons of 
confidentiality. Further, given the heterogeneity in BPO objectives (say innovation versus 
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increased revenue), allied strategic importance of the outsourced processes, and ensuing 
timeline of returns from outsourcing, it is difficult to reconcile the BPO relationships in 
terms of a singular measure of economic performance. In this regard, our measures of 
service satisfaction and perceived reduction in process costs create a defined anchor point 
and represent the best alternative.  
Further, the cross-sectional nature of our data also limits our ability to capture 
important learning effects that develop in the BPO relationship over time. Prior research 
in strategy (Anand and Khanna 2000) finds that with experience accumulation, firms 
learn to better manage complexity in alliances. This is likely true of BPO relationships as 
well. Future research could examine the influence of learning effects on choice of 
information structure and performance. 
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study makes important 
contributions to the literature on organization of outsourcing relationships. Data on 
transaction and relational characteristics of a range of BPO relationships allows us to take 
an early step towards understanding what drives the performance of this emergent, 
rapidly growing outsourcing form. In doing so, we complement and extend the rich 
literature on firm boundaries. Our results show that consonant with research that 
emphasizes the increasingly information intensive nature of business processes in 
organizations, the organization of these processes too is motivated by concerns of 
information processing in addition to traditional hold-up considerations. The contractual 
structure, the information structure and their interaction effects influence BPO 
performance, and the contract emerges, not just as a governance mechanism that 
addresses incentive conflict, but also as an important mode of organization of information 
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that addresses cognitive conflict. Applied to an organizational context, the framework 
yields an important understanding of the value of BPO and enables the user firm and the 
provider to define and enact a holistic information structure that positively influences 
firm profitability and competitiveness. 
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Chapter 3 - Transaction Costs and Equity Prices 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
In recent years, the empirical study of firm boundaries has come to be dominated by 
transaction cost economics (TCE). TCE attributes heterogeneity in performance of 
contractual exchanges, in large part, to incompleteness of the formalizing contract choice. 
Deleterious effects of contractual incompleteness include costly bargaining and privately 
favorable redistribution of surplus (Williamson 1985; Masten 1988). Thus, TCE predicts 
that as contractual exchanges between firms become characterized by increasing 
incompleteness, the likelihood of vertical integration should increase. Vertically 
integrative governance structures, with access to fiat and better information disclosure, 
allow for higher efficiency gains.  
While the key theoretical argument of TCE finds strong empirical support in the 
economics literature (see Shelanski and Klein 1995, David and Han 2004 for reviews), 
little is known about the size of transaction cost effects on the financial value of the firm. 
Yet, such knowledge has important implications. The make-or-buy decision is 
fundamental to the modern firm. It is estimated that by 2008, outsourcing will constitute 
58 percent of the average firm’s technology budget. Moreover, core business functions 
such as R&D, product development and marketing are being externalized across a wide 
spectrum of industries to achieve diverse strategic objectives that shape firms’ 
competitive positions. Despite this extended reach of outsourcing, as emphasized in the 
earlier chapters, several researchers and practitioners have highlighted the complexity 
and high failure rate of outsourcing. If this heterogeneity in performance is linked to the 
outsourcing decision and the financial ramifications are shown to be economically 
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significant, it would imply the need to exercise caution in initiating outsourcing 
initiatives and emphasize that value chain scoping and management are important sources 
of comparative advantage in the modern firm.  
In this study, we ask the question – does the efficiency of boundary decisions 
explain variation in shareholder value? Most research on the shareholder impact of 
managerial decisions such as mergers or acquisitions focuses on announcement period 
returns. The assumption of efficient markets is inherent to this use of the event-study 
method. However, our focus on outsourcing contrasts with these studies. Information on 
contract type and context that are required to interpret efficiency of the outsourcing 
decision in transaction cost economizing terms are rarely announced by the outsourcing 
firm; this information is likely collected privately by investors, and requires expertise to 
interpret. Further, the outsourcing investment itself is a tangible operational expense; yet, 
its potential benefits reflect “intangible”17 information on future cash flows. Daniel and 
Titman (2003) find investors’ private signals in interpreting “intangible” information on 
future cash flows are imprecise, resulting in misreaction and long-term abnormal stock 
returns. For these reasons, we do not expect our results to support the efficient markets 
hypothesis and adopt a long horizon approach to computing abnormal returns. 
Our data on the hundred largest outsourcing initiatives announced between 1996 
and 2005 are primarily obtained from International Data Corporation’s annual reports on 
the largest outsourcing contracts signed each year in the sample time period. Company 
data from COMPUSTAT, SDC Platinum and EXECUCOMP and stock price data from 
                                                 
17
 Daniel and Titman (2003) make the distinction between tangible and intangible information on a firm’s 
cash flows. The former is firm performance information that is described in a firm’s accounting statements 
such as sales or earnings growth while the latter is more nebulously defined as all firm performance 
information that is orthogonal to tangible information.  
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the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) complements contract data. In Section 
II, we describe these data sources in greater detail. Firms’ contract choices are 
categorized as either fixed price or variable price. Fixed price contracts involve payment 
of a fixed price per billing cycle when the outsourced output is indivisible (e.g. software 
development, closing of financial books) or per transaction per billing cycle when the 
output comprises a variable number of transactions (e.g. claims processed, calls fielded). 
Variable price contracts involve payment based on variable factors, often the time and 
effort expended in task execution. Firms that have implemented fixed price contracts for 
their outsourcing initiatives are part of the “fixed price portfolio” while those governed 
by variable price contracts are in the “variable price portfolio”. Given that fixed price 
contracts are subject to few price revisions over their lifetime, the fixed price portfolio is 
described as having more contractual completeness than the variable price portfolio.  
In Section III, we develop four hypotheses that describe potential relationships 
between governance choice and abnormal returns. Consistent with TCE, Hypothesis I is 
that higher contractual incompleteness that characterizes variable price contracts leads to 
efficiency losses. The market underestimates the costs (benefits) of contractual 
incompleteness (completeness), resulting in significant long tem abnormal returns 
following the implementation of the outsourcing contract. However, in contrast to the 
TCE assumption of immutably imposed contractual incompleteness, the latter is an 
endogenous choice that reflects the desire of the outsourcing firm to minimize the costs 
of contractual exchange. Yet, contract choice and performance have been studied largely 
independent of each other in the literature and examined different causal factors. 
Hypothesis II is that lower returns to relatively incomplete contracts is the outcome of the 
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contract selection process where some of the transactional characteristics that increase the 
likelihood of choice of a variable price contract are also associated with lower abnormal 
returns. Thus, contractual incompleteness is more an indicator than a determinant of 
transaction costs of the outsourced function. Hypothesis III is that private information 
underlying the outsourcing decision and/or contracting decision results in lower long-
term abnormal returns.   
In Section IV, we assess supportive evidence for the hypotheses. A comparison of 
three year abnormal returns following implementation of the outsourcing contract 
suggests that relative to a size-and book-to-market matched sample of control firms in the 
industry, the mean three year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the fixed price 
portfolio is 17.5 percent (p<0.05) and that for the variable price portfolio is -21.2 percent 
(p<0.10). However, after conditioning on the factors that drive the outsourcing and 
contract choices, we find that significantly lower returns to relatively incomplete variable 
price contracts are the outcome of an adverse selection process - rapidly changing 
business requirements, high specificity of relational investments, lack of prior 
cooperative association between participant firms, and lack of experience of the 
outsourcing firm that increase the likelihood of choice of a variable price contract also 
result in lower abnormal returns. The three year returns are consistent with changes in 
income efficiency of the outsourcing firm. This result suggests that complex incomplete 
contracts are indicative of significant transaction costs that must be managed over the life 
of the outsourcing relationship. Our results suggest that outsourcing in the presence of 
these transaction costs erodes financial value of the outsourcing firm up to 96 percent 
relative to vertically integrated firms with a similar risk profile. Unobserved factors that 
94 
influence the contracting decision also influence returns, providing partial evidence for 
the private information hypothesis. Section V concludes with a discussion of implications 
of the results to theory and practice. 
 
3.2 Governance Choice and Equity Prices: Three Hypotheses 
We describe three plausible relationships between governance choice and abnormal 
returns: 
Hypothesis I. Contractual incompleteness (completeness) results in higher (lower) 
transaction costs. The market underestimates these costs (benefits) of contractual 
incompleteness (completeness) at the time of implementation of the outsourcing 
contract.  
Hypothesis II. Contractual incompleteness (completeness) does not cause higher (lower) 
transaction costs; rather, certain contextual – firm, transactional and relational - 
factors that increase the likelihood of contractual incompleteness (completeness) 
also result in higher (lower) transaction costs. The market underestimates the effect 
of these factors at the time of implementation of the outsourcing contract. 
Hypothesis III. Contractual incompleteness (completeness) does not cause higher (lower) 
transaction costs; rather, it is correlated with private information underlying the 
outsourcing and/ or contracting decisions that result in long-term abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis I reflects the transaction cost approach adopted by Williamson (1985). 
Incomplete contracts permit participant firms to engage in costly bargaining and privately 
favorable redistribution of contractual surplus, as uncovered contingencies arise. The 
ensuing dissipation of efficiency gains is especially pronounced when the specificity of 
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relational investments and likelihood of opportunism are high in the outsourcing 
relationship. Thus, as the outsourcing relationship becomes characterized by increasing 
levels of contractual incompleteness, vertical integration will yield higher efficiency 
gains. Information on contractual completeness is not only costly to acquire but also 
requires expertise to interpret. Given information acquisition and processing costs, the 
transaction cost economizing benefits (costs) of relatively complete (incomplete) 
contracts are not likely incorporated in the equity price of the outsourcing firm18 at the 
time of implementation of the contract, resulting in positive (negative) abnormal returns. 
 Hypothesis II recognizes that contractual incompleteness is not randomly imposed 
on the outsourcing firm; it is an endogenous choice that reflects its desire to minimize the 
costs of contractual exchange. Independent analyses of contract choice and performance 
using different causal factors ignore the possibility that efficiency losses attributed to 
contractual incompleteness are the outcome of an adverse selection process- contracts 
most likely to be incomplete are also more likely to involve higher transaction costs. 
Contractual incompleteness (completeness) is an indicator rather than a determinant of 
higher (lower) transaction costs. 
 For instance, firms with a history of cooperative association are more aware of the 
routines and procedures each follows, rendering the interface between them more 
predictable and easier to manage.  Greater competence in transacting with each other 
results in more complete contracts. At the same time, firms with a historical propensity to 
cooperate in solving relational issues are also more likely to take a long-term view of the 
relationship, decreasing the likelihood of future opportunism and transaction costs. 
                                                 
18
 We do not assess provider returns since the outsourcing investment represents a tangible increase in 
revenue for them. Further, a given provider may sign multiple contracts with different firms in the same year, 
rendering it difficult to measure vendors’ long-run performance with respect to a specific contract. 
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Hypothesis II suggests that the market is slow to incorporate the effect of the contract 
selection process, resulting in long-term abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis III suggests that contract choices do not influence equity prices. Since 
the choice of contractual incompleteness is not random, unobserved private information 
underlying the outsourcing and/ or contracting decisions might impact abnormal returns.   
In Section IV, we examine the supportive evidence for each of the hypotheses. 
First, to test Hypothesis I, we analyze whether abnormal returns to the sample firms are 
explained by the choice of contractual incompleteness. The magnitude of transaction cost 
economizing is estimated by comparing three year buy-and-hold returns on the fixed 
price and variable price portfolios with those on control portfolios of equivalent firms 
that did not engage in an economically significant outsourcing initiative. For Hypothesis 
I, we should observe significantly positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to the 
relatively complete fixed price portfolio and significantly negative returns to the 
relatively incomplete variable price portfolio. For Hypothesis II, we develop a model of 
contract choice and check whether the BHAR are explained by contract incompleteness 
after conditioning on the firm, transactional and relational factors that explain contract 
choice. Finally, for Hypothesis III, we check whether the Inverse Mill’s ratios obtained 
from models of outsourcing and contract selection significantly explain abnormal returns.  
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Data Collection  
We base our analysis on the 100 largest outsourcing initiatives announced between 1996 
and 2005. The largest outsourcing contracts have important advantages over a similar 
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random sample. First, the firm-level economic impact of outsourcing is more likely to be 
detected when the contract value is large. The average lifetime contract value in our 
sample, at $922 million, represents an average of 1.02% of annual operating expenses. 
The aggregate contract value of $83 billion is also a significant portion of the total 
outsourcing contract value for the period. Second, our focus on large deals reduces the 
probability of confounding events; firms are less likely to sign as large contracts 
immediately prior or subsequent to the outsourcing agreement. 
 The data set draws on multiple sources. Information on the 100 largest 
outsourcing initiatives and their governing contracts is obtained from International Data 
Corporation’s (IDC) services contracts database. IDC tracks outsourcing contracts signed 
around the world with the database comprising more than 14,000 service contracts. As 
outsourcing began to gain momentum and contract value began to increase, IDC began to 
offer a detailed look at the top 100 outsourcing contracts each year, ranked by total 
contract value. This data dates back to 1996, and is the primary input to this study. IDC 
data on the top 100 outsourcing contracts signed each year includes contract value, 
length, announcement and signing date, geography, industry, outsourcing type, and a 
detailed description of the service provided. We use Lexis-Nexis and the Dow Jones 
News Retrieval Service to verify and supplement IDC information on announcement and 
signing dates. We use the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) files to 
compute abnormal stock returns, and the Compustat Basic and Research files to assess 
firm characteristics and develop operating performance measures. 
 We begin with a sample of 1000 outsourcing contracts spanning the period 1996-
2005. This initial sample comprises public, private and government contracts signed in 
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nearly thirty countries. Our final sample comprises the 100 largest outsourcing contracts 
that satisfy two requirements. First, the firm must be publicly traded on a major United 
States stock exchange. Second, information on the contract used to govern the initiative 
must be available. Our final sample of 100 outsourcing contracts includes 66 firms.  
 
3.3.2 Measurement of Variables 
Event-Time Abnormal Stock Returns: We use two main methods for estimating post-
event risk adjusted returns – characteristic based matching approach, also known as the 
event-time portfolio approach, and the Jensen’s alpha approach, also known as the 
calendar-time portfolio approach. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) describe event time buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) as “the average multi-year return from a strategy of 
investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified 
holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar nonevent firms”. 
Thus, the BHAR for stock i over holding period T is: 
TmTiTi BHRBHRBHAR ,,, −= ,      (1) 
where BHRi,T is the buy-and-hold return of the sample firm and BHRm,T is the buy-and-
hold return of the matching control firm over the same period. Here, the buy-and-hold 
return for holding period T beginning time a through time b is: 
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where rit is the return for firm i in month t; in this study, period a is the month after the 
contract effective month and period b is the earlier of the firm’s delisting date, the end of 
the three year period following the contract effective date or December 31, 2006.  
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Following Barber and Lyon (1997), we consider an industry-, size- and book-to-
market matched sample as a benchmark of returns post implementation of the 
outsourcing contract. We begin with a group of firms in the same two-digit SIC code as 
the sample that do not engage in a strategically significant outsourcing initiative as of the 
beginning of the contract effective year. From this initial screen, a matched firm is 
defined as the firm that has the lowest absolute value of the joint difference in size 
(equity capitalization) and book-to-market ratio (equity capitalization divided by book 
value of equity). Given potential skewness in the distribution of buy-and-hold returns 
owing to overlap of returns across firms in the post contract implementation period 
(Hertzel et al. 2002), we also use a bootstrapping procedure (Kothari and Warner 1997; 
Hertzel et al. 2002) to assess statistical significance of the abnormal returns.  
 
Calendar time abnormal returns: Certain studies (Fama 1998; Mitchell and Stafford 
2000) argue that measures of BHAR are more likely to spuriously reject market 
efficiency since they magnify underperformance through compounding single-period 
returns. Further, the use of BHARs does not adequately account for potential cross-
sectional dependence in returns, thereby resulting in biased estimates. To address these 
possibilities with BHARs, we also estimate abnormal returns using the Fama and French 
(1993) three factor model: 
tthtsftmtmftpt HMLSMBRRRR εβββα +++−+=− )(
 
where Rpt is the average raw return for stocks in calendar month t, Rft is the risk-free 
interest rate, Rmt is the CRSP value-weighted market index return, SMBt is the difference 
in returns between a portfolio of “small” and “big” stocks, and HMLt is the difference in 
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returns between a portfolio of “high” and “low” book-to-market stocks. A sample stock is 
included in calendar month t if t is within the 36-month period following the 
implementation of its contract. The expected value of the intercept (α) in the above 
equation measures the monthly abnormal return in excess of that achieved by passive 
investments in the factors; it is zero under the null hypothesis of market efficiency. 
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are reported in parantheses.  
 
Operational Performance: We measure abnormal gains in sales and income efficiency, 
defined as real sales divided by the number of employees and operating income divided 
by the number of employees respectively, using two groups of benchmarks. First, to 
control for industry effects, we use industry-adjusted performance measures calculated by 
subtracting the median value of the corresponding measure for all firms in the primary 
two-digit SIC code that the sample firm was a part of before the contract effective year. 
Second, we measure the sample firm’s industry-adjusted operating performance for the 
year prior to the contract effective year and for each of the three years following the 
effective year. Comparing the post-outsourcing performance to the pre-outsourcing 
benchmark provides a measure of change in operating performance.  
 
Contractual Completeness: IDC classifies outsourcing contracts as one of fixed price or 
transactional, time and materials, combination, or incentive. Fixed price contracts involve 
the payment of a fixed fee negotiated ex ante per billing cycle or per transaction (e.g. 
calls fielded, claims processed) with little or no price adjustments. The former is used 
more in the case of information technology outsourcing and custom application 
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development engagements while the latter is used more when business processes are 
outsourced. Time and materials contracts involve payment based on time and materials 
used during the billing cycle. Combination contracts have a combination of variable and 
fixed pricing components. For instance, in a custom application development project, the 
outsourcing firm may negotiate a fixed price contract during the assessment of project 
requirements and shift to a variable price contract such as time and materials during the 
actual development phase. Incentive contracts are risk-reward sharing arrangements that 
identify key performance indicators where improvement is needed, and reward the 
provider for improvements in these areas. In this study, we do not consider equity 
arrangements such as joint ventures, the outsourcing firm’s wholly owned captive 
operation, or the establishment of a venture by a consortia of vendors. 
The above contracts may be viewed along a continuum of completeness. The 
most complete contract in this regard is the fixed price contract that precludes bargaining 
over ex post surplus by excluding price revisions. Combination contracts are less 
complete but constrain provider opportunism by limiting the extent of bargaining and 
redistribution of ex post surplus. Time and materials or transactional contracts permit 
substantial price revisions that are largely limited only by the ability of the provider to 
document costs. Finally, incentive contracts are the most incomplete with no limits on 
provider opportunism, as the incentive targets themselves are open to unconstrained 
bargaining. We refer to the set of combination contracts, time and materials contracts, 
and incentive contracts as variable price contracts.  
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Explanatory Variables: Contractual incompleteness is not exogenously imposed on 
participant firms; it is an endogenous choice that reflects the trade-off between mitigating 
ex post transaction costs and the ex ante costs of designing complete contracts. We 
include several relational, transactional and firm variables that influence these two 
aspects of contract design.  
Relational variables considered in our analysis are specificity of relational 
investments (SPECIFICITY), prior cooperative association between the firms (PRIOR) 
and length of the outsourcing contract (LENGTH). Specific investments and the ensuing 
complexity of interdependencies between participant firms render it difficult to specify a 
precise division of labor and associated responsibilities. Thus, greater levels of specificity 
(SPECIFICITY) will result in greater incompleteness. Prior research in strategy argues 
that firms with prior cooperative association may have greater competence in transacting 
with each other, making it easier to contractually specify the management of the interface 
between them. Thus, we expect that prior association (PRIOR) will result in greater 
completeness. Similarly, expectations of continuity of the relationship increase the 
bargaining power of the outsourcing firm, thereby, weakening the association between 
uncertainty and contractual incompleteness. On the other hand, long-term contracts may 
involve greater adjustments and reconfiguration of the outsourcing relationship, rendering 
completeness costly. We test these conflicting predictions by examining the influence of 
contract duration (LENGTH) on contract choice.  
Outsourcing initiatives in our sample are classified as Information Systems (IS) 
Outsourcing, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) or Processing Services, and 
Application, Network and Desktop Management. In the case of IS outsourcing services 
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the service provider takes ownership of and responsibility for managing all or large part 
of a client’s IS infrastructure and operations, often involving customized, one-to-one 
engagements. If only the network and desktop environment are outsourced, IDC captures 
the spending in the network management services and desktop management services 
category. Likewise, if only the application environment is outsourced, IDC captures the 
spending in the applications outsourcing category. Applications outsourcing is a service 
wherein responsibility for deployment, management, and enhancement of a packaged or 
customized software application is externalized to the provider. Applications outsourcers 
also include application service providers (ASPs). ASPs deploy, host, manage, and rent 
access to an application from a centrally managed facility. Network management services 
involve the outsourcing of the operations of a specific segment or entire network 
communication system of a company. The network operations provided as part of a larger 
IS outsourcing contract are not captured in this category. Desktop management captures 
contracts for which several desktop services are outsourced to the same supplier. 
Processing services involve outsourcing business activities with performance metrics tied 
to the efficiency of high-volume service capabilities. BPO involves outsourcing business 
processes or functional areas (such as logistics or HR), with performance metrics tied to 
the strategic business value of services provided and to customer satisfaction. Business 
value is recognized through results such as new business opportunities, revenue 
generation and business transformation. These different types of outsourcing initiatives 
vary in their relative maturity and management challenges; hence, we control for the type 
of outsourcing initiative (TYPE) in our study.  
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Firm attributes may also influence contract choice. Uncertainty in business 
requirements of the firm increases the costs of contractual completeness since it 
necessitates systematic allocation of resources to monitor, interpret and forecast diverse 
action-outcome contingencies, and incorporate paths that are best aligned with the 
objectives of the outsourcing initiative. Thus, greater levels of environmental uncertainty 
(UNCERTAINTY) will likely result in more incomplete agreements. The greater the 
strategic importance of the outsourced function, the tighter are its interdependencies with 
the outsourcing firm’s value chain. The adaptive and evolving nature of strategically 
important functions introduces greater uncertainty in the outsourcing relationship. 
Further, the relatively higher payoffs and interdependencies inherent to these functions 
preclude the clear articulation of contractual parameters. This suggests that strategically 
important functions (STRIMP) will likely be characterized by greater contractual 
incompleteness. Larger firms have superior financial, technological and human resource 
endowments that render the design and monitoring of complex contracts more efficient 
and less expensive. Thus, we expect that larger firms (SIZE) will design more complete 
contracts. We also control for a series of firm variables - book-to-market ratio (BTM), 
short term cash needs (CASH), prior operating expenses (OPEX) and prior operational 
performance (PRIOROP_PERF) - that measure the financial health of the outsourcing 
firm. The measures of these variables are detailed in Table 3.1. 
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3.4 Governance and Abnormal Returns: Empirical Relationships 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.2 lists the distribution of our sample across primary SIC codes. The 
distribution indicates some clustering; to address potential bias arising from industry 
clusters, we control for industry effects in our empirical analysis. Also included is the 
sample distribution across outsourcing types. IS outsourcing contracts constitute 53 
percent of the sample, BPO and processing services comprise 27 percent, and application, 
network and desktop management contracts comprise 20 percent of the sample. The 
relatively higher number of IS outsourcing contracts is consistent with the greater 
maturity of this segment of the outsourcing market. 
Panel B of Table 3.2 lists some of the characteristics of the sample outsourcing 
firm and contract. As of the beginning of the contract implementation year, the mean 
(median) market value of equity of our sample firms is $37.3 ($23.8) billion. The mean 
(median) market to book ratio is 3.27 (2.71). This suggests that the sample is skewed 
towards large, high market to book firms. We control for these effects in our analysis.  
On average, the IS outsourcing contract in our sample is valued at $1.1 billion, the 
BPO contract is valued at $703 million and the application, network and desktop 
management contract is valued at $747 million. Gartner’s analysis of IT outsourcing 
contracts over a period of fourteen years found that as of 2003, the average annual value 
of an outsourcing contract was $47 million. A comparison with this estimate emphasizes 
the strategic import of our sample contracts.  
Panel B also reports that the mean two-day (-1, 0) announcement period return is 
an insignificant -0.11 percent. The finding is consistent with prior outsourcing studies, 
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which also find that there are no statistically significant value changes around 
outsourcing announcement dates. The firm’s decision to outsource is often followed by 
selection of potential vendors, competitive bidding among vendors and evaluation of 
submitted proposals, and choice of the vendor. Thus, information on the outsourcing 
initiative is likely incorporated into the stock price ahead of the announcement date. We 
begin measuring long-term abnormal stock returns at the beginning of the month 
following the effective date of the contract. We use the month lag to allow the market to 
be informed of contract characteristics and other accounting data. 
Figure 3.1 describes the number and value of the sample outsourcing contracts 
over time. More than 40 percent of the contracts in our sample were signed in the period 
2001-2003. Total contract value for the period 2001-2005 accounted for more than 50 
percent of the aggregate contract value for the sample period. Figure 3.2 suggests that 
fixed price contracts constitute 30 percent of our sample. The average value of the fixed 
price contracts is $826 million while that of variable price contracts is $834 million. 
Table 3.3 describes summary statistics and correlations for contract choice with 
explanatory contextual characteristics as of the year prior to implementation of the 
outsourcing contract. The correlation of a firm or contract characteristic with contract 
choice is given in column 1 of Table 3.3. The next two columns give the mean value of 
the characteristic in the fixed and variable price portfolios respectively; the last column 
gives the difference between means.  
The descriptive statistics provide some background for the ensuing analyses. 
Relational attributes of specificity and lack of prior cooperative association between the 
firms have the strongest correlation with choice of a variable price contract. These 
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variables are also correlated with the three year buy-and-hold abnormal returns following 
the implementation of the outsourcing contract. Similarly, uncertainty in the firm’s 
business environment is strongly correlated with the choice of a variable price contract 
and the ensuing returns to the outsourcing firm. The negative correlation between book-
to-market value and future abnormal returns is consistent with market values anticipating 
future accounting earnings; thus, in our analyses, we do not view the book to market 
value as a proxy for distress or unspecified risk. 
 If the efficiency of the outsourcing decision impacts firm performance and this 
relationship is fully incorporated by the market, then the equity price of the outsourcing 
firm19 will quickly adjust to changes in firm boundaries. In such case, the expected stock 
returns will be insignificant beyond the event window. However, if the outsourcing 
decision impacts performance but is not incorporated immediately into stock prices, then 
the realized returns would differ systematically from predicted values of the securities. In 
the next section, we examine this relationship between efficiency of the outsourcing 
decision as defined in transaction cost economizing terms and abnormal stock returns. 
 
3.4.2 Evidence on Hypothesis I 
Contractual Incompleteness and Event-Time Abnormal Stock Returns 
We obtain a quantitative measure of the importance of contractual completeness by 
comparing the return on the fixed price portfolio with that on the variable price portfolio. 
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports three year BHAR for all sample outsourcing firms following 
the implementation of the outsourcing contract. Panel B reports BHAR for outsourcing 
                                                 
19
 We only consider changes to the equity value of the outsourcing firm, not provider. For the latter, the 
outsourcing announcement represents a discernible increase in revenue while for the outsourcing firm, the 
benefit is less tangible. 
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firms that implemented contracts between 1996 and 2003 - all three years’ return data 
exist for these firms.  
The mean three-year BHAR for the fixed price portfolio relative to an industry-, 
size- and book-to-market matched control portfolio is 17.5 percent (p<0.05) while the 
corresponding estimate for the variable price portfolio is -21.2 percent (p<0.10). Thus, 
the fixed price portfolio outperformed the variable price portfolio in the sample period. 
The results in Panel B suggest that estimates in Panel A underestimate the costs (benefits) 
of contractual incompleteness (completeness). The mean three year BHAR for the fixed 
and variable price portfolios for which all three years’ price data exist are 23.6 (p<0.05) 
percent and -32.7 (p<0.05) percent respectively. The results support Hypothesis I. 
 
Contractual Incompleteness and Calendar-Time Abnormal Stock Returns 
Panel C of Table 3.4 reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns after attribution to 
the Fama and French (1993) factors20. The first row of Panel C provide results for 
estimation of calendar time stock returns in excess of the risk free rate for the entire 
sample of outsourcing contracts while the latter two rows provide corresponding 
estimates for the fixed and variable price portfolios respectively. The regression 
intercepts indicate that outsourcing firms engaged in fixed price contracts earned average 
abnormal returns of 1.1 percent per month (p<0.01) over the three year period following 
the implementation of the outsourcing contract. This translates to a three-year return of 
over 48 percent [(1+0.011)36 – 1]. The corresponding estimate for variable price contracts 
                                                 
20
 Fama and French (1993) suggest that higher returns to high book to market and small capitalization firms 
are compensation for higher systematic risk. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggest the returns are 
an outcome of investor biases. Daniel and Titman (1997) also posit that the higher returns are not directly 
associated with pervasive risk factors; rather, they are explained by similar firm characteristics in the 
portfolio of high book to market firms.  We do not take a position in this debate and view the factors only as a 
method of performance attribution.  
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is an insignificant -10 percent. The results suggest that the market underestimated the 
positive impact of relatively more complete fixed price contracts. 
 
Contractual Incompleteness and Long-Term Operating Performance  
The median industry adjusted sales and income efficiency estimates for both fixed and 
variable price portfolios for each of the years following the implementation of the 
outsourcing contract are reported in Panel A in Table 3.5. The median change in sales 
efficiency from year -1 to each of the years following the implementation of the 
outsourcing contract is reported in Panel B of Table 3.5. For each year, the sales 
efficiency gains to fixed price contracts are significantly higher than those to variable 
price contracts. Further, the increase in sales efficiency of $95.19 per employee in year 3 
represents a growth of nearly 40 percent over the increase of $67.92 per employee in year 
2, which, in turn, is a growth of 33 percent over the increase of $51.14 per employee in 
year 1. Thus, sales efficiency increases at an increasing rate for fixed price contracts. This 
is in contrast to estimates of sales efficiency gains from variable price contracts where the 
increase in sales efficiency of $57.63 per employee in year 3 represents a growth of 
nearly 17 percent over the increase of $49.16 per employee in year 2, which is a growth 
of nearly 20 percent over the increase of $40.84 per employee in year 1. Income 
efficiency gains to fixed price contracts are also significantly higher than those to 
variable price contracts. The results support Hypothesis I - fixed price contracts benefit 
from transaction cost economizing and the market underestimates these benefits at the 
time of implementation of the outsourcing contract.  
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3.4.3 Evidence on Hypothesis II  
Joint Analysis of Contract Selection and Long-Term Abnormal Stock Returns 
Contract choice is not random; Hypothesis II argues that the observed lower return to the 
variable price portfolio is in part an outcome of the contract selection process in which 
outsourcing initiatives that are most likely to be governed by variable price contracts are 
also the ones that are most likely to incur high transaction costs. To test this hypothesis, 
we use a Heckman two-stage model. The first stage relationship estimates a model of 
contract choice as a function of several variables that shift the relative costs and benefits 
of completeness: 
)()1( ' ii XYP βΦ== , 
where Yit represents the contract choice for firm i in date t, Xi is a vector of the firm-, 
transaction-and relationship-level characteristics that determine contract choice, β is a 
vector of estimated coefficients for these characteristics, and Φ(·) is the standard normal 
cdf. The inverse Mills ratio estimated at this stage controls for potential private 
information effects. Thus, the test of its significance is a test of Hypothesis III - whether 
private firm information impacting contract choice explains ensuing abnormal returns. 
 
Contract Choice: The first column of table 3.6 reports results for a probit model where 
CONTRACT takes on one of two values – fixed or variable price. The estimated 
coefficients are significant and of the hypothesized sign. We find that the coefficient for 
TYPE is positive and significant. Thus, BPO initiatives are more likely to be governed by 
variable price contracts. This is likely because the relatively nascent nature of BPO and 
the greater interdependencies of an outsourced business process render it relatively 
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difficult to predict and define all contingencies at the outset. The results for the other 
explanatory variables are also consistent with our theoretical expectations. Coefficients of 
UNCERTAINTY, SPECIFICITY and STRIMP are positive and significant while that of 
PRIOR and EXP are negative and significant. The positive effect of environmental 
uncertainty, relational specificity, and strategic importance of the outsourcing initiative 
on the likelihood of choice of a variable price contract is consistent with the argument of 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) and Banerjee and Duflo (2000) that variables leading to 
increased environmental complexity result in less exhaustive contracts. Prior cooperative 
association between the user firm and service provider facilitates greater ease in 
definition and management of the interface between them, resulting in more complete 
fixed price contracts. This is different from Crocker and Reynolds (1993) who find that 
prior cooperative association decreases the marginal benefit of complete contracts and 
affords greater incompleteness21. 
The second column of Table 3.6 reports results from a generalized estimating 
equations model that is a generalization of the widely-used generalized linear model 
formulation for uncorrelated data. The results are consistent with the probit estimation. 
The contracting decision is only observed for firms that engage in an 
economically significant outsourcing initiative. The third column of Table 3.6 estimates a 
heckman probit model of contract choice that controls for firm capabilities and 
unobserved heterogeneity that impact the decision to outsource and also likely influence 
the contracting decision. The exogenous firm instruments that we use in estimating the 
                                                 
21
 Banerjee and Duflo (2000) also find that firms that work with a repeated client are more likely to be 
governed by a variable price time and materials contract. However, on introducing the interaction between 
working for a repeat client and the age of the firm, they find that this is not true for old firms. Given that the 
sample firms  
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likelihood of outsourcing are prior operating expenses (OPEX), short-term cash needs 
(CASH), market and book leverage (MKTLEV and BKLEV), executive compensation 
(COMP) and CEO stock options (OPTIONS). Academic and industry surveys (e.g. 
Linder 2003, Dibbern et al. 2004) find that firms primarily outsource to reduce costs and 
improve management’s focus on more strategic issues. Thus, the higher the operating 
expenses, the greater should be the likelihood of outsourcing. Cash needs and financial 
leverage of the firm increase the likelihood that the firm will use outsourcing to transfer 
costly assets to the provider and convert capital to expense. Hall and Liedtka (2005) find 
that incentives created by CEO stock options and the overall compensation mix 
significantly influence the decision to outsource. The measurement of these variables is 
also described in Table 3.1.  
 The estimated correlation between the errors of the outsourcing and contract 
choice equations, ρ, is statistically insignificant suggesting that the probit estimation does 
not require controlling for sample selection effects. Thus, we estimate separately the 
models of outsourcing and contract choices to obtain correction factors for self selection 
into the outsourcing and contracting decisions respectively. The results for estimation of 
the model of outsourcing choice are presented in Table 3.7 and are consistent with the 
above theorized relationships. 
 
Abnormal Returns: Table 3.8 presents the results of our second stage models of three 
year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) following the implementation of the 
outsourcing contract. To test Hypothesis II, we check whether the BHAR are explained 
by (a) contractual incompleteness after conditioning on the factors that drive contract 
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choice and (b) contractual drivers both without and after conditioning on the contract. 
Petersen (2006), in his simulation of various methods of analyses in corporate finance, 
finds that when the residuals of a given firm are correlated across years, standard errors 
clustered by firm are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence intervals whether 
the firm effect is permanent or temporary. The fixed effect and random effect 
specifications also produce unbiased standard errors but only when the firm effect is 
permanent. Alternatively, in the presence of an unobserved time effect, Fama-MacBeth 
produces unbiased standard errors and correctly sized confidence intervals. When both a 
firm and time effect are present in the data, standard errors clustered on both dimensions 
are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence intervals. Thus, we estimate the 
following model: 
BHARic = αXic + βZic + γMic + δCic + εic, 
where Cic represents the contract type chosen by firm i in outsourcing contract c, Xic is a 
vector of firm characteristics, Zic is a vector of transactional characteristics, and Mic is a 
vector of relational characteristics. Given potential firm and time effects in the data, we 
cluster standard errors on firm and year of implementation of the outsourcing contract.  
Model I examines the effect of contractual completeness on BHAR. Model II 
examines the unconditional impact of the contractual drivers while Model III analyzes 
their effect after controlling for contract type. F-tests for all three models reject the 
hypothesis that the predictors are jointly insignificant. The adjusted R-squares for the 
models range from 0.23 to 0.27. An analysis of variance inflation factors (VIF) and 
condition indices suggested that the coefficients in the models were biased by near 
multicollinearity. The VIF for the inverse Mills ratio and contract choice were greater 
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than 10. The variance proportions associated with the condition indices also confirmed 
that the dependencies involved these variables. We used residual regressions (Chung and 
Charoenwong 1998; Ciscel and Carroll 1980) to handle spurious correlations. The 
residual value from the regression of the inverse mills ratio on contract choice was used 
in the final regression in all models for the estimation of BHAR. 
The coefficient of contract choice in Model I is significant and negative, 
suggesting that the long-term BHAR are an outcome of the market’s underestimation of 
the benefits of contractual completeness. Thus, results of Model I support Hypothesis 1.  
Model II describes the unconditional impact of contractual drivers on the BHAR. 
The negative impact of uncertainty and specificity of relational investments on the BHAR 
is robust to all specifications. Taken together with the results of the model of contract 
choice, these results suggest that uncertainty in the outsourcing firm’s business 
environment and anticipated relational specificity not only signal poor adaptiveness of 
the outsourcing firm but also trigger an adverse selection process in which they cause the 
outsourcing firm to pick a complex contract that becomes especially difficult to manage. 
The significant impact of ex post changes in income efficiency on BHAR observed in 
Model I become insignificant in Model II, implying that the changes in income efficiency 
are correlated with business uncertainty and relational specificity. 
Model III describes the impact of contractual drivers on BHAR after conditioning 
on contractual completeness. The analysis yields two key results. First, we find that in 
contrast to Model I, contractual completeness is not a significant predictor of abnormal 
returns. Second, environmental uncertainty, anticipated specificity, mutual trust and 
experience of the outsourcing firm managing similar strategic initiatives . Even after we 
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control for the type of contract, the influence of environmental uncertainty and 
anticipated specificity remains significant. This confirms the direct impact that these 
factors have on the BHAR. The significant positive impact of prior association in the 
conditional model is likely because induced trust and its underlying normative behaviors 
reduce the likelihood of opportunism and allied transaction costs. Similarly, outsourcing 
experience of the firm helps reduce the costs of ongoing coordination of outsourced tasks 
across firm boundaries. Given the strategic nature of the sample outsourcing initiatives, 
such costs are particularly pertinent.  
The results in table 3.8, in conjunction with the results of the model of contract 
choice, confirm Hypothesis II – outsourcing initiatives that are most likely to result in 
negative abnormal returns are also more likely to be governed by a variable price 
contract. Further, the market is slow to incorporate information on the contextual factors 
that drive contract choice so that there is systematic and predictable association between 
these factors and ex post contract performance. 
The Inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the model of contract choice is negative 
and significant in all specifications of Model III, providing evidence for Hypothesis III – 
private information underlying the contract choice impacts BHAR to outsourcing firms. 
 
3.4.4 Cross Sectional Patterns in Long-term Returns 
In order to ascertain the extent of impact of the contractual drivers on abnormal returns, 
we partition our sample along these observable characteristics to examine differences in 
the BHAR. Table 3.9 reports the gains from outsourcing for fixed and variable price 
contracts across the lowest and highest quartiles of environmental uncertainty, anticipated 
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specificity, prior cooperative association and outsourcing experience relative to matched 
firms that did not engage in an economically significant outsourcing initiative. Panel A 
reports the three year BHAR for the full sample of firms stratified by contract choice 
while Panel B reports equivalent estimates for the sample firms in whose case all three 
years’ return data are available. As in the case of BHAR calculated earlier, we observe 
that the results in panel A underestimate those in Panel B. The return on the fixed price 
portfolio is significantly higher than that on the variable price portfolio for the highest 
quartiles of uncertainty (83.8 percent significant at the 90 percent level) and specificity 
(111.3 percent significant at the 90 percent level), for the lowest quartile of outsourcing 
experience (118.4 percent significant at the 95 percent level) and for firms with no prior 
cooperative association (50.7 percent significant at the 95 percent level).  
Our results also suggest that the demonstrated superior returns to high book to 
market firms in the finance literature may be explained in part by the managerial choices 
of the firms. For instance, we find that the magnitude of superior performance of the 
fixed price portfolio is lower for firms in the lowest quartile of book to market. The mean 
three year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the fixed price contracts relative to that of 
the variable price contracts in the highest quartile of book-to-market is 66.2 percent 
(p<0.01) while in the lowest quartile of book-to-market, it is an insignificant 1.2 percent. 
Similarly, there is evidence that fixed price contracts do not outperform variable price 
contracts in the highest quartile of firm size. The mean three year buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for the fixed price contracts relative to that of the variable price contracts in the 
highest quartile of firm size is an insignificant -5 percent while that in the lowest quartile 
is 51.4 percent (p<0.05). Prior research in finance has speculated that the size and book to 
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market variables are correlated with macro economic variables such as GDP growth that 
explain variation in the investment opportunity set over time. Our results are consistent 
with Daniel and Titman (1997) who posit that the covariance among high book-to-market 
firms is an outcome, not of an underlying risk factor associated with distress, but of 
similar business characteristics, in this case, governance efficacy, that the firms share.  
Finally, we examine whether pre-event performance measures explain differences 
in the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The results suggest that prior performance of firms 
engaging in fixed price contracts is lower than that of firms engaging in variable price 
contracts; however, this difference in not significant. As shown in Table 3.10 (panel B), 
the mean and median raw returns for firms engaging in fixed price contracts is not 
significantly different from those of firms engaging in variable price contracts. Further, 
for both fixed- and variable-price contracts, the mean raw buy-and-hold returns are lower 
than the mean contemporaneous buy-and-hold returns for the industry-, size- and book-
to-market control firm benchmarks; however, this difference is insignificant. There is 
also no significant difference between the buy-and-hold abnormal returns of firms 
governed by fixed price contracts and those governed by variable price contracts. Results 
of the calendar-time portfolio methodology in Panel A confirm these results. 
 
3.5 Concluding Discussion 
Does contract choice influence outsourcing performance, and is the market slow to 
recognize the benefit of efficacy of contract choice? We answer this question by 
examining the long-term abnormal returns and operational performance gains to fixed- 
and variable-price contracts in a sample of the hundred largest outsourcing contracts 
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implemented between 1996 and 2005. For the three year period following the 
implementation of the outsourcing contract, we find that fixed price contracts experience 
significantly greater sales and income efficiency gains than variable price contracts. We 
also find consistent evidence that shareholders experience significantly positive abnormal 
stock returns for the three year period following the implementation of fixed price 
contracts and negative abnormal returns that approach significance for the three year 
period following the implementation of variable price contracts.  
Our findings corroborate with those of prior research that the market is slow to 
incorporate information on corporate decisions (e.g. Loughran and Ritter 1995). 
However, our analysis of outsourcing investments differs from these studies because the 
outsourcing investment is a managerial decision that reflects intangible information on 
future cash flows. Further, the contract choice, which explains the cross section of 
abnormal returns to intangible information on the outsourcing investment, is 
representative of a class of “strategic management” choices that the intangible 
information is embedded in. These choices are rarely announced but yet, offer important 
cues to investor interpretation of the intangible information. This explains the significant 
difference of over 47 percent (p<0.01) in three year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
between firms engaged in fixed- and variable-price contracts respectively.  
The result is inconsistent with traditional risk based explanations in finance. Fixed 
price (variable price) contracts are characterized by lower (higher) systematic risk (also 
evidenced by the lower beta for fixed price contracts relative to variable price contracts in 
the calendar time portfolio regressions) and yet, yield significantly positive (negative) 
abnormal returns. An alternative explanation is that information acquisition costs and 
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knowledge asymmetry of normative contract choices explain the abnormal returns. The 
relatively incomplete variable price contracts are an efficient choice when uncertainty in 
the business environment and coordination costs are high, since they render predicting 
and defining contractual contingencies in complete contracts costly. This is evidenced in 
the results of the probit model. However, while high levels of uncertainty and anticipated 
coordination render complete insurance of risk sub-optimal, they also exacerbate the 
moral hazard problem in the outsourcing relationship so that the costs of outsourcing the 
process exceed the costs of vertical integration. Consistent with this view, we find that 
the significant difference in abnormal returns between fixed- and variable-price contracts 
is not attributable to the contract choice, per se; after controlling for the selection process, 
including unobserved heterogeneity that drives managerial adoption of a particular 
contract, we find that the negative returns to variable price contracts are the outcome of a 
paradoxical selection process where variable price contracts most likely to be formed are 
also the ones most likely to yield negative abnormal returns. In particular, uncertainty in 
the business environment and anticipated coordination costs increase the likelihood of 
choice of a variable price contract and also decrease the abnormal returns to the contract. 
Similarly, prior cooperative association between the outsourcing firm and provider, an 
indication of mutual trust, allays value appropriation concerns in the relationship and 
renders management of the interface between the firms relatively easy. This decreases the 
costs of implementing relatively complete fixed price contracts and also improves the 
efficiency of the outsourcing process. There is some evidence in our results that investors 
react positively to prior association between the two firms. Our results emphasize that the 
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financial market is slow to recognize the effect of these contextual variables that 
influence choice of the outsourcing contract, resulting in significant abnormal returns. 
The significant impact of the contract selection process on abnormal returns 
suggests that by analyzing the performance impact of managerial decisions without 
considering the likelihood of adopting the decision, prior research on the financial value 
of managerial decisions ignores the important possibility that the performance outcomes 
are the result of the selection process. For instance, abnormal returns to an increase in 
R&D expenditure may very likely be a response to other strategic factors such as 
competitive pressures, technological advancements or new industry entrants that drive the 
increased expend. As intangible information increasingly explains the cross section of 
long-term abnormal returns, it becomes important to understand the specific nature of this 
intangible information and its drivers.  
The result also has important implications for the practice of outsourcing. The 
abnormal return measures the difference between the observed return and the predicted 
return had the outsourcing event not taken place. This suggests that high levels of 
environmental uncertainty and coordination requirements increase the costs of 
outsourcing a business function, emphasizing the need to exercise caution in initiating 
strategic outsourcing engagements characterized by these contextual attributes. The moral 
hazard problem is heightened in such environments rendering outsourcing sub-optimal. 
On the other hand, prior cooperative association between the firms signals reduced 
likelihood of opportunism, thereby, reducing the extent of the moral hazard problem. 
More generally, prior association may be representative of a class of reputation variables 
that signal mutual reliability of the participant firms. 
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Finally, the results have important implications for information disclosure. Prior 
research finds that investors adjust the cost of capital for asymmetric information and 
increased perceived risk. Greater disclosure by the outsourcing firm can help reduce the 
influence of these factors, thereby, reducing the cost of capital and increasing firm 
valuation. This suggests that in order to better manage the cost of capital, the outsourcing 
firm must disclose additional information on the risks inherent to the outsourcing 
initiative with emphasis on the interdependencies between the initiative and the business 
environment, the business objectives of the initiative and its complexity, and the nature of 
the relationship with the provider. Yet, it must simultaneously determine the inflection 
point beyond which the improvement of firm value through disclosure of information that 
increases the predictability of future cash flows is offset by the decline in expected cash 
flows caused by the relinquishment of critical competitive information. For e.g., 
information on the actual contract type may be retained within the firm. This is consistent 
with the finding that investors do not react to the choice of the outsourcing contract itself 
but rather to the firm- and transaction-level attributes that drive such choice. 
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FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Model of Fit between IR and IC 
 
Figure 1.2: Process Complexity, Interdependence, and IR of the BPO Relationship 
 
Figure 1.1: Continuum of IR of the BPO Relationship 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Illustrative Example of Complexity and Interdependence 
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Figure 1.3: Second-order construct of IC of the BPO Relationship 
 
Figure 1.4: Alternative conceptualizations of fit between IR and IC 
 
 
   
Figure 1.5: Fit as a match between IR and IC of the BPO Relationship 
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FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Figure 2.1: Second-order Construct of Information Structure of the BPO Relationship 
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FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Figure 3.1: Number and Value of Sample Contracts across Time 
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Figure 3.2: Outsourcing Value by Contract Type across Time 
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TABLES FOR CHAPTER 1 
Table 1.1: Comparison of Alternate Perspectives of Fit – Adapted from Venkatraman (1989) 
Key 
Characteristics 
Fit as 
Moderation 
Fit as 
Mediation 
Fit as 
Matching 
Fit as 
Gestalts 
Fit as 
Profile 
Deviation 
Fit as 
Covariation 
Functional 
Relationship 
Interaction Intervention Matching Internal 
Congruence 
Adherence 
to a 
specified 
profile 
Internal 
consistency 
Number of 
variables in the 
specification  
Two Two to 
multiple 
Two Multiple Multiple Four to 
multiple 
 
Table 1.1: Comparison of Transactional and Transformational BPO Initiatives 
 Transactional BPO Transformational BPO 
Process Attributes High analyzability 
Low variety 
Low interdependence 
Low analyzability 
High variety 
High interdependence 
IR Low High 
Aligned IC • Low levels of hierarchical control 
• Mechanistic relational structure 
with low levels of joint action, 
commitment and conflictual 
conflict resolution 
• Low technological capabilities 
• High levels of hierarchical control 
• Organismic relational structure with 
high levels of joint action, 
commitment and collaborative 
conflict resolution 
• High technological capabilities 
Impact Increase operational efficiency. 
Largely process level outcomes, 
e.g., reduce process costs by 40 
percent. 
Enhance firm competitiveness. 
Largely enterprise level outcomes, 
e.g., increase revenue by 5 percent. 
 
Table 1.2: Measurement of Key Constructs 
Construct Items 
Satisfaction with 
Service Reliability 
Perceived satisfaction with the service provider along the following four dimensions 
(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) 
1. My firm is satisfied with the cost and quality of services offered by the vendor. 
2. Services provided by the outsourcer are characterized by high levels of reliability 
and accuracy. 
3. The vendor is efficient and provides services that are in alignment with contracted 
guidelines. 
4. The vendor has requisite knowledge and competence to answer specific queries 
and requests.  
Satisfaction with 
Service 
Responsiveness 
Perceived satisfaction with the service provider along the following three dimensions 
(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) 
1. Our firm trusts the effectiveness of the vendor’s skills and ability for action 
whenever a problem arises. 
2. The vendor readily responds to our service requests. 
3. The vendor effectively uses feedback from our firm to improve service standards 
Satisfaction with 
Service Innovation 
Perceived satisfaction with the service provider along the following three dimensions 
(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) 
1. The vendor demonstrates high levels of service innovation. 
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2. The vendor exhibits “service transcendence” – making us aware of process needs 
that are not contracted for, and exceeding established service standards. 
Satisfaction with 
Service 
Systematization 
Perceived satisfaction with the service provider along the following two dimensions 
(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) 
1. The vendor works towards enhancing technologies and processes to serve us, the 
customer, more effectively.  
2. The vendor has effective customer grievance procedures and processes that help 
us communicate service issues and problems. 
Information Capabilities 
Governance Structure 
Governance 
Structure 
Choice of contractual structure for the outsourced business process in increasing order 
of hierarchical control: 
1. Short-term contracts marked by competitive bidding 
2. Long-term or open-ended contract 
3. Minority equity investment 
4. Joint venture/ majority equity strategic alliance 
5. Other  
Length of Contract Duration of the contract (in years) as it pertains to the outsourced process (Scale: 1 = 
<1, 7 = >10) 
Emphasis on 
Coordination versus 
Control 
Total ratio of time spent on coordination tasks. From a total of 100 points representing 
the total time spent working with the service provider in the relationship, respondents 
allocated a score (ranging in value from 0 to 100) to each of the following activities. 
Thus, the score is indicative of the relative time spent on that activity. 
1. Negotiating price with the vendor 
2. Monitoring the vendor’s performance 
3. Resolving very urgent problems 
4. Coordinating with the vendor for continuous improvements 
5. Exchanging ideas and future plans 
6. Keeping in touch with the vendor 
The first three tasks are control-oriented while the latter three are coordination-
oriented.  
Relational Processes 
Commitment Extent to which there exists an equal sharing between the user firm and service 
provider of risks, benefits and responsibilities for problem solving (Scale: 1 = Vendor 
has more of the share, 7 = Our firm has more of the share). 
Joint Action Extent to which there exists joint effort and cooperation between the user firm and the 
service provider in each of the areas mentioned below (Scale: 1 = No or minimal joint 
effort, 7 = Extensive joint effort): 
1. Long Range Planning  
2. Process Planning 
3. Process Execution 
4. Technical Assistance 
5. Quality Control 
6. Training/ Education 
Means of Conflict 
Resolution 
Extent to which past disagreements between the user firm and the service provider 
were resolved in an adversarial versus collaborative fashion (Scale: 1 = Based on 
confrontation, 7 = Based on problem-solving and negotiation). 
Information Technologies 
Scope of IT Use Percentage of transactions with the service provider that is electronically transmitted 
(Scale: 1 = <5%, 7 = >80%) 
Intensity of IT Use Extent to which IT is extensively used in the following (Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 
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= Strongly Agree): 
1. Process conception, preparation and execution 
2. Process support 
3. Auxiliary functions of the process 
4. Core functions of the process 
Sophistication of 
Coordination 
Infrastructure 
1. The range of enterprise technologies and standards used to coordinate activities in 
the relationship. Respondents were asked to check from a list of ten enterprise 
technologies and standards (e.g. transaction processing systems, data 
warehousing, security standards and policies, etc.) those that were used in their 
outsourcing context. 
2. The extent to which process information is exchanged and updated in real time. 
Information 
Requirements 
Amount of information communicated (1) within the organization, (2) with the service 
provider during the outsourcing process (Scale: 1 = Minimal, 7 = Very high) 
In addition, firms were asked to list the following: 
3.   Number of external support organizations used in the outsourcing process (market 
research/ analyst firms, technology consulting firms, management consulting firms, 
law firms, advisory firms, solutions integrator or any other) 
4.   Number of different purposes for which the abovementioned support services were 
used (contract negotiation and development, vendor evaluation and relationship 
management, risk management, etc.) 
Process 
Complexity 
1. The extent to which a clearly defined body of knowledge guides the effective 
functioning of the process. (1=Very well defined, 7=Not defined) 
2. The extent to which process managers and workers come across difficult problems 
that they don’t know how to solve immediately (1=Never, 7=Always) 
3. The extent to which the activities or methods followed in the process are about the 
same for dealing with different classes of inputs (e.g. categories of cases, claims, 
or clients) (1=Identical, 7=Extreme variation) 
4. The extent to which in doing their jobs from day to day, unit members have to 
adopt different methods or procedures to do their work. (1=Never, 7=Always) 
Process 
Interdependence 
1. The extent to which the business process is shared among business units/ 
functions. (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree) 
2. The extent to which the process can be executed and managed independent of 
other organizational processes (1=Strongly agree, 7=Strongly disagree. 
3. The extent to which the process requires involvement of multiple departments 
(1=Strongly agree, 7=Strongly disagree. 
4. The extent to which the process maintains standard interfaces with other 
organizational processes (1=Interfaces are standard, 7=Interfaces are customized) 
 
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Reliability 5.014 1.382
2 Responsiveness 5.196 1.400 0.620
3 Systematization 5.162 1.411 0.640 0.750
4 Innovation 5.098 1.184 0.748 0.626 0.616
5 Complexity 3.547 1.307 -0.015 -0.016 0.014 -0.024
6 Interdependence 4.712 1.314 -0.125 -0.028 0.017 -0.065 -0.400
7 Information Requirements 4.175 0.901 0.084 0.134 0.184 0.261 0.005 0.070
8 Information Capabilities 0.680 0.468 0.072 0.262 0.336 0.215 -0.014 0.116 0.621
9 Firm Size 2.438 1.309 0.302 0.229 0.158 0.378 0.019 -0.055 0.241 0.307
10 Firm Tenure 4.883 2.010 -0.078 -0.041 -0.076 -0.018 -0.085 0.030 0.022 0.052 -0.127
11 Mutual Trust 0.500 0.502 0.321 0.372 0.426 0.378 0.048 -0.152 0.271 0.251 0.252 -0.082
12 Environmental Uncertainty 4.039 1.578 -0.235 -0.038 0.068 -0.211 0.006 0.180 0.219 0.251 -0.050 0.025 0.045
13 Outsourcing Experience 3.828 1.311 0.403 0.398 0.312 0.376 -0.055 -0.069 0.110 0.179 0.053 -0.076 0.180 -0.145
14 IC Misfit 0.350 0.181 -0.383 -0.452 -0.348 -0.385 0.057 0.058 0.098 0.122 -0.257 0.146 -0.090 -0.103 -0.143
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Table 1.4: Estimates for the Second-Order IC Construct 
Construct Indicators Standard 
Loading 
Composite 
Reliability 
Variance 
Extracted 
Governance Structure 0.64 
Relational Processes 0.60 
IC 
Information Technologies 0.86 
0.75 0.50 
All loadings were significant at p<0.01 
 
Table 1.5: Estimates for the First-Order IC Sub-Constructs 
Second-Order 
Construct 
First-Order 
Construct 
Indicators Standard 
Loading 
Composite 
Reliability 
Variance 
Extracted 
Hierarchical Control 0.88 
Contract Length 0.80 
Governance 
Structure 
Degree of Formalization -0.63 
0.82 0.60 
Joint Action 0.79 
Commitment 0.78 
Relational 
Processes 
Conflict Resolution 0.71 
0.85 0.59 
Scope of IT Use 0.78 
Intensity of IT Use 0.72 
IC 
Information 
Technologies 
Coordination Infrastructure 0.73 
0.79 0.56 
All loadings were significant at p<0.01 
 
Table 1.6: Probit estimates for first-stage IC choice model  
Independent Variables Model I Model II 
Intercept   0.627***   0.700*** 
Firm Size   0.623***   0.536*** 
Firm Tenure   0.125   0.026 
Prior Association   0.180   0.060 
Environmental Uncertainty   0.472***   0.349*** 
Outsourcing Experience   0.312**   0.172 
IR    0.800*** 
N    128    128 
Log Likelihood -62.51 -49.20 
Pseudo-R Square    0.22    0.39 
(a) Positive coefficients indicate a greater probability of choice of high IC 
(b) **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 1.7: Estimates for second stage models of satisfaction with service reliability 
Model III Independent 
Variables 
Model I Model II 
High IC Low IC 
Firm Size  0.239***  0.089  0.128  0.023 
Firm Tenure  0.026  0.034 -0.047  0.370*** 
Prior Association  0.239***  0.208***  0.196** -0.025 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
-0.175** -0.290*** -0.359***  0.035 
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Outsourcing 
Experience 
 0.327***  0.235***  0.077  0.569* 
IC -0.061  0.187   
IC Misfit  -0.316*** -0.380*** -0.344** 
Correction for self-
selection (λ) 
 -0.149 -0.323  0.261 
N   128     128       87     41 
Model F  9.30***    9.70***   8.98***  4.98*** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.28    0.35    0.40  0.41 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 1.8: Estimates for second stage models of satisfaction with service responsiveness 
Model III Independent 
Variables 
Model I Model II 
High IC Low IC 
Firm Size  0.115 -0.063  0.034 -0.261 
Firm Tenure  0.022  0.047 -0.043  0.246* 
Prior Association  0.265***  0.239***  0.143  0.240 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
-0.036 -0.164* -0.225** -0.040 
Outsourcing 
Experience 
 0.325***  0.216***  0.200* -0.044 
IC  0.122  0.349**   
IC Misfit  -0.456*** -0.490*** -0.469*** 
Correction for self-
selection (λ) 
 -0.080 -0.467 -0.506 
N   128     128      87     41 
Model F  8.37  12.53 10.89***  3.87 
Adjusted R-
Square 
 0.26    0.42   0.45  0.33 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 1.9: Estimates for second stage models of satisfaction with service systematization 
Model III Independent 
Variables 
Model I Model II 
High IC Low IC 
Firm Size -0.003 -0.126  0.015 -0.204 
Firm Tenure -0.037 -0.009 -0.101  0.199 
Prior Association  0.337***  0.325***  0.222**  0.333* 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
 0.020 -0.064 -0.145  0.218 
Outsourcing 
Experience 
 0.221***  0.146*  0.025  0.213 
IC  0.225**  0.341**   
IC Misfit  -0.365*** -0.344** -0.506*** 
Correction for self-
selection (λ) 
  0.003 -0.790** -0.469 
N     128     128       87     41 
Model F    8.66***  10.26***    6.67***  4.28*** 
Adjusted R-    0.27    0.37    0.32  0.37 
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Square 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 1.10: Estimates for second stage models of satisfaction with service innovation 
Model III Independent 
Variables 
Model I Model II 
High IC Low IC 
Firm Size  0.265**  0.105  0.164  0.200 
Firm Tenure  0.087  0.101 -0.018  0.323** 
Prior Association  0.267***  0.238***  0.220** -0.145 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
-0.206*** -0.326*** -0.300*** -0.064 
Outsourcing 
Experience 
 0.224***  0.126  0.137 -0.197 
IC  0.105  0.346**   
IC Misfit  -0.368*** -0.376*** -0.568** 
Correction for self-
selection (λ) 
 -0.124 -0.367 -0.500 
N     128     128       87     41 
Model F  10.69***  12.29***  11.03***  4.24*** 
Adjusted R-
Square 
   0.31    0.42    0.45  0.36 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 1.11: Summary of support for hypotheses 
 
Satisfaction with 
reliability 
Satisfaction with 
responsiveness 
Satisfaction with 
systematization 
Satisfaction with 
process innovation 
Hypothesis 1 Supported Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 2 Not supported Supported Supported Supported 
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TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
Table 2.1: Estimates for the Model of Information Structure of the BPO Relationship 
Construct Parameter 
Estimate 
Composite 
Reliability 
Variance 
Extracted 
Information Structure 
Joint Action 0.729*** 
Relational Emphasis on Coordination 0.780*** 
Technological Capabilities 0.781*** 
0.81 0.65 
Technological Capabilities 
Scope of IT Use 0.760*** 
Intensity of IT Use 0.771*** 
Sophistication of Coordination Systems 0.878*** 
0.85 0.62 
  
Table 2.2: Probit Estimates for Choice of Contractual Structure 
 
Time and Materials  
Outsourced Process Characteristics  
Process Analyzability -0.413** 
(0.206) 
Process Modularity -0.005 
(0.182) 
Information Intensity -0.168 
(0.161) 
Relational Characteristics 
Prior Cooperative Association -0.582*** 
(0.185) 
Bargaining Power of the User Firm -0.566*** 
(0.145) 
Contractual Completeness -0.503** 
(0.195) 
Continuity Expectations  0.294* 
(0.173) 
Information Structure 
Joint Action  0.057 
(0.236) 
Relational Emphasis on Coordination  0.108 
(0.264) 
Technological Capabilities  0.234 
(0.231) 
Firm Size -0.326*** 
(0.124) 
Performance Guarantees -0.503** 
(0.200) 
Competitive Intensity  0.383** 
(0.187) 
Constant  0.541*** 
(0.150) 
Log Likelihood -52.21 
Pseudo R-Square    0.41 
(a) *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.3: Estimates for the overall Information Structure and Joint Action, Coordination, and 
Technological Capabilities across Contractual Structures 
 
Information 
Structure 
Joint 
Action 
Emphasis on 
Coordination 
Technological 
Capabilities 
Contractual Structure 
    
Time and Materials  0.615*** 
(0.146) 
 0.411**  0.597***  0.583*** 
Outsourced Process Characteristics  
Process Analyzability -0.332*** 
(0.059) 
-0.259*** -0.437*** -0.133 
Process Modularity -0.087 
(0.056) 
-0.167***  0.044 -0.144** 
Information Intensity  0.177*** 
(0.059) 
 0.137**  0.177***  0.141* 
Relational Characteristics 
    
Prior Cooperative Association  0.434*** 
(0.064) 
 0.312***  0.414***  0.388*** 
Bargaining Power of the User Firm  0.149** 
(0.061) 
 0.171**  0.012  0.225*** 
Contractual Completeness -0.041 
(0.074) 
-0.212**  0.118 -0.030 
Continuity Expectations  0.078 
(0.058) 
 0.043  0.074  0.081 
Other Controls 
Firm Size -0.026 
(0.052) 
-0.106  0.055 -0.032 
Correction for self-selection (λ) -0.442*** 
(0.130) 
-0.301** -0.437*** -0.427*** 
 
N  134     134     134     134 
Adjusted R2    0.54    0.44    0.53    0.32 
Model F  21.53***  10.90***  22.22***    8.69*** 
(a) *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
(b) Breusch-Pagan test of independence of equations: χ2(3) = 49.72, p<0.01. Given the 
significant correlation between the residuals of the three equations, we estimate the 
above system of equations using seemingly unrelated regressions. 
 
Table 2.4: Performance Effect of Joint Action, Coordination and Technological Capabilities across 
Contracts 
 Service Satisfaction Process Ownership Costs 
 Fixed Price T&M Fixed Price T&M 
Information Structure 
Joint Action  0.177 
(0.131) 
 0.326** 
(0.137) 
-0.083 
(0.143) 
 0.358** 
(0.150) 
Relational Emphasis on Coordination -0.062 
(0.155) 
 0.254* 
(0.129) 
-0.336 
(0.211) 
-0.016 
(0.177) 
Technological Capabilities  0.028 
(0.126) 
 0.208 
(0.133) 
-0.053 
(0.121) 
 0.341** 
(0.154) 
 
Process Analyzability  0.016 
(0.141) 
 0.332*** 
(0.097) 
-0.146 
(0.162) 
 0.062 
(0.135) 
Process Modularity  0.266* 
(0.142) 
 0.027 
(0.092) 
 0.090 
(0.133) 
 0.215* 
(0.116) 
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Information Intensity -0.190 
(0.127) 
 0.065 
(0.102) 
-0.014 
(0.162) 
 0.105 
(0.109) 
 
Prior Cooperative Association  0.361** 
(0.150) 
 0.273*** 
(0.101) 
 0.419* 
(0.229) 
 0.208* 
(0.109) 
Bargaining Power of the User Firm  0.358*** 
(0.131) 
 0.030 
(0.080) 
-0.094 
(0.145) 
-0.080 
(0.108) 
Contractual Completeness  0.172 
(0.154) 
 0.066 
(0.087) 
 0.637*** 
(0.182) 
-0.031 
(0.105) 
Continuity Expectations  0.328*** 
(0.116) 
 0.152* 
(0.091) 
 0.260* 
(0.145) 
-0.058 
(0.089) 
 
Firm Size -0.319** 
(0.147) 
 0.160* 
(0.085) 
-0.034 
(0.203) 
 0.182** 
(0.076) 
Correction for self-selection (λ) -0.079 
(0.159) 
-0.064 
(0.131) 
-0.297 
(0.202) 
 0.010 
(0.149) 
N  51   79   48   79 
Adjusted R2  0.45   0.62   0.22   0.42 
Model F  4.37*** 11.47***   2.09**   5.64*** 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
 
Table 2.5: Performance Effect of Overall Information Structure across Contractual Structures 
 Service Satisfaction Process Ownership Costs 
 Fixed Price T&M Fixed Price T&M 
Information Structure  0.091 
(0.124) 
 0.666*** 
(0.108) 
-0.310* 
(0.158) 
 0.591*** 
(0.139) 
 
Process Analyzability  0.024 
(0.137) 
 0.322*** 
(0.100) 
-0.104 
(0.151) 
 0.113 
(0.130) 
Process Modularity  0.240* 
(0.139) 
 0.010 
(0.091) 
 0.069 
(0.125) 
 0.177 
(0.121) 
Information Intensity -0.204 
(0.122) 
 0.064 
(0.102) 
-0.026 
(0.160) 
 0.090 
(0.117) 
 
Prior Cooperative Association  0.333** 
(0.125) 
 0.288*** 
(0.104) 
 0.365* 
(0.212) 
 0.222* 
(0.115) 
Bargaining Power of the User Firm  0.332** 
(0.125) 
 0.045 
(0.089) 
-0.096 
(0.146) 
 0.003 
(0.102) 
Contractual Completeness  0.089 
(0.140) 
 0.052 
(0.093) 
 0.577*** 
(0.177) 
-0.056 
(0.096) 
Continuity Expectations  0.350*** 
(0.111) 
 0.146 
(0.093) 
 0.247* 
(0.135) 
-0.050 
(0.086) 
 
Firm Size -0.374** 
(0.148) 
 0.165* 
(0.086) 
-0.050 
(0.192) 
 0.174** 
(0.077) 
Correction for self-selection (λ) -0.051 
(0.149) 
-0.076 
(0.137) 
-0.260 
(0.192) 
-0.001 
(0.160) 
N  51   79   48   79 
Adjusted R2  0.45   0.61   0.24   0.41 
Model F  9.10*** 17.85***   3.26***   8.67*** 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Table 3.1: Measurement of Variables 
Variable Description Measure Source 
Transactional Attributes 
TYPE Type of outsourcing 
initiative 
Ordinal variable in decreasing order of maturity 
of the outsourcing market is one of:  
1. Information systems outsourcing  
2. Application, network and desktop 
management 
3. Business process outsourcing and 
processing services  
IDC 
Relational Attributes 
CONTRACT Incompleteness of 
outsourcing 
contract  
Fixed price: fixed payment per billing cycle or 
per transaction per billing cycle 
Variable price: payment based on variable 
factors such as time and materials used during 
the billing cycle or improvements against key 
performance indicators or any combination of 
these factors 
IDC 
SPECIFICITY Anticipated 
coordination 
requirements of the 
outsourced function  
Anticipated interdependence based on the 
strategic rationale for outsourcing the given 
business function. The outsourcing literature 
points to eight rationales that cover the 
spectrum of outsourcing logics: 
1. Reduction of costs 
2. Improve management focus on core 
competences  
3. Access to competitive capabilities not 
available in-house 
4. Growth strategy 
5. Speed to market 
6. Access to new markets 
7. Proximity to customers 
8. Business transformation 
The rationales were assessed from the IDC 
description of the outsourcing initiative and the 
public announcement of the initiative. 
IDC 
TRUST Mutual trust 
inferred based on 
prior cooperative 
association 
between the firms 
We infer trust based on the bid type, which is 
one of competitive, incumbent or sole sourced. 
Competitive bidding suggests the absence of 
prior association between the firms. Incumbent 
bidding implies that the outsourcing firm has 
an existing relationship with the provider. A 
sole-sourced contract means that the provider 
is the only provider of the outsourced function. 
The outsourcing firm may enter into sole-
source negotiations with an incumbent in 
which case the bid type is recorded as 
incumbent.  
IDC 
CONTINUITY Expectation of 
continuity of the 
outsourcing 
relationship 
Length of the contract in months IDC 
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Firm Attributes 
UNCERTAINTY Uncertainty in 
business 
requirements of the 
outsourcing firm 
Variance in the outsourcing firm’s return on 
assets (RoA) over the three years prior to the 
contract effective year. RoA is defined as the 
ratio of operating income to total assets. 
Compustat 
STRIMP Strategic 
importance of the 
outsourcing 
initiative 
Ratio of contract value to operating expenses. 
Operating expenses is defined as the sum of 
cost of goods sold, sales and administrative 
expenses, and depreciation and amortization 
expenses 
IDC, 
Compustat 
EXP Outsourcing 
experience of the 
firm 
  
SIZE Market value of 
equity of the 
outsourcing firm 
Market value of equity, defined as the product 
of the number of shares outstanding and 
market price 
Compustat 
BTM Book to market 
ratio of the 
outsourcing firm 
Ratio of book value of equity to market value of 
equity of the outsourcing firm 
Compustat 
CASH Short-term cash 
needs of the 
outsourcing firm 
Cash and cash equivalents as a ratio of net 
sales 
Compustat 
MKTLEV Market leverage of 
the outsourcing firm 
Ratio of total debt (debt in current liabilities 
plus long-term debt) to total market value of 
firm (market value of equity plus total assets 
minus book value of equity) 
Compustat 
BKLEV Book leverage of 
the outsourcing firm 
Ratio of total debt (debt in current liabilities 
plus long-term debt) to total assets 
Compustat 
OPEX Operating 
expenses of the 
outsourcing firm 
Total of cost of goods sold and selling, general 
and administrative expenses as a ratio of net 
sales 
Compustat 
OPTIONS Incentive created 
by CEO stock 
options 
Black-Scholes value of all new options 
awarded to the outsourcing firm’s CEO as a 
percent of total CEO compensation 
S&P’s 
ExecuComp 
COMP Annual pay as a 
percent of total 
compensation  
Salary, bonus, and other annual compensation 
as a percent of total compensation (excluding 
option grants) 
S&P’s 
ExecuComp 
PRIOROP_PERF Prior operational 
performance 
Operating income as a percent of total assets 
as of the year prior to implementation of the 
outsourcing contract 
Compustat 
PRIORFIN_PERF Prior financial 
performance 
Buy and hold returns for the three year period 
preceding implementation of the outsourcing 
contract 
CRSP 
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Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics of Outsourcing Announcements, 1996 – 2005 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms across primary SIC codes 
 IS Outsourcing BPO and 
Processing 
Services 
Application, 
Network and 
Desktop 
Management 
All Deals 
SIC Sector Number % of all 
deals 
Number % of 
all 
deals 
Number % of 
all 
deals 
Number % of 
all 
deals 
0 Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fishing 
0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 100% 
1 Mining and 
Construction 
0 0% 0 0% 1 100% 1 100% 
2 Manufacturing 10 56% 5 28% 3 17% 18 100% 
3 Manufacturing 16 55% 8 28% 5 17% 29 100% 
4 Transportation, 
Communications, 
Electric, Gas, and 
Sanitary Services 
10 53% 4 21% 5 26% 19 100% 
5 Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
3 60% 2 40% 0 0% 5 100% 
6 Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
10 43% 8 35% 5 22% 23 100% 
7 Lodging and 
Entertainment 
4 80% 0 0% 1 20% 5 100% 
8 Services 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 100% 
9 Public Administration 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 100% 
 All Sectors 53 53% 27 27% 20 20% 100 100% 
Panel B: Sample Characteristics of Outsourcing Initiatives 
Outsourcing Firm Characteristics 
 N Mean Median 
Market Value of Equity ($M) 100 37,331 23,802 
Market to Book Ratio 100 3.27 2.71 
Tobin’s Q 100 0.18 0.09 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 88 -0.11 -0.01 
Wealth Effects ($M) 88 -10.07 -1.41 
Contract Characteristics 
Contract Value – All Deals ($M) 100 922 563 
Contract Value – IS Outsourcing ($M) 53 1,100 645 
Contract Value – BPO and Processing Services 
($M) 
27 703 517 
Contract Value – Application, Network and Desktop 
Management ($M) 
20 747 425 
% of Annual Operating Expenses 100 1.02 0.04 
Contract Length (months) 100 93 84 
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Correlation 
with contract 
choice 
Correlation 
with 3-year 
BHAR 
Mean, fixed 
price 
portfolio (a) 
Mean, 
variable price 
portfolio (b) 
Difference 
Transactional Attributes 
TYPE  0.213**  0.086  1.368  1.758 -0.390** 
SPECIFICITY  0.314*** -0.507***  2.974  3.897 -0.923*** 
Relational Attributes 
TRUST -0.344***  0.184*  1.421  1.121  0.300*** 
CONTINUITY -0.035 -0.029 93.816 91.603  2.212 
Firm Attributes 
UNCERTAINTY  0.246** -0.358***  0.025  0.053 -0.028** 
STRIMP  0.137 -0.033  0.009  0.014 -0.005 
EXP -0.175*  0.078  3.736  2.319  1.417* 
SIZE -0.098 -0.013 39,645.49  32,054.68  7590.81 
BTM  0.204** -0.230**  0.368  0.618 -0.250** 
CASH -0.112  0.049  0.369  0.234  0.135 
MKTLEV  0.008 -0.074  0.322  0.326 -0.004 
BKLEV  0.069 -0.116  0.255  0.275 -0.020 
OPEX  0.018 -0.001  0.849  0.853 -0.004 
OPTIONS -0.060 -0.132  0.444  0.412  0.032 
COMP -0.075 -0.047  0.716  0.677  0.039 
PRIOROP_PERF  0.208** -0.101  0.103  0.134 -0.031** 
PRIORFIN_PERF -0.135 -0.023  1.585  1.382  0.203 
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Table 3.4: Long-Run Returns following Outsourcing Announcements 
Panel A: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Returns (%) – Full Sample 
 Raw Return (in percent) BHAR (in percent) – Ind/ Size/ BTM 
Adjusted 
 All 
Contracts 
Fixed 
Price 
Variable 
Price 
All 
Contracts 
Fixed 
Price 
Variable 
Price 
N 100 30 70 100 30  70 
Mean 32.21*** 48.41*** 21.51*** -6.15 17.45** -21.17* 
Median 29.44*** 43.29*** 20.81***  0.93 17.63** -12.41 
t-statistic   6.02   5.20   3.55  0.69   1.94    1.62 
Bootstrapped p-
value 
      
Panel A: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Returns (%) – Three Year Sample 
 Raw Return (in percent) BHAR (in percent) – Ind/ Size/ BTM 
Adjusted 
 All 
Contracts 
Fixed 
Price 
Variable 
Price 
All 
Contracts 
Fixed 
Price 
Variable 
Price 
N 64 28 36  64 28 36 
Mean 27.50*** 49.08*** 12.52* -9.78 23.62** -32.68** 
Median 19.58*** 43.29***   5.36  3.20 26.52** -12.56 
t-statistic   3.78   3.79   1.64  0.86   2.07    1.98 
Bootstrapped p-
value 
      
Panel C: Calendar-Time Portfolios:   
tthtsftmtmftpt HMLSMBRRRR εβββα +++−+=− )(
 
 α  βm βs βh R-Squared 
All Contracts (N=100)   0.20 
 [0.96] 
 1.282*** 
[20.84] 
-0.246*** 
[-3.52] 
0.624*** 
[7.43] 
0.78 
Implied 3-year AR (%)   7.46 
Fixed Price Contracts 
(N=29) 
  1.10*** 
 [3.04] 
 1.150*** 
[13.11] 
-0.414*** 
[-4.77] 
0.357*** 
[3.50] 
0.65 
Implied 3-year AR (%)  48.27*** 
Variable Price Contracts 
(N=66) 
 -0.30 
[-1.06] 
 1.286*** 
[17.74] 
-0.097 
[-1.07] 
0.806*** 
[7.18] 
0.71 
Implied 3-year AR (%) -10.26 
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Table 3.5: Changes in median industry-adjusted operating performance of user firms 
Specification Year -1 to 
+1 
Year -1 to 
+2 
Year -1 to +3 
Changes in median industry-adjusted sales efficiency 
Fixed Price Contracts 51.14*** 67.92*** 95.19** 
Variable Price Contracts 40.84*** 49.16*** 57.63** 
Changes in median industry-adjusted income efficiency 
Fixed Price Contracts 10.72* 16.26** 15.45* 
Variable Price Contracts  5.10   8.37*   9.48* 
     *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 3.6: Model of Choice of Contractual Structure 
Variable Model I 
(Probit) 
Model II 
(GEE) 
Model III 
(Heckman Probit) 
Process Attributes 
TYPE  0.562***  0.568***  0.464** 
Relational Attributes 
SPECIFICITY  0.346*  0.361*  0.334* 
PRIOR -0.409** -0.408** -0.373** 
CONTINUITY -0.004  0.000  0.018 
Firm Attributes 
UNCERTAINTY  0.511***  0.525**  0.563*** 
STRIMP  0.240  0.198  0.389 
EXP -0.357*** -0.348* -0.486*** 
SIZE -0.105 -0.113 -0.031 
BTM  0.927***  0.941**  0.956* 
CASH -0.672 -0.731 -0.689 
OPEX -0.600 -0.657 -0.484 
PRIOROP_PERF  0.286  0.283  0.199 
 
CONSTANT  0.503**  0.503*  0.793** 
Pseudo R-Square  0.37   
Log likelihood -39.34  -106.90 
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Table 3.7: Model of Decision to Outsource 
Variable Model I 
Firm Attributes 
UNCERTAINTY  0.147 
STRIMP -0.450* 
EXP  0.978* 
SIZE  0.110 
BTM  0.126 
CASH -0.002 
OPEX  0.371 
PRIOROP_PERF  0.531* 
PRIORMKT_PERF  0.133 
MKTLEV  0.743** 
BKLEV -0.448 
OPTIONS -0.274* 
COMP -0.040 
 
CONSTANT  0.497* 
 
Pseudo R-Square   0.26 
Log likelihood -69.10 
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Table 3.8: Model of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 Clustered 
by firm 
and time 
Clustered 
by firm 
and time 
Clustered 
by firm 
and time 
Clustered 
by firm 
Clustered 
by time 
Random 
Effect 
CONTRACT -0.602** 
(0.297) 
  0.167 
(0.233) 
 0.167 
(0.284) 
 0.167 
(0.240) 
-0.079 
TYPE  -0.014 
(0.089) 
-0.206 
(0.159) 
-0.206 
(0.177) 
-0.206 
(0.158) 
-0.058 
SPECIFICITY  -0.454** 
(0.195) 
-0.688** 
(0.280) 
-0.688*** 
(0.237) 
-0.688** 
(0.279) 
-0.617*** 
PRIOR   0.074 
(0.106) 
 0.239 
(0.151) 
 0.239* 
(0.133) 
 0.239* 
(0.151) 
 0.112 
CONTINUITY  -0.081 
(0.078) 
 0.037 
(0.074) 
 0.037 
(0.127) 
 0.037 
(0069) 
 0.058 
UNCERTAINTY  -0.302** 
(0.115) 
-0.352** 
(0.137) 
-0.352** 
(0.170) 
-0.352** 
(0.136) 
-0.372*** 
STRIMP   0.505* 
(0.260) 
 0.422 
(0.255) 
 0.423 
(0.305) 
 0.423 
(0.264) 
 0.611* 
EXP   0.093 
(0.059) 
 0.237* 
(0.141) 
 0.237 
(0.145) 
 0.237 
(0.141) 
 0.404** 
PRIOROP_PERF  -0.010 
(0.100) 
-0.085 
(0.123) 
-0.085 
(0.119) 
-0.085 
(0.124) 
-0.109 
PRIORFIN_PERF  -0.147 
(0.091) 
-0.034 
(0.120) 
-0.034 
(0.157) 
-0.034 
(0.115) 
-0.089 
∆Income 
Efficiency 
 0.232** 
(0.109) 
 0.270* 
(0.146) 
 0.245 
(0.160) 
 0.245 
(0.152) 
 0.245 
(0.147) 
 0.051 
IMR1 - 
Outsourcing 
 0.097 
(0.117) 
  0.078 
(0.161) 
 0.078 
(0.241) 
 0.078 
(0.190) 
 0.072 
IMR2 - Contract  0.310 
(0.196) 
 -0.380* 
(0.205) 
-0.380* 
(0.215) 
-0.380* 
(0.199) 
-0.235 
Adjusted R2  0.10 0.33  0.36  0.36  0.36  0.36 
 
143 
 
Table 3.9: The Moderating Effect of Contextual Characteristics on Contractual Completeness 
 Panel A: Three Year BHAR – Full Sample 
 Lowest Quartile Highest Quartile 
 Fixed 
Price 
(a) 
Var Price 
(b) 
Difference 
(a-b) 
Fixed 
Price 
(a) 
Var Price 
(b) 
Difference 
(a-b) 
UNCERTAINTY  0.461  0.511 -0.050 -0.069 -0.694  0.625 
SPECIFICITY  0.377  0.401 -0.024  0.149 -0.828  0.977* 
PRIOR  0.150 -0.268  0.418**  0.207  0.246 -0.039 
EXP  0.271 -0.479  0.750*  0.047  0.204 -0.157 
 
Panel B: Three Year BHAR – Three Year Sample 
 Lowest Quartile Highest Quartile 
 Fixed 
Price 
(a) 
Var Price 
(b) 
Difference 
(a-b) 
Fixed 
Price 
(a) 
Var Price 
(b) 
Difference 
(a-b) 
UNCERTAINTY  0.464  0.499 -0.035  0.010 -0.828  0.838* 
SPECIFICITY  0.316  0.348 -0.032  0.247 -0.866  1.113* 
PRIOR  0.123 -0.384  0.507**  0.277  0.404 -0.127 
EXP  0.517 -0.667  1.184**  0.131  0.190 -0.060 
 
 
  
Table 3.10: Pre-Announcement Period Returns 
Panel A: Calendar-Time Portfolios (Months -12 through -1) 
 
 α  βm βs βh R-Squared 
All Contracts (N=100)  0.10 
 [0.31] 
 1.086*** 
[11.42] 
-0.027*** 
[-0.28] 
0.605*** 
[5.70] 
0.60 
Fixed Price Contracts 
(N=29) 
-0.30 
[-0.39] 
 1.171*** 
 [7.73] 
-0.011 
[-0.08] 
0.765*** 
[4.11] 
0.35 
Variable Price Contracts 
(N=66) 
-0.10 
[-0.24] 
 1.085*** 
[10.94] 
 0.013 
 [0.12] 
0.668*** 
[4.99] 
0.52 
Panel B: Buy-and-Hold Returns Prior to the Outsourcing Announcement 
(Month -24 through Month -1, in %) 
 Raw Return (in percent) BHAR (in percent) – Ind/ Size/ BM 
Adjusted 
 Full 
Sample 
Fixed 
Price 
Variable 
Price 
Full Sample Fixed Price Variable 
Price 
N   100    30    70 100   30   70 
Mean  27.9***  27.0***  28.3*** -9.4 -12.2 -8.3 
Median  24.1***  29.5***  21.0*** -5.8 -12.1 -0.9 
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